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ABSTRACT 
SHADOWS OVER GOSHEN: PLAIN WHITES, 
PROGRESSIVES AND PATERNALISM IN THE DEPRESSION SOUTH 
by 
Fred C. Smith 
This dissertation is about poverty and rural Southerners and the beginnings of 
America's rational assault on poverty. By 1932, a sense of emergency and 
desperation permeated American economic and political thinking. The apparent 
collapse of the industrial economy and credit markets created an environment in 
which politicians allowed and the public demanded bold experimentation. The 
period, 1933-1937, in which most of America approved or tolerated progressive 
notions, offered an opportunity for progressives to demonstrate their solutions to 
persistent southern poverty. 
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH), an agency of the 
Department of Interior, created communities that combined subsistence gardening 
with part-time wage work. The Resettlement Administration (RA) developed the 
New Deal's most progressive efforts to cure southern poverty, entire towns populated 
by subsistence yeoman farmers. However, other progressives, especially liberal 
churchmen and the Socialist Party of America envisioned a more radical solution for 
rural southern poverty. 
This study of three communitarian projects reveals that the clients of those 
communities, representing the lower and lower middle class, were intensely 
concerned with mamtaining or achieving a specific class status. A subordinate thesis 
ii 
of this dissertation, evidenced by the words of the clients, suggests that the 
dispossessed (for whatever reasons) rural Southerners made a distinction between 
"poor whites" and "plain whites." All of the clients of the communities in this study 
were poor; not all of them were plain. "Plain whites," as employed in this study, 
refers to poor rural southerners without access to financial or political power. Three 
projects typify the approach by progressive liberals of the 1930s. Success for all 
three projects would be determined, in large part, by the willingness of their clients to 
forego voluntarily some of the privileges and rights associated with American 
individualism. In all three projects success depended on the economic cooperation of 
the clients. The Tupelo Homesteads were designed to meet the requirements of a 
"pleasure economy" and a radically different manufacturing world. Dyess Colony 
was an attempt to create in flesh and blood what had often been an American myth, a 
robust class of independent and disinterested yeoman farmers. Delta Cooperative 
Farm was supposed to give the means of production to the people and to turn the 
hearts of man to God. To say, categorically, that these projects failed is to ignore the 
primary purpose of experimentation. 
All three projects promised dignity, self-determination, and refuge for those at 
the bottom of the economic pyramid. Activists associated with New Deal in general 
and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads, Works Progress Administration, Resettlement Administration, and Farm 
Security Administration in particular encouraged their clients to be satisfied with 
subsistence. The Socialist Party of America joined with a coterie of liberal 
churchmen and promised social and economic justice and control of the means of 
i i i 
production. Despite the powerful influence of such notables as Rexford G. Tugwell, 
M. L. Wilson, Lawrence Westbrook, Harry Hopkins, Sherwood Eddy, and most 
famously, Reinhold Niebuhr, the clients refused to abandon their notions of dignity 
and their aspirations to upward mobility. 
Arguably, the greatest benefit from experimentation is falsification of theory. 
Two of the experiments, Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony were certain to be 
failures from the very beginning. The failure of Delta Cooperative Farm was self-
inflicted by its liberal leaders. The various "wars" on poverty since the Great 
Depression have been shaped, in part, by the first attempts of liberal progressives to 
take advantage of the crises and opportunities of the Great Depression. 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mrs. Joe Alexander was not satisfied that the application blank she had just 
completed was sufficient. The blanks asked only for the stark facts relative to her 
family's shame; there was no provision for explaining the exceptional circumstances that 
had caused the family to fall from respectability to poverty. In her mind, at least, poverty 
and respectability were, with some exceptions, mutually exclusive. The application 
blanks were stark and sterile; there was no place to explain how and why they had fallen 
into poverty. Her letter of 8 October 1934 endeavored to give Mr. Dyess "a few facts" 
and to demonstrate - in a way that facts derived from blanks could not - that her family 
deserved a place at Arkansas Colonization Project No. 1. Her letter is interesting, if for 
no other reason, because it reveals that the Alexander family had experienced almost 
every one of the depression-era phenomena that characterized rural southern families.1 
According to the almost embarrassingly transparent revelations in her letter, the 
Alexander family had survived the boll weevil and the Delta floods of 1912-1913. 
They had struggled by until the cotton boom in 1916 brought them a crop big enough and 
rich enough to pay off their old debts. In the years between the "overflows" and the 1916 
cotton crop the Alexanders had been forced to accept furnish and financing from the local 
furnishing merchant/cotton factor. Several times since their marriage in 1910, they had 
deposited significant sums in the Blytheville bank. Beginning with 160 acres of Delta 
land in Mississippi County, Arkansas, bequeathed by her father, they owned a succession 
1
 Letter to William R. Dyess from Mrs. Joe Alexander, Blytheville, AR, 8 October 1934, 
in the University of Arkansas Special Collections, Works Progress Ad^ninistration File, 
MS UN3, hereinafter "WPA Administration File." Colonization Project No. 1. was 
renamed Dyess Colony in Honor of its chief founder, William R. Dyess. 
of farms, always upgrading their property and banking the profits. In the process of 
buying and selling they spent one crop year as tenants on a large plantation near Osceola, 
for them a satisfactory year. They had three industrious non-drinking boys; the oldest 
was twenty-three and still living at home. Their twenty-year-old son was "working his 
way through college on football," and their seventeen-year old was a graduating senior in 
high school. They had an ample work force. The family had, in one year, raised and sold 
756 Rhode Island Red chicks and the family had always kept at least two Jersey cows for 
domestic and commercial use. Malaria and the desire to move the boys closer to a town 
school motivated their move to Blytheville. The Alexander family was a fine example of 
small farmers, of southern yeomanry.2 
Just as the family sold its latest farm, banked the proceeds from its sale, and was 
"about to invest in a farm close enough to town for the boys to attend the city schools," 
the bank failed. The savings of twenty-eight years of hard work and frugality had 
vanished. For the past four years, Joe Alexander had worked less than sixteen weeks a 
year at the rate of $18.00 a week. After narrating these facts, the now penniless 
Alexander, in her letter neatly summarized the family's embarrassed condition, "So you 
see we cannot save any money for future needs." No doubt, Mrs. Alexander thought that 
the series of "exceptional circumstances" would somehow differentiate her family from 
others seeking the same kind of opportunity. It did not. Accounts of the boll weevil, 
floods, drought, tenancy, ruinous prices, ill-health, and diminishing agricultural 
opportunities were ubiquitous in the letters of desperate southerners to the "government 
men" that ran the huge relief/rehabilitation efforts of the New Deal. The Alexander 
2
 Ibid. 
3 
experiences were so common that the family was an almost perfect physical 
manifestation of the rural southern stereotype. They were living cliches. Indeed, in 
comparison to other letters of the same genre, there is nothing noteworthy or remarkable 
in the family's circumstances. There was ample justification for FDR's assertion that 
they, and thousands of others for whom the Andersons were stereotypical, constituted 
"America's number one economic problem." 
In 1933, Americans were still generous and compassionate toward the deserving 
and working poor. Americans were also near despair. The combination of native 
compassion, desperation, and the thaumaturgy of newly elected President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt created a social and political environment that encouraged, even demanded, 
bold experimentation. The FDR administration fulfilled the new President's pledge to 
"take action and take action now." The New Deal that emerged from the confluence of 
despair, compassion, and politics was, despite the characterization of many commentators 
and scholars, not solely given over to liberal or progressive experimentation. The New 
Deal was, necessarily, Janus-faced. The dominant policy makers within the Agricultural 
3
 Ibid. "WPA Management File" contains over 300 similar letters. Other letters of the 
same genre are located in Record Group 69, National Archives and Records 
Administration II (NARAII), WPA Central Office Records, hereinafter "WPA Central 
Office Records," and in Record Group 96, Box 182, NARA II, hereinafter RG 96. 
"Government men" is a term that appears often in the letters from applicants. Clients 
most often used the term to designate administrators and managers of the various 
relief/rehabilitation efforts. The term "boss" also used in this dissertation appears in the 
letters and most often refers to project supervisors and social workers. The terms 
"government men" and "bosses" are terms ubiquitous in the letters of those seeking 
information or positions. Writers used "Government men" to designate relief and project 
administrators; the term "boss" is, likewise, applied to clerical personnel, social workers, 
etc. For New Deal archival sources, for example see: Letters, budgets, etc, WPA 
Administrative File, UM3 Series 1, Box 4, Folder 3, Special Collections, University of 
Arkansas Libraries. 
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Adjustment Administration, created by the Agricultural Adjustment Act (both AAA), and 
particularly the Cotton Section of that agency, ensured that policies satisfied the sole 
purpose of supporting and mamtaining the economic health and social dominance of 
large agricultural producers, even when such policies inflicted devastating wounds to the 
majority of southern cotton growers. The progressive and liberal elements of the New 
Deal recognized the economic necessity and embraced the moral imperative to relieve, 
rehabilitate, and redeem poverty-stricken southern agrarians. From that source and via a 
succession of New Deal agencies, liberals created within the vast New Deal rural 
rehabilitation and relief efforts over 100 communities in which the government offered an 
opportunity for carefully selected participants. The Tupelo Homesteads, engendered by 
the slightly less progressive first New Deal (1933-1935), and Dyess Colony operated 
under notions propagated by policy makers of the more progressive second New Deal 
(1935-1939), are two of the three communities under consideration in this dissertation. 
Some of the same phenomena that created an environment tolerant of and 
conducive to bold experimentation within FDR's administration pricked the souls and 
consciences (and perhaps, the political avarice) of a progressive coalition positioned far 
to the left of the liberals in the New Deal. Liberal and progressive professional 
Christians, ostensibly under the intellectual and moral tutelage of, arguably, America's 
most famous contemporary intellectual, Reinhold Niebuhr, joined forces with the 
Socialist Party of America and its agents to create the most radical and bold experiment 
ever conducted on behalf of America's least powerful, most destitute, and thoroughly 
terrified citizens, southern sharecroppers. That experiment, The Delta Cooperative Farm, 
5 
near Hill House, Mississippi, completes the trio of agrarian communities under 
consideration. 
Sometimes cliches are harmless and even useful. Such is the case of the Joe 
Alexander family with regard to the vicissitudes experienced by cotton growers in the 
depression-era South. Most often, however, thoughtless cliches are socially acceptable 
ways of expressing disdain or contempt. Writers H.L. Mencken and Erskine Caldwell, 
purveyors of gratuitous ridicule and slander, conducted wholesale character assassination 
to the approval of a large portion of the American reading public, and thus perverted the 
image of millions of American Southerners, black and white.4 
As non-satisfying, unproductive, and degrading as are the polemics of Mencken 
and the rancid caricatures of Caldwell, perhaps even a greater obstacle to understanding 
and analysis of America's number one economic problem comes from people of 
progressive notions and vibrant compassion. James Agee and Walker Evans, to great 
acclaim and praise from high places, introduced a more nuanced and sympathetic image 
of rural southern agrarians. Unlike Caldwell and Mencken, Let Us Now Praise Famous 
Men is subject to the constraints imposed by good scholarship and common decency. It 
speaks well of American society that many chose and choose to view the subjects with 
compassion and generosity. However, such right-minded thinking and compassion also 
has, in some cases, added to the impedimenta obscuring contemporary views of the 
4
 Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (New York: Grosett and Dunlap, 1932), passim. For a 
representative sample of Mencken's work see: Charles Angoff and H.L. Mencken, "The 
Worst American State," American Mercury, 24 (1931), 1-16,175-88, 355-71, and 
anything he wrote about the Scopes Trial from Dayton, Tennessee in 1925. For a 
scholarly and objective account of that trial see, Edward J. Larsen, Summer for the Gods, 
The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 199$), passim. 
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realities of destitute southern agrarians of the depression. As a consequence of good, if 
limited, scholarship and the attendant desire to show respect and give dignity to this 
population, certain cliches and stereotypes have emerged that are even more injurious to 
understanding and analysis. It is these other cliches and stereotypes, propagated for the 
most part by people of right minds and good hearts that serves as the fulcrum for the 
thesis of this dissertation. The southern agrarian victims of the depressions are often 
portrayed as innocent, heroic, noble, and helpless. They were, according to that 
perspective, foils, and objects only of the designs and actions of their elite bosses. 
Consideration of the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and Delta Cooperative Farm 
allows that some of them were noble and heroic; they were not without options and they 
were not powerless. They made calculated and considered choices; certainly not all of 
them were innocent. 
The conditions of southern sharecroppers and hardscrabble cotton farmers and the 
opportunity and choices presented in the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and Delta 
Cooperative Farm is somewhat analogous to the Children of Israel and the Land of 
Goshen. About 3,000 years ago, the "Land of Goshen" was a place of refuge for the 
Children of Israel, a place where they could escape the imminent starvation that faced 
them. In the "best of the land of Egypt," they could prosper under the benevolent 
paternalism of Brother Joseph and the Pharaoh. Their God promised to nourish and 
protect them and the Pharaoh would supply furnish for a flat twenty percent of the crop -
"on fifths" as a Delta cropper might phrase it. All three of the communities provided a 
twentieth century parallel to the Land of Goshen, each of them offered a place of refuge 
and a chance to achieve a life, if not of surfeit, at least of subsistence. The twentieth 
7 
century Goshens at Tupelo, Dyess, and Hill House held at least one attribute in common 
with the Egyptian model, "every form of refuge has its price."5 
This dissertation argues that the clients of the three progressive depression-era 
communities, although weak in economic and political power, abused by the elite and 
their institutions, and oppressed in spirit and fearful of their futures were not mere foils; 
they did not abandon their right and obligation to consider, judge, and act within the 
limits that their circumstances allowed. The menu of choices available to the clients was 
limited, but all the clients had choices and they exercised choices, and bore the 
consequences, good and bad, of those choices. In the end, this study explores the 
beginnings of the Federal government's rational assault on poverty. By 1932, a sense of 
emergency and desperation permeated American economic and political thinking. The 
apparent collapse of the industrial economy and credit markets created an environment in 
which politicians allowed and the public demanded bold experimentation. The relatively 
brief period, 1933-1937, in which most of America approved or tolerated progressive 
notions, offered an opportunity for progressive experimentation. The various "wars" on 
poverty since the Great Depression have been shaped, in part, by the first attempts of 
liberal progressives to take advantage of the crises and opportunities of the Great 
Depression. 
Works of Paul Conkin and Donald Holley form the historiographical base for this 
study. Conkin's masterful and authoritative Tomorrow A New World is a necessarily 
brief administrative history of one hundred such New Deal communities. The scope of 
5
 Glenn Frye and Don Henley, "Lying Eyes," One of These Nights, Asylum Records 
Benchmark Music/Kicking Bear Music, ASCAP, 1975. 
8 
that work did not allow Conkin to consider individual communities from the perspective 
of their clients, nor did his study consider efforts outside the New Deal. Donald Holley's 
Uncle Sam's Farmers focuses more sharply on the creation, management, and 
administration of Region VI (Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana) of the Resettlement 
Administration (RA). Holley gives significant attention to Dyess Colony but he, like 
Conkin, does not include a view from the clients. Uncle Sam's Farmers gives brief 
administrative information concerning the Interior Department's Division of Subsistence 
Housing (DSH) and in that exercise mentions the Tupelo Homesteads and highlights the 
brief history of its sister project, The Eleanor Roosevelt (McComb, Mississippi) 
Homesteads.6 
There exists very little published scholarship on the Tupelo Homesteads and the 
Delta Cooperative Farm. The paucity of published material on The Tupelo Homesteads 
and the Delta Cooperative Farm combined with the broad and "top-down" view of the 
scholarship of Conkin and Holley leaves room for consideration of these projects. 
"Shadows Over Goshen" takes a more intimate look at these communities and pays 
attention to the clients and their attitudes and actions.7 
Each of the three communities drew its clients from the strata of lower and lower-
middle class whites. In two of the communities, theorists chose the clientele with 
specific and assumed class differentiation as a primary qualifier. One project, Delta 
6
 Paul W. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1959). Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers: The New Deal 
in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975). 
7
 Fred C. Smith, "The Tupelo Homesteads: New Deal Agrarian Experimentation," 
Journal of Mississippi History, 68, (2), (Summer 2006): 85-112. For a more complete 
bibliography, see Chapter 6, footnote 7. 
9 
Cooperative Farm, did not select clients; the dispossessed came because they had no 
other choice. 
Three depression-spawned communities, whether a part of or estranged from the 
larger community, were products, to some degree, of the history of that larger 
community. Even the one community that became an immediate town with an instant 
history, Dyess Colony, drew on reservoirs of shared but sometimes divergent cultural 
preferences and social mores. In two cases, Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm, 
the peculiar economic and cultural constraints imposed by the Delta required that the 
clients produce cotton. In the other community, the Tupelo Homesteads, the lack of such 
crop and organization imperatives hastened the end of the experiment. The Tupelo 
community was a product of the First New Deal; Dyess Colony, technically organized 
under the aegis of the "first" New Deal, reorganized and operated under the "second" 
New Deal. Delta Cooperative Farm, the last and most romantic-radical of all, was the 
issue of the union of the Socialists and churchmen. 
At Tupelo, according to historian Donald Holley, Mississippi's best example of a 
New South city, lower middle-class whites who were providentially and temporarily in 
straightened circumstances due to forces mostly beyond their control were invited to 
place a portion of their personal sovereignty on the altar of cooperation as sacrifice in 
exchange for a lower middle-class, life-long indenture. The New Deal offered middle-
class white folks a chance to own a subsistence homestead.8 
At Dyess, Arkansas, the Second New Deal offered a slightly reduced reward for 
those who were willing to trade a measure of independence and a generous helping of 
Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 54. 
10 
deference for the security of life-long subsistence yeomanry. The Second New Deal 
included in its objectives rehabilitation of the dispossessed, not merely their relief. The 
$4.8 billion appropriation that funded the Works Progress Administration (WPA) also 
funded, and by Executive Order established, a dedicated assault on rural poverty, the 
Resettlement Administration (RA). The typical Colonist at the Dyess Colony, according 
to the preferences of Second New Deal bosses, was demonstrably lower class - preferably 
of the upper lower class. The "blanks" or forms used by the government men that 
granted entrance to the colony endeavored to ensure that Dyess Colonists be among the 
very best of the failures. If a prospective family survived the winnowing of blanks and 
government men, they were assumed to be of a cooperative spirit. Dyess Colony offered 
failed farmers a chance to own a subsistence farm. 
At Delta Cooperative Farm, the alliance of Christians and Socialists received 
those that would come; those who did were the most abjectly poor and terrified white and 
black people in the country. The sacrifice demanded of the Cooperators was more 
sacrificial; taxes and oblations are always most severe for the very poor. 
The larger canvass - the more enthralling and problematic observation - is that of 
the people who were the Homesteaders, the Colonists, the Cooperators. About 18 million 
people lived in the non-urban South; of those 5.5 million whites and almost 3 million 
African Americans cultivated someone else's land — mostly cotton land. Fully one-half 
of the Southern farmers were tenant farmers; half of those tenants were sharecroppers. 
This dissertation has the main eye on the dispossessed whites of the South. In literature 
they are ignored, for the most part, in favor of white elites and black sharecroppers; they 
11 
are almost invisible in the scholarly literature of the 1920s. Such literary attention as they 
receive portrays them as degraded, pitiful, and amoral.9 
Not all of the South's dispossessed whites were tenants, or even farmers. Some 
who became tenants and cultivators as a function of the depression that began at least as 
early as 1920 cultivated cotton or truck patches because it was their only option. Some 
college educated, technically trained, and socially adept whites lost their middle-class 
status with the disappearance of their middle-class jobs. While each community sought 
to alleviate the depression in the lives of a distinct class strata and despite (sometimes) 
wildly differing notions of governance and economic philosophy, they had some 
attributes in common. All drew from a resume of progressive ideas, the most applicable 
coming from the robust transfer of notions that Daniel T. Rogers has labeled, famously, 
Atlantic Crossings. All three projects made agriculture their economic centerpiece, and 
all three demanded "cooperation" or "cooperative spirit" as the primary qualifier for 
inclusion. There were, of course, significant differences. All Homesteaders, Colonists, 
and Cooperators bargained under the heavy duress of the Great Depression; their rescuers 
applied a gentle and subtle duress in order to induce, cajole, convince the Homesteaders, 
Colonists, and Cooperators to cooperate and prove the validity of the particular strain of 
gospel preached by the bosses. 
Chapter I is a consideration of the confluence of geography, society, and culture. 
Chapter II identifies the strands of progressive social thought and economic theory and 
the speculation that provided foundations for all three projects. Chapter III treats the 
9
 Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 7-8; Paul E. Mertz, New 
Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1978), 5-8; 
12 
subsistence homesteads and the Homesteaders at Tupelo. Chapter IV examines the 
construction and politics of Dyess Colony; Chapter V examines life at Dyess and the 
choices available and those taken by the Colonists. Chapter VI is the story of America's 
most radical and, perhaps, most promising of all the communitarian efforts. Chapter VII 
is conclusion and application. 
13 
CHAPTER I 
AMERICAN GOSHEN 
You shall dwell in the land of Goshen... 
Also, do not be concerned for your goods, for the best of the land of 
Egypt is yours... 
And at harvest you shall give a fifth to Pharaoh and four-fifths shall be 
your own... 
And Joseph made it a statute concerning the land of Egypt valid to this 
day, that Pharaoh should have the fifth... Genesis 45:10; 23-26 circa 
2500 B.C.E. 
The alluvial plain is, in an agricultural respect, one of the most 
important formations ...in all the southern states; nay, more than that, 
even in the United States. ...it is still a wilderness; the prejudice of its 
unfitness for cultivation has only lately subsided, and the axe of the 
wood-man scarcely begun its ravages; but after the lapse of another 
century, whatever the Delta of the Nile may have been, will only be a 
shadow of what the alluvial plain of the Mississippi will then be. It will 
be the central point—the garden spot of the North American continent -
where wealth and prosperity culminate. E.N. Lowe, Mississippi State 
Geologist, 1857.1 
By Inauguration Day 1933, the American agricultural depression was twelve 
years old. The continuing decline of agricultural prices and the concentration of land into 
ever-larger units of production, the absence of a robust foreign market, the tariff-
enhanced high prices for manufactured goods, the diluted political power of about half of 
the rural white populace, and the practical absence of it among blacks posed peculiar 
difficulties for the New Deal. Added to the fundamental economic problems, the 
American mentalite of the 1920s had embraced the euphoria induced by prosperity. 
Flappers, corporate welfare, roaring industrial production, time-purchase contracts, and 
'Quoted: Robert L. Brandfon, Cotton Kingdom of the New South: A History of the Yazoo 
Mississippi Delta from Reconstruction to the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967): 29. 
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the coronation of business and businessmen had coalesced into a Modern Temper, the 
"jazz age." By 4 March 1933, the United States had crossed that ill-defined psycho-
economic line that separated recurring American depressions or "panics" from a "Great" 
one. By winter of 1932-33, the United States had crossed into an era of economic and 
industrial malaise in which it seemed that market forces had abandoned the application of 
the "unseen hand" of market and industrial rationality. President Herbert Hoover had 
been remarkably aggressive, innovative, and daring in his attempt to assuage what had 
become a worldwide conundrum. He had also been remarkably ineffective. The 
distinction between "depression" and the Great Depression was not one of mere 
semantics. 2 
The realization that the depression of 1930 was no ordinary panic and that the 
self-correcting attributes of modern capitalism showed little signs of applying a 
correction goaded President Hoover into applying aggressive and unparalleled 
government action. In spite of Hoover's fairly radical departure from economic 
convention, Americans used his name as a mocking, bitter slogan; the depression was 
still Hoovering around, empty pockets turned inside out were Hoover flags, old 
newspapers used by park-bench sleepers were Hoover blankets. By the conventions of 
the day and in accordance with traditional Republican notions of "normalcy," Hoover 
2
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became increasingly aggressive and unorthodox as the aberrant nature of the Great 
Depression became increasingly apparent and painful. Even as President Hoover 
ratcheted up government intrusion into the economy, the Great Depression was 
accelerating. In Europe and the Far East, the economic catastrophes made the political 
economies of Germany, Italy, and Japan prone to nationalistic frenzy, military 
aggrandizement, and a quest for autarchy. The "Dark Valley" through which the world's 
people traveled resolved into world war and a decidedly more complicated world.3 
The pace of Hoover's willingness to change his mind and insert the government 
into business affairs did not keep pace with the ever-increasing realization of the extent 
and magnitude of the Great Depression. Yet, some of the notions given fuller form in 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal had their origins in Hoover; some of the 
ideas propagated by FDR were eerily similar in substance to those previously suggested 
by the Great Engineer. Not only were the skeletons of some of the more radical New 
Deal programs suggested and implemented by Hoover's administration, both men were 
prone to issue non-sense nostrums in order to create or preserve confidence and instill 
hope in the American psyche. "No one has actually starved," said Hoover, when in fact 
New York hospitals affirmed that several had died of that malady. "One hobo got three 
meals in one day," he noted, assuring Americans that things were not so bad as some 
believed. When in December 1930, the International Apple Shipper's Association 
decided to sell apples on credit to unemployed men, the now-famous depression era icon 
of apple sellers appeared on city streets. Hoover interpreted this phenomena in a most 
3
 For an excellent commentary and analysis of the magnitude and power of the depression 
worldwide, particularly its effect on society and government see: Piers Brendon, The 
Dark Valley: a Panorama of the 1930s (New York: Random House, 2000). 
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positive manner. "Many people have left their jobs for the more profitable one of selling 
apples," he said. Most notoriously, he announced that business conditions were 
fundamentally sound in the wake of the disintegration of the American credit and 
securities markets. Thaumaturgy comprised the bulk of Hoover's public pronouncements 
about the depression, its depth, and prospects of recovery; recovery only needed the 
restoration of confidence. Hoover's initiatives, many of them modified by the New Deal, 
included the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), 
and the Federal Farm Board. The New Deal modified all three of the issues; securities 
regulation, mortgage liquidity, and agricultural surpluses. Initially even President 
Roosevelt seemed to mirror Hoover's faith in orthodox economic and social theory. FDR 
promised to balance and to cut the national budget. He did that, in part, by reducing 
servicemen's pensions. It is ironic that Hoover's refusal to accommodate the Bonus 
Army and George Patton's attack on patriotic Americans, in FDR's opinion, sealed the 
1932 presidential election for him. The new President was also prone to non sense 
thaumaturgic statements. Addressing a hopeful but anxious nation, FDR told it that, "the 
only thing we have to fear is fear itself," a misstatement of facts as enormous as any that 
Hoover ever made. The difference was that the nation believed Roosevelt4 
While the 1920s roared with the hum of increasing industrial production, 
corporate profits fueled further efficiencies of production, and while much of America 
reveled in the Zeitgeist of the jazz age, the scientists and technicians associated with 
agricultural colleges, extension services, and experiment stations introduced hybrid seed, 
4
 Hoover's quotations are taken from, William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream: a 
Narrative History of American, 1932-1972 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 
26,4-43. Manchester is sharply critical of Hoover, for a contrasting view see David M. 
Kennedy, The American People in Depression and War, 43-130. 
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technology, and the scientific application of both. Just as in industry, agricultural 
production increased dramatically while the labor required to produce it fell 
precipitously. As Ogden Mills, Hoover, and Andrew Mellon presided over a spectacular 
industrial boom and the initial phases of its even more spectacular decline, agribusiness 
sought a way to restore the prosperity of American agriculture.5 
The spectacular Wall Street crash, the dramatic tales of urban fear and poverty, 
and the jeremiads of the popular press focused the attention of the nation on the Great 
Depression as an urban and business phenomenon. For twelve years southern cotton 
cultivators, tenants and small farmers, had been effectively ignored as the agricultural 
depression methodically translated the small yeoman cotton farmer into landless cotton 
cultivators. Only as the nation felt the intensity of a "great" depression did the 
dispossessed of the South command the attention of politicians and policy makers. For 
twelve years the agricultural depression had inexorably ground the expectations of the 
great majority of agricultural workers and small farmers into ephemeral hopes. Hope 
delayed, like justice, is often no hope at all. In the South, particularly in the old 
Confederate states and specifically in the cotton-South, eight million destitute and docile 
citizens, "half starved black and white" wrote Lorena Hickock, "struggle in competition 
5
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for less to eat than my dog gets at home, for the privilege of living in huts that are 
infinitely less comfortable than his kennel." 
All three of the communities in this study were born of political desperation but in 
two vastly different "cotton-south" economic environments. The Division of Subsistence 
Homesteads (DSH) located the Tupelo Homesteads in a region that embraced New South 
commerce and industry. Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm were bound both 
mentally and economically to the Delta. The region's debilitating economic dependence 
on 100-foot-deep topsoil and vulnerability to natural cataclysms moderated the limits of 
radical experimentation. This chapter introduces the two distinct geo-economic 
environments and the depression-induced desperation that allowed experimentation and 
suggested that some people should modify their economic aspirations. Two of the 
communities under consideration shared common geophysical and cultural environment; 
that environment accounted for the location of the communities. The economy and 
culture of Dyess and Delta were, in large measure, a function of a common geophysical 
environment, that of the Great American Delta. Tupelo's development was more a 
function of circumstance. 
6
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Tupelo had grown from a village prior to the Civil War into a bustling little 
regional cotton shipment center and mill-town by the 1930s. It was not particularly 
favored in terms of natural resources over any of the other villages in northeast 
Mississippi. An insignificant village at the end of the Civil War, the town grew as a 
function of its relative location, situated about halfway between Birmingham and 
Memphis and at the intersection of north-south and east-west railroads. By the onset of 
the Great Depression, Tupelo was a minor manufacturing center and cotton depot for the 
area and boasted a population of about 6,000. It owed its growth and development, 
primarily, to its strategic location. It also had powerful advocates in the U.S. Congress 
and Senate. The President depended on the support of Congressman John Rankin of 
Tupelo and Mississippi Senator Pat Harrison (Chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee) in accomplishing the New Deal legislation. Such cooperation, and an 
attempt to reward it, may account for the surprisingly robust presence of the New Deal in 
Mississippi. The New Deal came to Tupelo more emphatically, perhaps, than to any 
other Mississippi city due to the influence and prestige of Mississippians, particularly that 
of Pat Harrison. In addition to the Tupelo Homesteads, the Roosevelt administration 
established the Natchez Trace Parkway, and most famously, made Tupelo the first city 
served by the Tennessee Valley Authority. Tupelo's development was a function of 
politics and location. Northeast Mississippi was typical of much of the inland South. 
There were few grand vistas and the climate, while temperate, was neither particularly 
brutal nor particularly pleasant; it was, in the vernacular, just tolerable. The landscape 
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and conditions were moderate and unremarkable. The Tupelo Homesteaders did not have 
to contend with the Delta. The Delta was different.8 
From a geologic point of view, the Delta is new ground. The combined effects of 
time, glaciations, and the meandering Mississippi River dug a gently sloping (toward the 
south) and slightly tilted (to the east) basin. While the slope of the basin is gentle, the 
declination from the bluffs that compass the Delta - Arkansas bluffs to the west, Missouri 
bluffs to the north, and Mississippi bluffs to the east - to the basin floor is severe. For 
millennia, the Mississippi River and a few of its tributaries have been filling in that basin 
of almost 12.7 million acres; it is almost exactly the same size as the Mekong Delta of 
Vietnam.9 The area drained by the Mississippi and its principal tributaries, the Ohio and 
the Missouri, is huge - amounting to about 41 per cent of the area of the contiguous 
states. Every year the runoff from this wide area made its way to the Mississippi River. 
Just South of Cape Girardeau, the character of the Mississippi undergoes a significant 
transition. There the river broadens, slows, and begins its section of writhing, twisting, 
loops, turns, and bends; soil suitable for apples in northwest New York mingles with the 
ground that supported corn in Iowa and wheat in Kansas and Montana. It is also where 
the Delta begins.10 
8
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Memories of the terrible flood of 1927 form contemporary consciousness of 
Mississippi River flooding. Visions of pitiful, huddling masses; the efforts of an entire 
nation to provide relief; and stories of heroism, mendacity, self-sacrifice, churlishness, 
and despair remind that the river is a beast. It seems that the river lies in wait until it 
draws people and money into its maws and then wages its awesome assault on humans 
and their institutions. As recent phenomena and reactions to them suggest, contemporary 
humans are wise to be afraid of the river.11 
From the beginning it was not so. In spring, the river system began an elegant 
ballet. When rain or snow fell in prodigious amounts and under very common 
conditions, the river swelled and roared, its banks teeming and the water rolling, roiling, 
roaring, riotously tearing off sections of its bank, snapping huge trees like match sticks 
and creating whirlpools and counter-currents. As the Mississippi rose, it stalled the water 
rushing from tributaries. The Arkansas, St. Francis, and Yazoo rivers, carrying flood-
memorable definition of the Mississippi Delta as beginning " . . . in the lobby of the 
Peabody Hotel in Memphis and ends on Catfish Row in Vicksburg" by David Cohn is 
unfortunate. Cohn was hyper-provincial. He willingly ignored the, in some cases more, 
ubiquitous Delta attributes in Arkansas than in the Mississippi-Yazoo Delta; David Cohn, 
Where Iwas Born and Raised (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 12. 
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stage volumes and unable to relieve the pressure in the Mississippi River, imposed 
similar constraints on their tributaries. Thus the Coldwater, Deer Creek, Little 
Tallahatchie, L'Anguille, Big Sunflower, White, Tyronza, Bayou Bartholomew, Cache, 
Bayou DeView, Black, Ouachita, Tensas, and hundreds of their own tributary creeks and 
streams also roared and rolled, and roiled and finally, the climax! Nevertheless, these 
pre-human encroachment eruptions were mild and gentle - floodwater inexorably made 
its way to the lowest level - for the ecosystem was self-regulating. The low natural 
levees did not crash in defeat at the pressure of a tumultuous flood; they merely 
submitted to the inevitable. The flood flowed over the natural levees. The main rivers, 
especially the Mississippi, had natural floodways and alternate courses for the water. The 
rivers and streams relieved themselves by gently releasing water over the natural levees 
formed by previous floods. As the water spread and covered the basin, it slowed, and as 
it slowed, it laid deposits from the literal and ultimate "land bank" of continental 
America. The larger and heavier sediment fell first, along the borders of the stream, the 
lighter silt made its way toward the interior of the basin. When the water receded, the 
land along the banks was higher and all the earth so covered was richer. 
Moreover, the rivers moved. The Mississippi changed its channel and created 
islands and ox-bow lakes. Within the bluff-ringed basin, the river moved east - sidled 
west - and then started the whole process all over. In springtime flood, before man's 
dramatic alteration of the environment, the Delta - from its northern extent in Missouri to 
its termination in Concordia Parish, Louisiana - must have shimmered in the warm sun as 
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the rays reflected from the watery expanse, an inland sea. It may have been beautiful to 
behold; no one knows. 
Delta terrain is mirage inducing. The scoured-out basin, continually self-leveling, 
and flat as the human eye can discern, is actually quite an undulating surface. When 
rivers and streams changed their courses - as they moved laterally across the Delta - they 
left sediments behind. The heavier sediments formed the natural levees and ridge lands, 
making them quicker to dry and to produce. Unnoticed by the unaided eye, the Delta is 
laced with ribbons of embankments, old levees, and abandoned creek banks; these raised 
ribbons are arrayed parallel with the streams (or parallel with past streams), thus they run 
(mostly) southeast throughout the Delta. In that portion of the Delta west of the 
Mississippi River, the prevailing winds drove particles of loam against the barely 
perceptible ridges and levees and formed sand ridges. Thus in the midst of the low Delta 
basin one encounters oddities such as the Sikeston Ridge in Missouri. An even more 
anomalous structure, Crowley's Ridge sliced diagonally across the Delta from Missouri 
to Helena, Arkansas. Although most of the sand ridges of the Delta are located in 
Missouri and Arkansas, Dogwood Ridge extending from Coahoma to Holmes County in 
Mississippi, separates the flood plains of the Sunflower and Yazoo Rivers. This ridge, 
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two to eight miles wide, is the only place in the Delta where the dogwood tree is 
indigenous. Dogwoods are not flood tolerant and prefer well-drained soils. These 
unexpected relatively high plateaus provide visual relief to the landscape and a dollop of 
sandy loam soil different in nature to the alluvial soils of the rest of the Delta. On most 
maps, these "fingers" of ridges and plateaus are shaded to note elevation; the Arkansas 
and Missouri portions of the Delta appear to be less robust according to the shading 
marking elevation. On U.S. continental maps, typically used as background for televised 
weather reports, the physical expanse of the Great American Delta is apparent. The 
shading allocated to the sand ridges of Arkansas and Missouri makes the color demarking 
those counties less vibrant and robust.13 
Delta Development 
According to environmentalist Mikko Saikko, the subtle changes in topography 
are profound: "elevational change of a couple of inches creates distinctively different 
hydrologic conditions, soils, and biotic communities."14 The apparently flat Delta terrain 
is actually composed of a series of gently sloping valleys. In some Delta "valleys," the 
outlining parallel ridges might only be a few feet higher than the valley floor, and the 
ridges miles distant. Thus, the valleys in the inner Delta resulted in a terrain that was 
undulating, not bumpy. The valley sides, or "ridge lands," offered an advantage over the 
valley bottoms. The ridges and the sloping sides were quicker to drain and dry, thus, 
quicker to produce cotton. The soil was ineluctably rich loam and clays. In the interior 
13
 Saikku, This Delta, This Land, 26-31. 
lAIbid., 35. For a thorough and helpful discussion of the undulating character of the 
Delta, the nature of flooding, and weather patterns, and other Delta commonalities, see: 
Saikko, 23-51. 
25 
of the Delta in the low-lying areas, the flood deposited its finest granules of agricultural 
gold. In the nineteenth century, agriculturalists would call this rich lowland clay 
"buckshot"; farmers since that time have cursed and praised it. Buckshot is rich but 
aggravating. Its consistency when wet was almost like liquid paste and the mud was 
aggressive; it tried to swallow whatever came near. In the drought of late summer 
buckshot shattered into sharp-sided cracks and crevasses in the earth. One Arkansas folk-
tale involves a farmer that claimed he lost two mules in one year. One of them drowned 
in spring when he mired in the mud; the other one fell in a crack in August and had not 
been heard from since, he said.15 
Despite the hard times and financial difficulties, in the period 1890-1925, the 
Delta population increased rapidly. Some of that growth was provoked by the enticing, 
but not necessarily truthful, recruitment efforts by cotton barons.16 In December 1895, 
E.P. Skene, Land Commissioner (presumably for the Illinois Central Railroad Company) 
issued an impressive sales brochure. The company offered to sell Delta land in forty-acre 
sections for as low as $7.00 an acre, with only 20 percent down and the rest financed over 
six years at 6 percent annual interest. To make sure that prospective buyers understood 
what a chance in a lifetime this sale represented, the brochure hastened to clear up some 
misunderstandings. Mississippi Delta land was far superior in yield and profit to 
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agricultural lands in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. In Iowa, average land cost was $23.52 
per acre and each acre yielded crops worth an average of $6.85. In Illinois, the figures 
were $38.65 and $7.85 respectively; in Indiana, they were $45.66 and $8.23. The 
average land value in Mississippi was $17.21 and the average money product was $12.21 
per acre. By this ratio, said Skene, the Illinois Central Land was easily worth $50.00 per 
acre. The brochure quickly reminded that its land was located in the Yazoo Valley, an 
area far more productive than any of the state averages, and this land could be obtained 
for as little as $7.00 per acre. Skene warned that these conditions could not last. 
"Mississippi will soon double or treble its population by the addition of thrifty, 
industrious immigrants, possessed of some capital; the price of lands will then, no doubt, 
increase to something like a real value."17 
Other misinformation, thought Skene, needed correction. An Episcopal Bishop 
"proved" by census information that the Mississippi Delta was healthier than Missouri, 
Tennessee, Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Illinois, Alabama, and Colorado. 
Another Episcopalian averred, "As to malaria, that is more to be dreaded in a week on the 
1ft 
Hudson than in all our borders in a lifetime."10 If one needed wage work while starting 
his crop operations, one could easily, said Skene, acquire work in one of the many area 
sawmills. Good water was only a matter of driving a pipe about forty-five feet and the 
taxes were expected to average about seven cents per acre. However, the most important 
correction came toward the end of the brochure. "NO OVERFLOW (sic) from the 
17
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Mississippi River need ever be feared, as the levees built and maintained by the State are 
on the best approved system now known." 19 In the space of thirty-one pages Skene 
demonstrated that unless one was rich and contented, one must be an idiot to ignore a 
chance to buy the richest land in the world at an inconsequential price. 
Other efforts to promote the Delta continued throughout the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. The Southern Alluvial Land Association did not have land to sell. 
The association's purpose was to "place on these lands desirable farmers and settlers." 
In 1919, the association published its appeal for delta development. "The Call of the 
Alluvial Empire" was a state-by-state expose of the Alluvial Empire, an area almost 
exactly congruent with the Great American Delta. The Southern Alluvial Land 
Association was a bit more sober than was E. P. Skene. By 1919, most people knew that 
topsoil 100 feet deep is not necessarily a guarantee of perpetual fertility. A cotton plant's 
root system can procure nutrients only to a depth of about seven inches. However, in the 
Delta, those seven inches might be more than enough. F. D. Beneke, the association's 
secretary, addressed that issue in his contribution: 
Scientific data discloses that there is enough phosphorous in alluvial soil 
to produce more than one hundred crops of cotton, nearly one hundred 
crops of corn, and sixty to eighty years of other standard crops before 
exhausting the present supply, and this from the first seven inches of soil. 
Each succeeding inch yields sufficient additional supply for one to several 
decades, according to the kind of crops raised. The money properly spent 
for fertilizer alone on a northern farm would buy an alluvial farm.2 
19
 Ibid, 27. 
20
 "The Call of the Alluvial Empire," (Southern Alluvial Land Association: Memphis, 
TN, 1919), 3. 
21
 Ibid, 7. 
28 
Extolling the variety of commercial crops amenable to climate and soil, the association 
was also quick to disabuse people of fear of malaria or of the river. With apologies to 
T.P. Skene and his Episcopalian witnesses, there was considerably more malaria in the 
Great American Delta than there was in the Hudson River Valley. Dr. William Kraus, in 
his contribution to "The Call of the Alluvial Empire" was more measured in his report. 
Drainage had dramatically reduced the incidence of malaria. In December of 1915, there 
were 100 sick calls for malaria in Cross County, Arkansas; in December of 1916, there 
were four. Civil Engineer L.L. Hidinger was also more moderate in his comments about 
flood control, yet confident. "The levees have now been brought to a height above any 
high water that has ever occurred and their width and thickness has been increased so that 
today the levee system stands as a great earthen dam bordering each bank of the river and 
capable of holding its own against the greatest floods."22 
The development efforts of the Illinois Central Railroad and the Southern Alluvial 
Land Association were directed at middling and prosperous white folks. One of the 
testimonials in the Illinois Central brochure came from a farmer in Illinois who moved to 
the Delta. He bought 1,540 acres for which he paid $38,500. He prospered.23 
Despite the opportunity costs, there were ways in which plain folks might make a 
place in the Delta. Desperate for labor to clear land, drain swamps, and raise cotton, 
Delta planters offered opportunities for plain folks, especially black plain folks, to own 
land. Often these acquisitive and commercially minded plain blacks sought areas close to 
un-improved acreage. They were often able to obtain title to acreage by swapping their 
22
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labor to the landlord in exchange for un-improved land. By 1910, blacks owned about 
two-thirds of the farms in the Mississippi Delta; the improved acreage in those farms was 
rniniscule. 
Until the advent of the war-induced agricultural depression of the 1920s, plain 
whites, for the most part, did not try to farm the Delta. They were and remained a 
distinct minority. The depression revealed some of the horrible conditions and 
impossible obstacles to attaining yeoman status in the South. In the course of the 
agricultural depression and the Great Depression that succeeded it, Americans were urged 
to adopt aspirations foreign to American ideology. Things changed rapidly after 1930, 
conditions, ideas, and policies that were mysterious and vague to Delta cotton cultivators, 
black and white, controlled and defined their lives. Pressures they did not understand and 
forces over which they had no control increasingly determined the economic fate of the 
plain whites of the Delta. 
The New Deal came to the New South before it came to the cotton south. M.L. 
Wilson's notion of subsistence gardening as a necessary component of income in support 
a middle-class lifestyle, promised to remove the sting of reduced industrial wages. The 
best and most orthodox of Wilson's decidedly unorthodox notions, the most successful of 
any of the 100 New Deal agrarian communities, was in the Mississippi hill country about 
six miles from Tupelo, Mississippi. 
CHAPTER II 
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER REVISTED - THE SEARCH 
FOR A NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER 
"Wearing away the prime of life in a country that can boast as many evils as hell 
itself." Cousin to James Franklin Smith1 
"But there are lots of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of them is 
having the assurance of a competence, of a sufficient living, of a good life and good 
neighbors. You boys have a mighty fine chance at that assured life." FDR, May 
19342 
In a paper presented to the American Historical Association in 1893, Frederick 
Jackson Turner proclaimed the end of a definite era of American History; the American 
frontier, he said, was closed. Parts of the Great American Delta were isolated and almost 
as remote, in practical terms, as were areas noted for their frontier isolation. In the spring 
of 1878, twelve years before the Superintendent of the Census revealed the data upon 
which Turner built his thesis, James Franklin Smith of Coffeeville, MS, received a 
remarkable letter. The letter was from his cousin who lived on a new farm along the Big 
Sunflower River, about forty miles distant as the crow flies and the author offers 
powerful testimony about the frontier isolation. "Cousin" complained of the lack of 
society and conveniences. Living only about fifty miles from the Mississippi River, 
Cousin found the conditions in the interior of the Delta as lonely and dangerous as those 
confronting settlers on the western frontier. Despite such pockets of frontier-like 
1
 Letter addressed to "Dear Cousin," dated March 28,1878, Leigh's Landing, MS. The 
letter is in possession of Dr. James W. Smith, Greenville, MS; copy retained by author. 
James Franklin Smith's own plantation now lies in the middle of Grenada Lake, itself a 
legacy of Great American Delta flood control. 
2
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Vol. 2, Year of Crises (New York: Random House, 1938), 320. 
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isolation within the heartland, the frontier, said Turner, was closed and no longer 
provided the safety valve and social opportunities that had formed the American 
character. American society, his thesis implied, had to find new mechanisms for 
•a 
controlling and channeling excess people, energy, and ambitions. 
The superintendent of the 1890 census noted that he could no longer find a 
continuous line beyond which the population decreased to fewer than two per square 
mile. Turner considered that fact and from it developed his widely known, often debated, 
but influential frontier tittesis. Turner wrote, "The existence of an area of free land, its 
continuous recession, and the advances of American settlement westward explain 
American development." According to Turner, it was to the frontier that the American 
intellect, " . . . owes its striking characteristics That coarseness and strength combined 
with acuteness and acquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find 
expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to 
effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for 
good and for evil, and with all that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom 
- these are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the frontier." 
In the 1920s and 1930s, economists, policy makers, and politicians saw evidence that the 
economy of the United States indeed faced limits imposed by the disappearing frontier of 
American industrial consumerism.4 
3
 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, (New York: Holt, 
RMnehart, and Winston, 1920). Mary Hamilton, Trials of the Earth: The Autobiography 
of Mary Hamilton, Helen Davis Dick, ed., forward by Ellen Douglas, (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1992): passim. 
4
 Ibid. 
While some New Deal policy makers and activists sought to rationalize American 
agriculture, others suggested modifications to traditional American notions of industrial 
productivity and personal economic aspirations. As economists struggled with defining 
parity and planning for an altered world-economy, many Americans began to reconsider 
"back to the land" notions. Such willingness to modify and to reconsider were products 
of the depression. Further justification for use of "great" to designate the depression 
beginning in 1929 is the first consideration of this chapter. 
In the decade 1919-1929, without an increase in the work force, industrial 
productivity rose by over 100 percent; real income rose a comparatively scant twenty-two 
percent. Industrialists struggled to find markets for the output of increasingly productive 
facilities, while the work force producing this abundance, through the seduction of 
advertising and the advent of time-purchase contracts, reached the limits of consumerism. 
Soft demand for industrial goods actuated a severe reduction in employment and 
dramatically reduced wages. In 1929, industrial wages in the United States averaged $25 
($294) a week; by 1932 the average weekly industrial wage had fallen to $17 ($250). 
Fully one fourth of the national work force was unemployed in 1932, and the heavily 
industrial Midwest and Northeast experienced unemployment pockets as high as 90 
percent.5 
5
 The figure in parentheses are the 2006 equivalent of the immediately preceding figure. 
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), 179-180. Industrial production increased from an index of 58 in 
1921 to 110 in 1929 (1933-39 = 100). Leuchtenburg gives an insightful overview for the 
reasons for this productivity: Taylorism; the replacement of steam engines with electric 
motors; advertising induced consumerism; and other innovations. Roger Biles, A New 
Deal for the American People (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), 11. 
The figures in parentheses are equivalent present value figures. 
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Scholarly investigation of the Great Depression necessarily involves the 
consideration of income and prices. Because of inflation, monetary policy, and myriad 
other factors, a vast differential exists between the purchasing power of the 1933 dollar 
and that of the twenty-first century. Consequently, repeated references to depression era 
dollars often present problems in analysis. First, such references obscure the degree of 
disparity that existed among different levels of wealth and poverty. For example, a $400 
differential in 1933 is equivalent to a $6,222 differential in 2006 real dollars. A 
difference in income of $6,222 per year among families in the sixty to seventy thousand 
dollar range is significant but hardly catastrophic. A $400 differential among farm 
families in 1933 meant that one family lived in poverty while the other enjoyed middle 
class status. Secondly, the very degree of poverty or wealth is often understated by use of 
depression era dollars as a means of comparison. The scholarly literature on the Great 
Depression is filled with references to five-cent cotton and family incomes of $200 per 
year. Such repeated references can easily induce a familiarity that, in itself, serves to 
diminish appreciation of psychological, social, and political pressures. Familiarity with 
the paucity of prices received and paid by the dispossessed is offset by a parallel in 
consideration of the payments received by big time producers. As part of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) crop reduction campaign of 1933, the 
Delta Pine and Land Company headquartered in Scott, Mississippi, received $114,800. 
In 2006 dollars, this rich government dole translates to almost $1.8 million. To illustrate 
this largess another way, consider: the 1933 AAA payment was large enough to purchase 
seven farms the size of the one established at the Delta Cooperative Farm.6 
6
 James C. Cobb, The Most Southern Place on Earth: The Mississippi Delta and the Roots 
of Regional Identity, Cambridge: (Oxford University Press, 1992), 192-193. 
34 
Industrialists looked longingly toward those foreign markets that had proven so 
lucrative in the Great War and immediately thereafter. Unfortunately, for them, 
revitalization of war-torn industries in Europe and the economic nationalism of 
worldwide tariff policy served to close the foreign economic frontier for American 
industries. Europe, still America's largest trading partner, no longer provided an all-
consuming market for excess American production. 
As the factories produced goods that Americans could neither consume at home 
nor sell abroad, the mining industries also produced a surplus in search of a new frontier. 
In 1923, U.S. coal concerns operated 9,331 commercial mines with an annual capacity of 
970 million tons. The United States consumed its largest yearly amount of coal at the 
height of World War 1-579 million tons. No market and no frontier demanded the 
excesses of coal and other minerals produced by American mining productivity.8 
Not only were American manufactures and extractions looking for a home, 
agricultural products also needed a market. The "pull" of profitable wartime 
opportunities and government inducements had resulted in a dramatic increase in 
agricultural production. Farmers had brought marginal land into production, applied 
technology with fertilizer, and taken advantage of the prices influenced by European war-
related shortages. The price of cotton, for example, had risen from thirteen-cents a pound 
in 1913 to thirty-eight cents a pound in 1919.9 
7
 Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 179-180; Biles, A New Deal, 10-12. 
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 The mining production figures are taken from: Phillip M. Glick, "The Federal 
Subsistence Homesteads," Yale Law Journal, 44 (June 1935): 1325. 
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 Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 100-02. 
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Agricultural prices and incomes had decreased dramatically at the beginning of 
the 1920s. The World War had imposed artificiality on the development of American 
agriculture as American farmers greatly expanded production in order to meet wartime 
demands of home and Allies. Between 1914 and 1919, wheat acreage increased from 
about 48 million to over 75 million acres. With increased production and higher prices, 
the cotton crop of 1919 brought a record $2 billion and gross farm income that year 
reached $17 billion. Overall, with notable exceptions, particularly among the cotton 
cultivators, farmers enjoyed a fairly comfortable existence during the five year halcyon 
period.10 
Conditions for agriculture changed quickly. By 1920, much earlier than for 
manufacturing or mining, the loss of markets and the lack of a new economic frontier 
clearly revealed that farmers produced more than the market could sustain. In the years 
1919 -1929, the price of wheat fell from $2.19 a bushel to $1.04. Farm income fell from 
16 % of national income in 1919 to 11.5 % by 1925, to 5.8 % in 1933. Farm cash 
incomes fell from an aggregate of $10.3 billion in 1929, to $4.2 billion by 1933, a 60% 
decline. By 1933, the average per capita net income for southern farmers, owners 
included, ranged from a low of $89 in the black belt to $127 in the coastal plain. The per 
capita income for Mississippians, for example, fell to $117. Few of the tenant farmers of 
Arkansas and Mississippi had received any cash income since 1921. American policy 
10
 John D. Black, Parity, Parity, Parity (Cambridge: The Harvard Committee on 
Research in the Social Sciences, 1942), 4-5,45; Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the 
Fight for Farm Parity (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 8,9-10; Bureau of 
the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, V, Agriculture, 1920 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1922), 514. The census reveals that in the Midwest almost 
fifty percent of farmers owned motorized vehicles and almost seventy percent had 
telephones. 
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makers and politicians did not use Turner's language of the closed frontier to describe the 
economic landscape of the 1930s; many attributed difficulties to the vicissitudes of a 
mature economy.11 
Pre-New Deal Efforts to "Adjust" Agriculture 
United States creditors curtailed loans to Europe at the end of the war, resulting in 
lost markets for basic agricultural products. Between 1919 and 1922, the value of U.S. 
agricultural exports declined by more than half, from $4.1 billion to $1.8 billion. The 
U.S. tariff policy further compounded the problems for American agriculture. Following 
accepted protectionist economic policy, the Republican-controlled Congress raised tariffs 
on imports, which further reduced the ability of foreign nations to pay for American 
agricultural exports while protecting American industrial production from competition. 
While foreign markets diminished, grains and meat from South America and Canada 
entered the world market in significant quantities. The U.S. Government withdrew 
agricultural wartime price supports in 1919-1920; when prices began to fall in 1920, no 
mechanism existed to cushion the shock.12 
As early as 1920, the farm bloc, a group of Congressmen unofficially led by 
Republican Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, voiced support for some sort of 
price-equalization machinery. One Iowan explained to Norris that Congress ought to 
nIbid.; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1933. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1934), 556-570. Roger D. Mertz, New Deal Policy and Southern Rural Poverty 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 9. 
12
 Fite, George N. Peek, 9-10; Gene Smiley, The American Economy in the Twentieth 
Century (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1944), 14-40; George F. 
Warren and Frank A. Pearson, Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1933), 39-62; 
Black, 85-89. 
guarantee farmers, "a reasonable profit, and fair return on everything they produced." A 
Des Moines lawyer urged Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace to "see to it that 
minimum prices were set at the cost of production plus a fair profit." 
In the winter of 1922, Wallace convened a conference concerning the 
maladjustment of agricultural and industrial prices. George N. Peek, president of the 
Moline Plow Company and later an official under New Deal Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace, suggested that a "fair exchange value" be placed on agricultural 
products. Peek defined "fair exchange value," a term translated into popular jargon as 
"parity," as "one which bears the same ratio to the current general price index as a ten-
year average crop price bore to the average price index for the same period." In 1922, 
wheat sold for $1.02 a bushel; according to Peek's calculations, the "fair exchange value" 
or "parity" price would be $1.60 a bushel.14 
Peek's calculations represented a synthesis of the 1922 general price index of 152 
and an agricultural price index of 97. The agricultural price index came from USDA 
Bulletin 999, Prices of Farm Products in the United States by George F. Warren. 
Concurrently with USDA Bulletin 999, the Department of Agriculture commenced 
publication of a power index series in Weather, Crops, and Markets. Utilizing a 
synthesis of Warren, Peek, and Weather, Crops, and Markets, USDA economists chose 
13
 James E. Boyle, Farm Relief: A Brief on the McNary-Haugen Plan (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1928), 15. 
14
 Ibid. Black, Parity, 45-47 
38 
the average of prices paid and received during the years 1910-1914 as the baseline, or 
100.15 
Using this new statistical tool, representatives from agricultural states attempted 
to fix farm markets by legislation. The McNary-Haugen Bill, first introduced in 1923, 
represented an attempt to adjust agricultural pricing by using direct governmental 
interference in the market as a "normalizing" influence. In some ways, the McNary-
Haugen Bill of 1923 foreshadowed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Both 
measures offered relief in terms of surplus reduction, loans, and price insurance, and both 
attracted the support of the liberal/progressive elements of Congress and the vacillating 
support of farm-state conservatives. Both plans benefited prosperous and middle-class 
farm interests at the expense of tenants and agricultural laborers. 
One principal difference was the manner in which the legislation proposed to 
treat the agricultural surplus. The McNary-Haugen Bill proposed to establish a parity 
price in the U.S. market by "dumping" the surplus abroad. The government would 
purchase all agricultural production in excess of that which insured a domestic parity 
price. In turn, the government would sell this surplus on the international market at 
whatever price it brought. The differential between what the government paid and 
15Black, Ibid.; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural 
Parity: Historical Review and Alternative Calculations, Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 671, by Lloyd D. Teingen (New York: Economic Research Service, 1987), 3. 
Professor George F. Warren of Cornell did yeoman work in assembling the database. He 
also convinced FDR to buy gold in order, theoretically, to raise prices. The President's 
gold buying plan was very informal. At breakfast once a week FDR would determine the 
price the U.S. Government would pay for a stated quantity of newly mined domestic 
gold. The measure was, as the great majority of economists warned at the time, 
ineffective. The only appreciable commodity price increase was that of gold; it reached 
$35.00 an ounce in 1934 at the program's conclusion. Gold had demanded $20.65 an 
ounce at the programs beginning. 
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received was to be recovered by imposing an equalization fee on producers. The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act proposed to reduce the amount of surplus by invoking a 
domestic allotment plan. While the Agricultural Adjustment Act reduced the surplus by 
controlling production, McNary-Haugen allowed unabated production. The McNary-
Haugen Bill met defeat in three consecutive congresses before it passed and twice fell to 
President Calvin Coolidge's veto.16 
Deep South legislators gave McNary-Haugen tepid support, at best, throughout its 
life. Although they represented agricultural states, they also represented, above all, the 
interests of prosperous agrarians. Even in the midst of deepening financial distress 
experienced by a majority of their constituents, they remained conservative Democrats. 
Unmoved by the progressivism of Republican Senators Robert La Follette of Wisconsin 
or George Norris of Nebraska, they focused primarily on reducing tariffs and 
safeguarding the well-being of commercial farmers. In 1933, FDR called for the support 
and leadership of these southern representatives but found that the deepening economic 
crises moved them only to lukewarm and temporary support for New Deal initiatives. 
They still championed the cause of the prosperous and middle-class farmer at the expense 
of the dispossessed cotton cultivators and their views eventually dominated the goals and 
methods of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 
As Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed office in March 1933, amidst a wholesale 
and universally acknowledged depression, there already existed concepts and tools 
designed to rectify the imbalance in the relationship between agricultural and industrial 
prices. The phrase "mature economy" became a sort of verbal shorthand for the 
economic implications of Turner's closed frontier thesis. Specifically, conservatives 
16
 Boyle, Farm Relief, 29. 
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promoted the "confidence thesis," and New Dealers argued the validity of the 
"purchasing power thesis." New Dealers and progressives argued that the government 
had to replace the opportunities and stimuli for growth formerly provided by the frontier. 
The new economic frontier, they believed, lay in the area of increased consumerism 
prompted by a higher standard of living characterized by Columbia professor and "Brains 
Truster" Rexford G. Tugwell as a "pleasure economy." Mal-distribution of wealth, 
disparity in buying power between industrial and agricultural workers, and irrational land 
usage sprang directly from the closing of foreign markets, the saturation of the American 
consumer, and the absence of the promise of radical new consumer oriented technology, 
1*7 
m short, the fruits of a closed frontier. 
In the course of the debate, policy makers explored both derivatives and 
negations of the closed frontier thesis. Herbert Hoover saw the promise of a new 
economic frontier in the thaumaturgic contributions of science and engineering, an 
articulation of the confidence thesis. He believed that capital needed only the tools and 
products promised by an unrestrained application of science and technology. He found 
allies. At the center of one New Deal agency, the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), two Mississippi cotton barons designed the programs that 
inflicted devastating oppression on the nation's cotton cultivators. Oscar Goodbar 
17An excellent, but relatively brief, summary of the positions of New Dealers, 
Progressives, radicals, and conservatives relative to the "mature economy thesis" is found 
in: Theodore Rosenof, "Understanding the Crash," in Major Problems in American 
History, 1920-1945, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999). 
193-200. A fuller treatment, and the work from which this essay is derived, is available in 
Rosenof s, Dogma, Depression, and the New Deal: The Debate of Political Leaders Over 
Economic Recovery (Port Washington, NY: National University Publications, Kennikat 
Press, 1975). 
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Johnston, manager of Delta Pine and Land Company, and Cully Alton Cobb, agricultural 
publisher and one-time Deputy Director of the Mississippi State Agricultural Extension 
Service, ensured that the AAA worked to rationalize cotton production to the benefit of 
• 1 0 
large planters and to some members of the American Farm Bureau Federation. 
The term "parity" and the notion of rationalization of agricultural prices became 
part and parcel of the New Deal's farm policy. By 1933, politicians and policy makers 
subsumed the technical nature of the statistical term "parity" into a politically correct and 
virtuous sounding aspiration. Politicians and government bureaucrats used the term to 
sell the notion of justice, fairness, and equity. The American people believed in all three 
- provided that the imposition of such cost nothing. "Parity" cost a lot and it did not 
impose justice, fairness, or equity.19 
Back to the Land - Notions of Community 
Commonly held assumptions concerning the superiority of country life and the 
societal benefits of communal living formed part of the intellectual background to the 
Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and the Delta Cooperative Farm. In spite of a 
18
 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society 
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1980), 122,141-142; Mertz, New Deal Policy, 
111-112,218; Donald H. Grubbs, Cry From the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers' 
Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 159-
60; Lawrence J. Nelson, King Cotton's Advocate: Oscar G. Johnston and the New Deal, 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999); Roy V. Scott and J. G. Shoalmire, 
The Public Career of Cully A. Cobb: A Study in Agricultural Leadership (Jackson: 
College and University Press of Mississippi, 1973); The Farm Bureau was able to 
increase its membership by huge numbers with the advent of the AAA production 
contracts. Thousands of sharecroppers were intimidated or tricked into paying dues to 
the AFB A, an organization diametrically opposed to programs that benefited 
sharecroppers. 
"Government subsidies to agricultural interests have been an increasingly large part of 
the Federal Budget since the AAA's programs were inaugurated in 1933. 
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transition from frontier subsistence survival to urban-centered market capitalism, 
American ideology retained an articulated preference for the character and values that 
necessarily come from the country. Benjamin Franklin held that as societies aged they 
became corrupt. To Franklin, an urban and industrialized society marked full maturity 
and the apex of corruption; according to Franklin, maturation was prelude to destruction. 
Thomas Jefferson believed that a virtuous society required a dominant class of un-
encumbered yeoman farmers. These yeoman farmers, Jefferson thought, were — alone of 
all classes - able to act and govern according to the dictates of a free and disinterested 
conscience; wage laborers would necessarily be bound by the political, social, and moral 
preferences of employers. President Theodore Roosevelt added enthusiasm for outdoor 
and rural life, manifested by the Country Life Movement. In 1933, President Franklin 
Roosevelt echoed the same sentiments in attributing to country life both the benefits of 
peace of mind and the opportunity to gain a "competence." In August of 1933, in an 
impromptu speech to residents of a vocational farm for boys, FDR articulated part of his 
notions: 
More and more people are discovering that if they go to 
live on a farm they will never starve to death, while they 
may if they remain in the city. Of course, in the city they 
have a chance of becoming milUonaires. But there are lots 
of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of 
them is having the assurance of a competence, of a 
sufficient living, of a good life and good neighbors. You 
boys have a mighty fine chance at that assured life.20 
20
 An excellent, but brief, view of Franklin's notions and, to some extent, those of 
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Indeed, American politicians often invoked the hope-laden properties of the 
yeoman farmer mythology. In 1936, after demonstrating a decided animosity toward 
thousands of evicted sharecroppers, Arkansas Governor Junius Marion Futrell opened the 
newly-created Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission with a statement of faith in farm life. 
Farm ownership, he said, "will give our country more real protection against foreign 
invasion and conquest than the expenditures of millions on our armies and navies." Fully 
concurring with those sentiments, the Commission responded, "Farming is a special 
pursuit fundamentally different from all others . . . a way of life all its o w n . . . Farm-
home ownership is definitely related to character and patriotism. It is conducive to high 
character and good citizenship . . . America will not be a great nation by the end of the 
century unless she preserves a healthy rural life."21 
Politicians and policy makers of the depression years considered benefits accruing 
to individual farm owners less important than the preservation of American agricultural 
capitalism. Private ownership precluded evicted sharecroppers and destitute hardscrabble 
farmers from joining the ranks of leftist movements. According to the then current 
doctrine, "no property owner could become a Communist." The Farm Security 
Administration (FSA), stepparent to the Tupelo Homesteads, gained the support of 
otherwise conservative politicians who believed that a government-sponsored program of 
small farm ownership diminished the attractiveness and, thus, the effectiveness of such 
groups as the Communist-led Sharecroppers Union and the Southern Tenant Farmers' 
21
 The quotes, ellipses included, are taken directly from Donald H. Grubbs, Cry From the 
Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1971), 128. 
Union, an adjunct of the Socialist Party of America (SPA). Indeed, the legislation that 
established the Farm Security Administration (FSA, 1937) also prohibited government 
sponsorship or cooperation with any future community or collective/cooperative projects. 
Notions of cooperative farming distressed large commercial interests and alarmed the 
potentially prosperous clientele represented by the American Farm Bureau. Even the 
radical Midwest farm interests, represented by such groups as the National Farmers' 
Union and the Farm Holiday Association, which encouraged federal management of 
agricultural pricing, maintained a rigid orthodoxy relative to individual farm ownership. 
Traditional American farm interests saw communal, cooperative, or collective farm 
experiments as a challenge to their prosperity and posterity. Landowning farmers prized 
their independence and they saw collective agriculture as a threat to mamtaining such 
independence.22 
Nevertheless, prior to the complete dominance of the market over the subsistence 
economy and before the closing of the frontier deprived un-landed farmers of 
opportunity, some Americans had already embraced the notions of communal efforts, 
communities, cooperatives, and collectives. Agriculture had often, but not always, been 
the focus of such movements. 
Communities included particular religious, ethical, or ethnic preferences. In the 
1820s, '30s, and '40s, communitarians established dozens of communities throughout the 
United States stretching from New England to Utah. Motivations for removal and 
community sprang from such disparate sources as revolt against the slave-like working 
conditions extant in English-style New England textile factories to the discovery of 
golden tablets at Hill Cumorah in New York. The movement continued throughout the 
22
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nineteenth and into the twentieth century. In addition to the Mormon settlement in Utah, 
one which M.L. Wilson studied with great interest, in 1892 the Jewish Agricultural and 
Industrial Aid Society (Jewish Agricultural Society) established a community in 
Woodbine, New Jersey, remarkably similar to ones later constructed by the New Deal 
some four decades later. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), known popularly 
as "Wobblies," experimented with collective farming, adding a twentieth-century element 
to the agrarian socialist experimentation of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier. 
Interestingly, very few communitarian projects were established for economic or basic 
subsistence reasons. Most communities were formed in an attempt to provide a tolerant 
atmosphere for experimentation in human relationships or for millennial considerations.23 
Meanwhile, the government also periodically expressed its interest in private 
agriculture by enacting several land acquisition programs. The Land Act (1820), the 
Preemption Act (1841), the Homestead Act (1862), and the Farm Loan Act (1916) were 
all efforts to ease land hunger. The consistent removal of Native Americans from 
vouchsafed land was further testament to the government's pragmatic response to white 
land-acquisitiveness. 
Given the history of Americans' fascination with agrarian experimentation 
evidenced by the various communities and government land disposition policies, it is 
easy to understand how the ravages of the Great Depression served to make more 
seductive than ever notions of "back to the land." In 1932, for the first and only time in 
23
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American history, population movement favored the country over the city. Rural 
population growth exceeded that of urban growth by more than 266,000. This change in 
population velocity, admittedly very small, nevertheless, was an indication of the power 
of the notion. For some people, "back to the land" was verbal shorthand for romanticized 
visions of rural life. For city dwellers, the nostalgic meditations on clean air, unhurried 
life, simple pleasures, and self-determination built a place of mental refuge amidst the 
crumbling economic infrastructure of the city. Many prodigals returned to the rural areas 
of their youth and found that the imagined and incorrectly remembered benefits of 
country life no longer existed, or that their memories omitted some of the basic reasons 
for having left the country in the first place.24 
Progressive Notions of Cooperation -Atlantic Crossings 
Daniel T. Rodgers, in his masterful study of the transference of social politics 
among North Atlantic progressives via Atlantic Crossings, says that U.S. progressives 
were slow to consider the problem of American agriculture: 
Old forms of poverty never interested progressives as much as the new 
domain of wage labor, old forms of trade as much as the outward rush of 
market commodification, old forms of production as much as the new 
world of concentrated force and massed economic power. The diffuse and 
tradition-bound populations of the great rural hinterlands did not, in the 
first instance, draw their attention at all.25 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century Grange, Agricultural Wheel, and the 
Farmer's Alliance in the U.S. were manifestations of the "Atlantic Crossings" of 
24
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progressive notions. Although turn of the century progressives were, as a group, slow 
and moderate in their pursuit of rural reforms, the example that tiny Denmark provided, 
along with the apparent redemption of Irish agriculture by means of cooperation and 
cooperative associations, excited American rural reformers and agrarians. In 1908, 
American retail mogul and only recently a California produce baron, David Luben, 
convinced the King of Italy to sponsor the first international agricultural database, Intuit 
International D 'Agriculture (International Agricultural Institute) in Rome. By 1935, 
according to the Institute, the United States still ranked number one and Texas number 
two in worldwide rankings of cotton lint production, but the United States' dominant 
position was becoming ever more tenuous. In that year the Great American Delta ranked 
only sixth in world cotton production rankings, lagging behind Egypt, India, and Peru. 
Rexford G. Tugwell, a disciple of Simon Nelson Patten of the Wharton School at 
the University of Pennsylvania, also drew heavily from the notions of his Columbia 
colleague John Dewey. Patten, a German trained economist, was decidedly hostile to 
classical economics. He told his students that they should not worry about savings, that 
they should in fact spend every penny and borrow in order to spend more. Possibly his 
advice was meant for the shock value, but it contained a slice of what would later be 
labeled "Keynesian economics." Patten was probably emphasizing the point that a 
continuous circulation and growth of the money supply was central to high employment, 
26
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thus high consumption, thus a healthy economy. The pragmatism of John Dewey 
influenced bom Tugwell and Milburn L. Wilson.27 
Two adherents of the notion that the new economic frontier had to come from an 
increased standard of living, characterized by a shorter working day and the advantages 
of a pleasure economy, articulated and defended the notions that directly resulted in the 
creation of the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony. Milburn L. Wilson, an 
agricultural economist from Montana State University, and Rexford G. Tugwell believed 
in a planned economy, and especially planned land use. 
According to Tugwell, an essential component of a rationalized economy was the 
decentralization of industry. Tugwell was not enamored of subsistence gardening and 
farming; he viewed farm life as physically harmful, culturally deprived, and intellectually 
barren. He championed the rapid mechanization of agriculture and the ever diminishing 
labor required. Tugwell called for planned land use as part of the girders for erecting 
what his mentor, Simon Patten, had labeled a "pleasure economy." The aggregate wealth 
of the world was sufficient, if properly distributed and managed, to provide an economy 
bereft of egregiously distasteful and laborious tasks; the pleasure economy envisioned by 
Patten and Tugwell sharply reduced time required to earn a comfortable livelihood. 
People would be free to devote their increased personal time to community and personal 
development. Creation of the pleasure economy required a few prerequisite changes in 
the political economy. Complete transparency in terms of markets and resources must 
govern economic decisions. Companies and institutions would share information and 
27
 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 318-366; Paul W. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 86, 
121,146-52,164-165,295, 328-329; David M. Kennedy, Over Here, 120-121,141-142; 
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many of the restrictions governing the operation of monopolies would be discarded. A 
rational economy, one that provided dignified and pleasurable economic pursuits to 
everyone, required planning. Planning, to Tugwell and his colleagues did not mean 
simple orderliness in the application of resources to tasks. Planning in this economic 
sense meant that the entire inventory of the world's assets be employed by economic 
technicians with access to a comprehensive knowledge of total resources, both physical 
and human, and the authority to install mandatory macroeconomic procedures governing 
the global economy and its markets. It was decidedly irrational in Tugwell's view, for 
example, for a radio manufacturer to schedule production for a factory without first 
knowing the size of the market and the resources and intentions of his competitors. Such 
application of resources by sheer instinct to meet a market demand, shrouded in mystery 
and subject to disruption by competition, was tantamount to betting against the house. 
Irrational economic behavior resulted in surpluses and shortages, roaring industrial 
production and factories in mothballs; irrational capitalism allowed and even predestined 
depressions.29 
Tugwell did not expect that the world wide "pleasure economy" would become a 
reality within the foreseeable future. The Columbia professor believed that mankind was 
unable to accept the realities necessary for a pleasure economy; the changes would not be 
accepted, they would have to be mandated. People must experience the benefits of 
economic and social cooperation in order to be willing to sacrifice that degree of personal 
autonomy necessary for a cooperative society. He saw no indication that the world's 
various political entities were willing to place their economic systems, and thus, their 
29
 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 318-366; Stershner, Rexford Tugwell, 11-16; 370-395; 
David Hamilton, New Day, 181-183; 216-236. 
community and society, at the disposal of a few planners. Tugwell s system was 
necessarily socialistic, and equally as necessarily non-Marxist People would never 
cooperate to the extent necessary; they would have to be coerced. 
There were some prerequisites to forming a pleasure economy that 
contemporaries would accept. His application of Columbia colleague John Dewey's 
philosophy of pragmatism allowed Tugwell to accept and use programs that would have 
been disowned by the managers of a pleasure economy. Tugwell believed that 
decentralization of industries would remove many of the problems associated with the 
densely populated urban industrial centers. By moving industrial production to smaller 
communities, workers living on plots large enough to establish gardening and some 
animal husbandry would be able to bridge the income gap caused by reduced hours. 
Subsistence gardening or farming became analogous to one of the theses in classic 
Marxist dialectics. It would serve a utilitarian purpose until its antithesis was called into 
existence. The Homestead subsistence gardening projects, the subsistence farm projects 
of the state Rural Rehabilitation Corporations, Dyess Colony, and the entirety of the 
Resettlement Administration program were, in Tugwell's view, practical concessions 
demanded by the spirit of the age and the mind of the times. Dyess Colony, the Tupelo 
Homesteads and the Resettlement Administration were exercises in the application of 
pragmatism. The Great Depression opened a brief window for experimentation. How far 
could the mentalite of the Great Depression accommodate prerequisites for a pleasure 
economy? Perhaps the Colonists at Dyess, the Resettlement clients of the RA, and the 
Tupelo Homesteaders might provide useful sociological data for future planning. 
Tugwell was adamant that willingness and skill in cooperating were mandatory 
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prerequisites for further rational economic planning. He was equally sure that that 
contemporary people would not willingly cooperate; cooperation must be induced, 
coerced. It would come only with the application of duress. 
Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony were laboratories wherein to test the 
resistance to cooperation. Oddly, Delta Cooperative Farm emphasized cooperation more 
emphatically and was less sensitive to personal dignity than did either of the New Deal 
communities. The Christians and the socialists, it seemed, held a lower notion of the 
dignity of man than did the New Dealers. 
M.L. Wilson was not as convinced as Tugwell that the future course of the 
American economy would require a reduced workday, nor was he confident that the 
economic nationalism in vogue as a response to the depression was a permanent 
alteration. He did believe that American agriculture suffered from decidedly irrational 
land usage and that subsistence agriculture was a likely cure to shrinking incomes and 
inadequate diets. M.L. Wilson was devoted to subsistence gardening and subsistence 
farms, and enamored of rural life. 31 
Pragmatism held, among many other notions, that one should plan and alter 
institutions and mores to fit the circumstances at hand. MX. Wilson adhered to this 
notion of pragmatism but added to it a rather strong insistence that the pragmatic actions 
and policies designed to fit the contemporary political economy could not and should not 
be mandated or heavily influenced by governmental or institutional authorities. Wilson 
30
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believed that the benefits of alterations in policies and institutions should be explained to 
the public. Institution of such changes had to gain not only the approval of the majority, 
but required their active involvement. Wilson was a pragmatist, an advocate of 
pragmatic planning, but he was above all a democrat. He was leery of the possible 
restriction of liberty as a function of planning. He insisted that American society: 
Is capable of producing a kind of supergovernmental (sic) economic and 
social intelligence which (sic) can function in harmony with our 
democratic heritage and attitude of mind.32 
Wilson came into conflict with Interior Secretary Harold Ickes over this very issue. 
Wilson designed the construction procedures of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
(DSH) to use local and democratic control. Ickes objected and was relieved when 
Comptroller General John R. McCarl mandated compliance with government mandated 
controls. Lawrence Westbrook, an assistant to Harry Hopkins in both the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration and the Works Progress Administrations, sought to 
establish cooperative manufacturing businesses in the three communities in which he 
held a consultant's position. 
The views of Wilson, Tugwell, and Westbrook, all influenced by European 
models and pragmatism are evidenced to some degree in all three of the communities in 
this study. Tugwell expected that, due to the enormous strain on city populations, 
industry would de-centralize. He expected component parts to be constructed in various 
small town or even rural locations. Westbrook believed that such decentralization was 
unlikely and he had doubts about the ability of subsistence farming or homesteading to 
32
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provide a middle-class income. M.L. Wilson was a champion of subsistence gardening 
and insistent on local and client control. Tugwell, Wilson and Westbrook felt 
cooperative associations were essential for success and the emphasis on such at Dyess 
Colony was a source of conflict and irritation throughout the colony's existence. 
The European model relied on a three-legged structure for reestablishing and 
maintaining a vibrant and prosperous country life. The application of practical education, 
good business, and community cooperation had rescued Denmark from the devastation of 
the 1870s. With the loss of her southern provinces through war and the devastation of 
grain crops because of drought, Danish farmers faced extinction. Their rescue came via 
an overlapping network of producer cooperatives. Individual small operators were able 
to profit from economic leverage and management. Cooperative cows came with a 
record of input and output; instead of being left free to graze at will, the cooperative cow 
was tethered to a carefully selected grazing area; and high quality eggs and dairy products 
provided an enviable standard of living. Much of the initial inspiration of Miles Horton's 
Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee and Commonwealth College in Mena, 
Arkansas came from the Danish Folk School Model. The successful Danish and Irish 
cooperatives served as a model for U.S. agrarian cooperatives, manifested in such diverse 
institutions as grain elevators in the mid-west and agricultural marketing cooperatives. 
By the 1930s, cooperatives marketed most of the American tobacco crop and much of the 
cotton. In the western grain and dairy regions of the United States marketing 
cooperatives enabled the mainly family-sized farm operators to gain the market power 
that comes with leverage. In California and especially in the Southeast cotton areas, agri-
business conglomerates and the cotton aristocracy dominated production. In a perversion 
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of the spirit of the European cooperative notion, in the South cotton barons formed 
marketing cooperatives consisting only of large producers. The vast majority of southern 
cotton cultivators were bereft of the benefits of cooperative education.34 
Another divide between the Northern Atlantic progressive notions and their 
continental cousins is illustrated by the concept of cooperation. In the United States, 
southern cotton barons restricted the term to economic consolidation - the power of the 
elites to magnify their economic power. In Denmark and Ireland, the notion of 
cooperation certainly included economic endeavors, but it also embraced the idea of a 
more sociable and supporting society/community. From these notions, for example, 
emerged the Llano Colony and the Highlander Folk School. In all three of the projects 
discussed herein, New Dealers, Churchmen, and Socialists sought to bring not only the 
economic benefits of producer and consumer cooperatives to Dyess and Delta 
Cooperative Farm, but also to encourage the flowing of a cooperative spirit. Such 
cooperative spirits would counteract the stark and barren social lives of rural southerners. 
The New Dealers, Churchmen, and Socialists all agreed that the single most important 
characteristic for a potential Colonist, Cooperator, or even a Homesteader - in Tupelo 
there was no common economic endeavor - was a "cooperative attitude." 
Concepts that gave birth to the Tupelo Homesteads and ideation made into 
physical reality in Dyess Colony and Delta Cooperative Farm thus did not spring 
suddenly into existence as an attempt to mitigate the Great Depression. Notions of "back 
to the land" and the advantages of community living had circulated consistently between 
34Ibid. Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 110,164,192-193,195. 
35Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 316-366. 
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the times of Jefferson and Roosevelt, and among the North Atlantic progressives. The 
communities constructed by the New Deal continued the American flirtation with "back 
to the land" ideation. 
Congressional Consistency and the Dispossessed 
At the beginning of the New Deal, FDR had little problem in gaining bipartisan 
support for legislation proposed in the first hundred days. Not surprisingly, however, one 
bill that encountered some difficulty and delay was the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The 
inability of farm interests to present a united front predated the New Deal. The McNary-
Haugen bills suffered from the conflicting notions of how to compute equalization fees. 
A wheat farmer on the very edge of the cultivable arid West thought it fair and reasonable 
to assess fees based on production; farmers in more productive areas deemed it obvious 
to assess on the basis of acreage. Wisconsin dairy farmers, dealing in highly perishable 
commodities, had altogether different concerns than those who raised cotton or corn. 
Farmers who produced mainly for export faced different problems from those who 
produced primarily for domestic consumption. Each new version of the McNary-Haugen 
bill had highlighted different provisions and benefited particular farmers at the expense of 
others. Consequently, one year's congressional proponent of the legislation became the 
next year's opponent. The farm bloc failed to achieve cohesion because of the disparate 
interests of those it represented. Significantly, however, in none of the versions did the 
bill attempt to assist tenant farmers or agricultural laborers.36 
Similarly, New Deal efforts to adjust agricultural incomes fell victim to 
particularism. Any New Deal programs that encouraged a form of farm production at 
variance with that preferred by the interests represented by the American Farm Bureau 
36
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and agribusinesses quickly faced obstacles. For example, when the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) entertained notions of land held in perpetuity by the federal 
government and leased to tenant farmers, heretofore supportive Congressmen became 
belligerent opponents. In the view of their middle-class and prosperous agricultural 
constituents, government ownership threatened both private property rights and the 
prospect of acquisition of new land, at attractive prices, from under-funded, under-
educated, under-privileged, and under-represented newly-propertied small farmers. 
Distribution of small parcels of land to individuals had always provided opportunities for 
the prosperous to accumulate large amounts of property at the expense of small operators. 
In many cases, the amount of land distributed was too small for the "diy-farming" 
techniques required in the West. It soon became apparent that agriculture in the arid west 
had to be conducted on a bonanza scale in order to be profitable. Bonanza farming 
required that the newly enfranchised have access to capital; most of them did not. Unable 
to farm enough acres to gain the economies of scale, unable to secure affordable 
financing, and suffering from discriminatory freight and storage rates, these newly-
propertied small farmers often had no choice but to sell to better financed interests. To 
avoid concentration of newly awarded lands in the hands of large agricultural interests, 
various New Deal programs attempted the sell the notion of land held in perpetuity by the 
government and farmed by qualified tenants on a life-tenancy basis. Deep-South 
Congressmen vigorously opposed such legislation. They demanded occupancy fee-
simple, which meant, of course, that any recipient of government land grants would be 
free to sell to better-financed, large land interests.37 
"Hamilton, From New Day, passim. Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 99-103; 107-108; 
112-115; 181-199. 
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Congressional support for New Deal agricultural readjustment plans also waned 
whenever such programs materially and substantially offered to assist those on the 
bottom of the agricultural ladder, specifically, farm laborers, sharecroppers and tenants. 
After all, said Arkansas Governor Futrell, you couldn't do much for "worthless people 
who can't be helped." For the most part, the terms "tenant farmer" or "sharecropper" 
were practically meaningless to the cotton cultivators of the Great American Delta. 
However, under the provisions of the 1934 AAA producer contract, the distinction 
between "sharecropper" and tenant farmer became crucial. A tenant farmer had rights to 
a portion of the spoils paid under the crop reduction contracts; a sharecropper had none. 
To garner all of the payments from the AAA, many planters manipulated the status of 
their tenant farmers to that of sharecroppers. When asked to comment on the Arkansas 
Farm Tenancy Commission, Mississippi Governor Hugh White said he did not want to 
burden the Mississippi Legislature with the issue. Mississippi, he said, did not have those 
kind of problems. 
It is interesting to note that Congress had little difficulty accepting the notion that 
farmers ought to get "parity" because it was a fair recompense for hard work. They 
"deserved" to have a certain quality of life. However, sharecroppers, said an Arkansas 
deputy sheriff, ought to be satisfied with their condition; they got what their work was 
worth.39 
Many planners and policy makers envisioned a radically altered American 
economic system and they planned for it. This chapter has examined the development of 
Arkansas Gazette, 16 August 1935. 
Mitchell, Mean Things Happening, 68. 
the American agricultural allotment plan and the economic and cultural theories that 
shaped all three of the communities under study. 
Before the programs of the AAA actuated the creation of the Delta and 
Providence Cooperative Farms, and before the FSA introduced the notion of permanent 
tenancy, a new agrarian experiment began in Tupelo, Mississippi. Oddly, this project 
sprang not from the mechanisms of the Agricultural Adjustment Act but from the 
president's initial attempt to rescue industry, the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA)ofl933. 
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CHAPTER i n 
TUPELO HOMESTEADS - A SHELTER IN THE STORM 
"But there are lots of things better than growing exceedingly rich and one of them is 
having the assurance of a competence, of a sufficient living, of a good life and good 
neighbors." FranklinD. Roosevelt1 
"I remember that during those days you couldn 't hire a decent carpenter in Tupelo, we 
had all of them working for us." David O. Puckett, Jr., Tupelo Lumber Company2 
"Mr. Anthony is, I believe, a warm blooded southerner, native to this region, and a 
firm believer in individual rights, and from his attitude I knew he resented being asked 
to stop his target practice." Claude A. Wagner, Jr., U.S. Park Service Ranger3 
The Natchez Parkway meanders for more than 400 miles from near Natchez to 
near Nashville. Along the way, travelers may stop and read about events of the 
prehistoric and frontier history of the area. Interpretative signs point out locations of a 
treaty signing by Native diplomats and immigrant warlords, a clash between Native 
American nations and European empires, or just a popular "stand." Brochures and books 
inform visitors of the age of warfare, banditry, whiskey, and murder. The dark history of 
the Trace adds an intriguing stain to the romance and adventure. It is good that the public 
has access to this well-maintained, well-researched, and well-articulated commentary. 
However, undocumented and in the shadows, unheralded by signs and unnoticed by 
travelers is a provocative and well-preserved physical testament - an artifact of an era not 
so far gone - to an effort to assuage the consequences of, arguably, the greatest emotional 
1
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Volume 2, Year of Crises (New York: Random House, 1938), 320. 
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and economic storm to assault the nation. For a brief while, some Tupelo people found 
shelter from the storm in the Tupelo Homesteads.4 
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH) initiated the first federal attempt 
at agrarian community building. The DSH intended to help middle class people mitigate 
the effects of the depression. Of the more than 100 agrarian communities funded by the 
federal government, the one at Tupelo is the best example of the philosophy and failure 
of the DSH projects. 
Oddly, one of the first New Deal demonstrations in agrarian planning came not 
from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, specifically enacted to further agrarian interests, 
but within the National Industrial Recovery Act (NTRA). Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
believed that part of the answer to industrial doldrums lay in a revitalized farm income. 
As farm income grew, he reasoned, farmers would buy industrial products. His 
experience as Governor of New York and his conversations with M. L. Wilson and 
Rexford Tugwell convinced him that an entirely new class of producer/consumer could 
speed industrial recovery. Industrial workers, and other wage earners, could greatly 
increase their disposable income by growing a significant portion of their food on small 
homesteads. FDR envisioned a new class of American consumer/producers coming from 
urban congestion or from non-productive farms. They could go "back to the land" with 
the assistance of the federal government and begin producing for their own needs while 
buying the products of American industries. In April 1933, he wrote Republican Senator 
3
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George Norris of Nebraska of his desire to have congress enac t " . . . one more bill which 
would allow us to spend $25 million this year to put 25,000 families on farms at an 
average cost of $1,000 per family."5 The President, as events clearly showed, was 
abysmally wrong in his estimate of the cost of resettlement. The Subsistence Homesteads 
concept appealed to Senator John H. Bankhead and on 9 March 1933, Bankhead 
introduced a bill to establish a national subsistence homestead program. Despite support 
from the President, the bill died in committee. Undeterred, Bankhead attached a 
subsistence homesteads provision to the National Industrial Recovery Act. The 
homesteads provision passed without discussion or opposition.6 
Section 208, Title II of the NIRA, approved 16 June 1933, appropriated $25 
million " . . . to provide for aiding the redistribution of the overabundance of population 
in industrial centers" and granted the president authority to set up agencies for " . . . 
making loans for and otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence homesteads."7 This 
section of the NIRA represented the culmination and synthesis of several strands of 
economic, social, and agrarian planning. Acting under authority granted in the act, FDR 
assigned this project to Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes. Ickes, in turn, 
established within his department the Division of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH), and 
convened an advisory committee chaired by Senator Bankhead. The committee held its 
5Quoted in Holley, 26. For evidence of Wilson's familiarity with FDR's notions and 
New York programs see M.L. Wilson, "A Land Use Program for the Federal 
Government," Journal of Farm Economics, 15 (April 1933): 217-35. 
6Ibid., 26-27; Conkin, 132-136; John H. Bankhead, "The One Way to Permanent 
Recovery," Liberty Magazine (22 July 1933):18. 
7Monthfy Labor Review (July 1933): 75. 
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first meeting on 26 September 1933, and made a fifteen-point recommendation for use of 
the appropriated funds. The first two recommendations are of particular interest in 
conducting an evaluation of the Tupelo Homesteads. The first provision classified the 
need for a Demonstration project as urgent. The projects were to . . . "point the way to a 
program of a permanent character." They were to reconcile the problems of the 
industrial worker and American agriculture with experimental projects; such 
reconciliation would. . . "point the way out" The second provision of particular interest 
called for the demonstration projects to be located in," . . . problem areas of the United 
States and not on the basis of allocations of funds on the basis of States, the projects to be 
selected... as to the individual soundness and merit."8 
Simultaneously, another group of projects often identified with the DSH was 
coming to fruition. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), under the 
direction of Harry Hopkins, also began funding subsistence programs. Through 
consolidation and creation of the Resettlement Administration (RA), the supervision of 
all subsistence programs were eventually consolidated in the Agriculture Department's 
Farm Security Administration (FSA). In April 1935, The RA assumed responsibility for 
the previously existing FERA subsistence projects and those funded by Section 208 of 
NIRA. Thus, the original DSH projects became identified with the much larger Rural 
Rehabilitation projects. Because of such linkage and identification, the DSH programs 
were later evaluated and criticized based on their perceived failure to meet criteria that 
were not part of their origin or intent. Consequently, political opponents of the New Deal 
criticized the DSH projects for failing to obtain objectives which they were not designed 
Monthly Labor Review (September 1933): 1327-1328.Italic emphasis added by author. 
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to meet; circumstances soon proved that the DSH had trouble enough of its own without 
borrowing from other agencies. After the RA began its attempt to tackle the problem of 
rural poverty, the DSH projects seemed to be non-productive and the residents seemed to 
be beneficiaries of government largesse. Most of the homesteaders led lives 
indistinguishable from their contemporaries; furthermore, the government had provided 
the homesteaders with modern conveniences, tools, and equipment that their 
contemporaries had to purchase. The DSH projects also suffered from identification with 
the impulsive, impractical, ill-conceived, and wildly expensive Arthurdale, West 
Virginia, project, introduced later in this chapter. 
The New Deal legislation enacted in the spring of 1933 reflected the contradictory 
notions about, and aspirations of, a revitalized agrarian community. Under the energetic 
and imaginative Hopkins, FERA established a program of subsistence homesteads as a 
part of its rural rehabilitation efforts. These programs were designed to help farmers who 
already received relief by making them self-sufficient. In contrast, the earlier DSH 
programs envisioned, with a very few exceptions, creation of a new economic entity that 
combined wage employment with agriculture. The DSH required a particular type of 
client. Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service 
Committee and a proponent of DSH, briefly described the ideal client: "We must 
experiment with those who share the idealism of the movement, who have the capacity to 
respond to those ideals, who have a good deal of the pioneering spirit."9 
Proceedings: National Conference on Subsistence Homesteads, Dayton Ohio (December 
1933): 28. The movement to which Pickett referred was the conscious effort to stretch 
the purchasing power of wage income by raising a large portion of food needs on the 
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DSH regulations denied persons on relief rolls participation in the homesteads. 
The application for a subsistence homestead required that the successful applicant: be an 
American citizen; live in an industrial center; be over twenty-one years old; have an 
income sufficient to meet homestead payments; and not have an income sufficient to 
secure a loan for a home using normal channels.10 Because of two government agencies 
serving dual clienteles but using the same terminology, the DSH projects later lost their 
specific identification and became, in the mind of the public, simply another New Deal 
welfare project. One exception proved the rule. The DSH approved a very limited 
number of projects assisting impoverished farmers. However, the only project of this 
type ever completed was at Richton, Mississippi. Other rural projects initiated by FERA 
became identified with Richton because of the inclusion of the Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporations (RRC) and DSH under the umbrella of the Resettlement Administration 
(RA), created in 1935, under the direction of Rexford Tugwell. The Cumberland 
Homesteads near Crossville, Tennessee, also provided assistance to those on relief rolls. 
However, the Cumberland Homesteaders, in the main, had not been subsistence farmers, 
they were "displaced" and "stranded" workers. If, indeed, the Arthurdale project was the 
most controversial, it was simply because it was the most publicized. n 
homestead. The DSH distributed charts and graphs that illustrated the increased 
purchasing power of a family that practiced subsistence farming. 
10Benjamin P. Groves, "The Federal Subsistence Homestead Program" ( M.A. thesis., 
University of Cincinnati, 1935.) An original of the application is appended to Groves's 
thesis. 
nThe Cumberland Homesteads was, and is, by far the most interesting. A very good 
account of the Cumberland project is found in: United States Department of Agriculture, 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Russell Lord and Paul H. Johnstone, eds., A Place on 
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The DSH advisory committee identified three types of clientele and three types of 
proposed communities: 
Homestead colonies established for industrial workers and located in the 
out-skirts of cities or large towns; rural settlements in which small 
industries or branches of large industries can be established; and 
agricultural settlements. The program will deal largely with city dwellers, 
stranded populations (i.e. those left jobless by the moving of local 
industries or the exhaustion of natural resources, as for instance coal and 
copper mines, sawmill workers, etc.), and farmers now working lands too 
poor to be profitable. 
Each subsistence-homestead project will be established in accordance with 
the industrial and agricultural trends as they relate to the population 
problems of a given region or State. 
Every undertaking will be regarded as experimental. The experiment is to 
test a method of living that may conserve the best of both urban and rural 
life, afford greater stability in family living and point the way to a more 
permanent adjustment for workers in the shorter hour week and part-time 
employment. 2 
Because the program was not intended to be a welfare effort and since 
homesteading represented a new economic endeavor, FDR maneuvered to have it 
administered by the person he considered the best executive in Washington, the "old 
curmudgeon," Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes. Ickes was an unfortunate choice 
as administrator in ultimate authority for the subsistence homestead program. He was 
authoritarian and viewed committees and boards with distrust and suspicion. He believed 
in micro-management and when his subordinates could not immediately answer inquiries 
as to minuscule details, he immediately lost confidence in them. Ickes was also tight-
Earth: A Critical Appraisal of Subsistence Homesteads (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1942), 82-96. 
^Monthly Labor Review, 37 (November 1933): 1328. Under the RA the "subsistence 
program" was expanded to include other populations, thus creating other types of 
communities. 
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fisted and hyper-conservative about the distribution of federal funds; Harry Hopkins was 
not. Ickes, rarely finding a subordinate whom he liked, placed the program under M.L. 
Wilson, then the head of the AAA wheat section.13 
M. L. Wilson did not remain long as Director of the Division of Subsistence 
Housing. By January 1934, differences with Ickes over the administration, control, and 
even the goals of DSH convinced Wilson of the need to work in some capacity free of 
Ickes's supervision. He took a position as Assistant Secretary (later Under Secretary) of 
the Department of Agriculture. Fundamental differences regarding fiduciary propriety, 
local control and community building exacerbated pre-existing political and 
administrative differences between Wilson and Ickes. Wilson envisioned communities 
planned and directed under local guidance, answerable to Washington only on 
fundamental questions of policy and administration.14 
Wilson, true to his belief in the primacy of democracy, constructed the fiduciary 
machinery of the DSH with an eye toward local control and direction. Under the laws of 
Delaware, the DSH established the Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation (FSHC), 
According to Ickes, the president told Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, that 
Ickes was "the greatest executive I have ever known." Pinchot was looking to advance 
his own interests; he may have been ingratiating himself to Ickes. In spite of an attempt 
by The Chicago Tribune to implicate Ickes in a financial scandal, Ickes maintained a 
reputation for uncompromising honesty. The quotation in this note is from Harold L. 
Ickes, The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 163. The Secret Diaries of Harold Ickes, noted above, 
contains evidence of the assertions made in this note. M.L. Wilson left the Department of 
Interior shortly after arriving to become Undersecretary of Agriculture. In this post and 
with the cooperation of Rexford Tugwell, he exercised influence over the entire rural 
rehabilitation, subsistence homesteads, and resettlement programs when they were 
combined under the Department of Agriculture. 
Conkin, 120. 
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a non-profit corporation, with stock held in trust by Secretary of the Interior Ickes. Under 
Wilson's plan, each new community would be planned, built, and adrninistered by a local 
subsidiary corporation. By using the members of the local corporation to acquire and 
dispose of land and buildings and to contract with borrowers, architects, and builders, the 
projects were assured of local involvement and support. Wilson believed that such high 
profile local involvement would also serve to differentiate the subsistence projects from 
the relief efforts of the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA).15 
Ickes, on the other hand, viewed local control as an opportunity for graft and 
waste. There had been no hint of financial scandal in the Interior Department's PWA; 
Ickes believed in close scrutiny and multi-level approval of any expenditure. The ability 
of local organizations to select sites, hire architects, and spend money without the line-
by-line approval of national authorities alarmed Ickes and provoked his suspicions. 
Historian Paul Conkin, the recognized authority on the New Deal community programs, 
argues that Ickes's fiduciary extremism, basic distrust of loosely supervised personnel, 
and his insistence on intense micro-management came to him as a function of his 
previous career as a political reformist in Chicago. Conkin attributes Wilson's insistence 
on local control to his career in agriculture dealing with farmers. In a re-statement of the 
Hamiltonian- Jeffersonian argument, Ickes trusted persons while Wilson trusted the 
people.16 
'Ibid, 105-106. 
5
 Ibid, 93-130. 
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Ickes received aid in controlling the DSH from an unexpected and unappreciated 
source. Responding to President Roosevelt's ruling that required all government 
accounts be submitted, approved, and executed by General Accounting Office standards 
and procedures, on 15 March 1934, Comptroller-General John R. McCarl mandated that 
all federal funds, including those connected with subsistence housing projects, be 
deposited with the United States Treasurer and disbursed according to standard 
government disbursing and accounting procedures. Ickes bristled at the ruling, 
interpreting it as McCarl's attempt to expand his influence at Ickes's expense. The 
Secretary of Interior used this ruling, however, to modify Wilson's system of local 
control. Meanwhile, Charles Pynchon, Wilson's understudy at DSH, replaced him as 
Director in January 1934.n 
By spring 1934, the Washington DSH office assumed practically all control of the 
projects. The local corporations had to surrender their legal status and the former board 
members reconvened as homestead associations. Only when a project was completed 
and ready for local ownership would a local corporation be formed. The local association 
still made recommendations stemming from their own investigations and fieldwork, but 
all decisions, from what materials to use to the specific applicants accepted, required 
approval from various newly formed sections of the DSH. As a result, the planning, 
building, and occupation of the homesteads experienced delays, duplication, and 
confusion that plagued the DSH for the remainder of its short life. 
Glick, 1339-1384; Ickes, 335, Conkin, 119. 
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As news of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and its $25 million 
appropriation spread around the country, funding requests, mainly addressed to President 
and Mrs. Roosevelt, inundated the DSH offices. In February 1934, loan requests totaled 
over $4.5 million. Real estate promoters, chambers of commerce, and individuals 
proposed particular schemes; others asked for loans to buy houses. Some of the notions 
for the use of the funds were bizarre, alchemy for example. A suggestion from one who 
identified himself only as "A Catholic Priest," recounted a tale in the life of St. Vincent 
de Paul, a French Catholic Priest captured by the Turks. The French cleric watched his 
captor melt gold and silver together until they were fused, then he added a yellow 
powder. "The result was considered gold. May I suggest that you have your chemists 
work on this possibility? It would increase the amount of gold we have for our money 
system or open the way for new standards." From the mass of requests and applications 
the DSH had to choose which projects deserved consideration, and then, which projects 
should be funded.18 
By the end of October 1933, two projects had gained approval. The DSH made a 
$50,000 loan to the Cooperative Production Units subsistence project already started by 
the Council of Social Agencies in Dayton, Ohio. Ralph Borsodi, the council's advisor, 
had long been a promoter of "back to the land" subsistence communities. The initial loan 
Letter to President Roosevelt, from "A Catholic Priest," 21 September 1933, President's 
Personal File, Box 21-A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Conkin, 101-
104. 
of $50,000 was the extent of assistance to the Dayton project, and it was the only project 
in which the government did not own the land.19 
The second project funded by DSH was its most famous and most controversial. 
Operators had drastically curtailed mining operations in the bituminous coal fields of 
Appalachia as the surplus of American coal continued to glut national and international 
markets. The Interior Department acquired a 1,100-acre farm at Reedsville, West 
Virginia, and established Arthurdale. The DSH approved plans for Arthurdale, named 
for the former owner of the farm, to serve as a colony for 200 families. Adhering to the 
principles established by the DSH Advisory Committee, the government personnel and 
community leaders subjected prospective clients to a series of tests.20 
Those applicants who passed the initial screening with high marks for agricultural 
ability, physical fitness, attitude, and ambition received in-home inspections. After 
further reducing the applications by eliminating persons with tuberculosis and negative 
attitudes about farm life, the applications of 200 families gained approval from the 
increasingly bureaucratic and fragmented DSH administration. Approximately half the 
heads of households were unemployed coal miners, about one-fourth were former 
sawmill workers, and the remaining one-fourth were Appalachian farmers. The DSH 
Monthly Labor Review (37): 1330. The Dayton project was the only DSH project in 
which the government did not own the land. In some other projects, later popularly 
associated with DSH projects but not part of the DSH, the government did not own the 
land and provided only managerial services. A good example of this type of project was 
the Deshee Farm in Indiana. See: Rebecca J. Thompson, "Deshee Farm: A New Deal 
Experiment With Cooperative Farming," Indiana Magazine of History, 91 (1995): 380-
406. 
'Ibid., 1329; Conkin 108. 
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plans called for a modest house and roughly five acres of tillable land for each family. 
The DSH projected that each family would require an expenditure of about $2,000. 
Eleanor Roosevelt took a particular interest in the Arthurdale Project. Her interest in 
seeing for the comfort of the families and her pressure to hurry along the project, along 
with the experimental nature of such project building, produced delay (hastily assembled 
houses transported to the site were too flimsy for occupancy), waste, disorganization, and 
a resettlement cost to the DSH of over $10,000 per family. 
Fears of local committees running amok and dispensing federal funds with a 
wholesome disregard for economy and fiduciary propriety, combined with Eleanor 
Roosevelt's aggressive interest in the DSH projects, eventually caused Ickes to move 
toward divesting his department of responsibility for the subsistence homestead program. 
Whereas the president and Ickes had envisioned the houses at Arthurdale as sturdy but 
plain and lacking indoor plumbing or electricity, Eleanor Roosevelt, along with Wilson 
and project director Bushrod Grimes, aimed for more personal conveniences. They 
insisted on indoor plumbing and electricity. In November 1933, the DSH had confidently 
predicted that the houses at Arthurdale would be occupied at a cost between $2,000 and 
$3,000. By March 1934, Grimes revised his cost estimate; each occupancy would cost 
over $10,000. President Roosevelt advised Ickes that DSH " . . . could justify the cost 
because it was a model for other homestead projects." Ickes responded by asking,"... 
what it was a model of, since obviously it was not a model of low-cost housing for people 
Ibid.; Ickes, 152. 
on the very lowest rungs of the economic order." Even the March 1934 estimates were 
low; the final cost for each of the homesteads at Arthurdale was $16,635 ($250,456). In 
1935, the DSH transferred responsibilities to the Resettlement Administration, under the 
direction of Rexford G. Tugwell.23 
Under the provision for "stranded populations," the DSH established three other 
projects in addition to Arthurdale: Cumberland Homesteads near Crossville, Tennessee; 
Tygart Valley Homesteads, outside Elkins, West Virginia; and Westmoreland 
Homesteads at Greensburg, Pennsylvania. Each planned for from 250 to 300 units, and 
stretched the bounds of orthodoxy in the DSH advisory committee's directive. They 
were the most problematic, expensive, and criticized of all DSH projects. It is interesting 
to note that the January 1935 Monthly Labor Review listed the designation of the 
Arthurdale project as "experimental" rather than "stranded populations."24 
The Tupelo Homesteads 
By 1 March 1935, the DSH had approved forty-three projects. Of these, inclusive 
of the ones listed above, however, only thirty-four were completed by the DSH. The 
DSH designated one as "experimental," one as "a resettlement community," three as 
"farm communities," one as "co-operative industrial," and one as a "Garden city for 
Ickes, 152. 
'Ibid.; Conkin, 153-153; 332. 
lConkin,108: Monthly Labor Review (January 1935): 22. 
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Negroes."25 The experimental, stranded populations and farm communities were 
permissible under the advisory committee's guidance, but they were not at the center of 
the aspirations and visions of the architects and planners of the subsistence homestead 
movement. The remaining twenty-four "industrial," projects, best represented the hopes 
for a new economic entity and a reconciliation of agrarian and industrial dissonance. 
Of the twenty-four projects most representative of the ideas and the aspirations of 
President Roosevelt, M. L. Wilson, Rexford Tugwell, and others, six were located in 
Mississippi. In addition to the only fully completed DSH farm community at Richton, 
five industrial projects for Mississippi gained approval: Hattiesburg, Laurel, Meridian, 
McComb, and Tupelo. The DSH never began construction on the Laurel project; 
Hattiesburg and Meridian quickly defaulted and the houses were sold to individuals. The 
McComb project, which Professor Holley views as the most significant of the DSH 
communities, has a particularly woeful history. Only one client ever moved into the 
Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads at McComb. The DSH sold the McComb houses to 
individuals.27 
Groves, Appendix, p. 14. Conkin classifies Arthurdale as a "stranded community." This 
is probably a more accurate reflection in operational terms but it contradicts the DSH 
terminology. Part of the story of Arthurdale involves the attempt to establish a factory 
with a contract with the U.S. Postal Service as a source of employment for the 
homesteaders. This provision met with opposition from representatives of furniture 
manufacturing areas. The Jersey Homesteads, another "stranded population" community 
was able to develop its own commercial textile operation, taking advantage of the skills 
of the homesteaders who, in the main, had been employed in that industry. 
26Monthly Labor Review (Januaryl935):19-37; Groves, Appendix, 14; Conkin, 332-334. 
27Conkin, 93-130. It is likely that Professor Holley did not have access to the archives of 
the Tupelo Homesteads. The archive assembly and custodial program did not commence 
74 
On 15 December 1933, the DSH announced plans for a twenty-five unit complex 
for Tupelo, Mississippi. The local board of directors of the Tupelo Homesteads of 
Mississippi, a subsidiary of the Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation (FSHC), 
represented the top echelon of community leadership. Its members included: R.V. Road, 
V. S. Whitesides, J. H. Leonard, L. A. Olsen, Mrs. T. F. Elkin, J. E. Redus, L. T. Wesson, 
J. M. Thomas, Jr., and Tupelo Mayor, J. P. Nanney. Operating under the original 
provisions of M. L. Wilson's management and organizational system, the board took 
action to identify quickly and place under option likely plots of land ranging in size from 
160 to 650 acres on which to build the proposed homesteads. 
Two of the options granted but not exercised are of particular interest. Glenn 
McCullough granted an option to Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi. Almost seventy 
years later, McCullough's grandson, also named Glenn McCullough, accepted a position 
on the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority; in 2001, he became 
Chairman. Bel-Air Golf Course, now owned by the city of Tupelo, was once the Tupelo 
at The Natchez Trace Parkway until the early 1990s. The Parkway staff assembled many 
of the records from other sources. Some of the materials on the Tupelo Homesteads were 
filed within the records of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Indeed, I found these records 
only because a staffer at NARA in Atlanta, Georgia suggested that I look at them. Much 
of the primary source material was and is in the Tennessee Valley Authority Records in 
NARA, Atlanta. There is little doubt that had Professor Holley been able to access these 
files, he would have written more extensively on Tupelo. 
28
 Record Group 79, Department of Agriculture, Resettlement Administration, 
Management Division, file D06619114-L14, "Summary and Justification: Tupelo 
Homesteads, SH-MS-6," 18 February, 1934, National Archives and Records 
Administration, Atlanta, GA. The composition of the Board of Directors changed 
throughout the corporation's brief existence. Resignations occurred with regularity, 
possibly because of the change in administration caused by Comptroller General 
McCarl's ruling and Ickes's desire to gain more centralized control. See: V.S. 
Whitesides letter to I. B. Bradshaw, March 6,1934; W.F. Trapp, Associate Community 
75 
Country Club. On 5 January 1934, the Tupelo Country Club optioned its real estate to 
the Federal Subsistence Corporation for $19,000. Should the option be exercised, the 
membership voted to build a new club. The Tupelo Homestead Corporation did not 
exercise that option and there is no language in the minutes indicating whether the option 
granted was motivated by financial difficulties or the desire for a new club. 
On 26 March 1934, the Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi purchased property 
from W. W. and W. M. Thompson. The property consisted of 170.58 acres of land, six 
miles north of Tupelo and bisected by the newly constructed U.S. Highway 45. The 
acreage, consisting of "pheba silk loam soil, well adapted to garden, truck and fruit, 
contained quite a bit of timber." At twenty dollars an acre, it was a good buy. 
The Thompson purchase proved to be an administrative headache. Shortly after 
the parties executed the contract, one of Thompson's neighbors challenged the sale on the 
basis that the land in question included a small portion which belonged to him, not 
Manager to J. B. Lawson, Assistant Regional Director, Resettlement Administration, 
June 21,1937, all in the management division file noted above. 
RG 79, NARA, Atlanta, copies of options granted; Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal, 
Nov., 23,1999; RG 79, 86-28-6-(300) "Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Stockholders 
of Tupelo Country Club," NARA, Atlanta. The options taken by the Tupelo Homestead 
Corporation reflect the quality of real estate desired. The Bel-Air area was and currently 
is a very desirable section of the city. This is, perhaps, an indication that the members of 
the board did not view potential homesteaders as welfare recipients. They did not view 
the potential homesteaders as people who would drive down property values or create 
unpleasant neighborhoods. Likewise, the McCullough property optioned was then and is 
now very valuable and desirable real estate in Tupelo. In the 1960s, the Tupelo Country 
Club did establish a new golf course. Based on limited information one could assume 
that the delay of some thirty years in building a new club indicates that the club optioned 
its property in hopes of improving its financial condition rather than to satisfy a desire for 
a new club. 
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Thompson. The law firm of Deavours and Hilbun represented the DSH and, through a 
barrage of letters to and from the Thompsons, finally gained a "no objection" statement 
•51 
from the Attorney General to the commencement of construction on 10 May 1935. 
There remained a degree of uncertainty relative to the budget of the Tupelo 
Homesteads throughout its life. Figures submitted to the DSH fluctuated as construction 
manager C. T. Ames waffled between building twenty-two, twenty-five, or thirty-five 
units. Finally, Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi submitted a budget of $58,350 and 
received approval for, " . . . the development and the perfection of a Demonstration in 
Subsistence Homestead Gardening to be located adjacent to the corporate limits of the 
City of Tupelo, County of Lee, Mississippi."32 Even after approval, Ames requested 
modifications to the Tupelo Homesteads budget. I. R. Bradshaw explained to 
Washington officials that the $58,350 budget was "apparently arbitrarily set" and that the 
Tupelo Homesteads should have no trouble qualifying for $75,000. 
jURG 79, Letter to I .R. Bradshaw, V S. Whitesides, March 6,1934; W.C. Inzer, Lee 
County Extension Agent, to I.R. Bradshaw, January 13,1934. Of the almost 171 acres, 
114 acres were purchased at $20. The remaining 56 acres cost $50 per acre. 
31Ibid., Thomas K. Shuffig, Office of the Attorney General, letter to Paul D. Shriver, 
Chief Counsel Division of Subsistence Homesteads, May 10,1935; J. B. Lawson, project 
manager to Deavours and Hilbun," April 13,1935; "Inter-Office communication, Charles 
E. Pynchonto J.B. Lawson, December 18,1934; W. W. Thompson to V.S. Whitesides, 
March 14,1934. The communications cited above, and many others not cited, reveal 
severe administrative problems. In addition to contested ownership was the mistaken 
notion that part of the land represented a portion of the Thompson homestead. This 
matter was not fully resolved until 1937. No evidence exists that this lack of resolution 
had any deleterious effect on the individual residents' attitudes about, or plans 
concerning, the homesteads. 
32Ibid., "Schedule XVI"; J. B. Lawson to S. N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, DSH, 23 June 
1934." 
During the period of wrangling over the budget and examination of the property 
title, DSH officials evidently worried about losing popular support. Bradshaw 
telegraphed N. S. Perkins, assistant chief of the Construction Section: 
In my opinion Lawson will go through successfully under revised budget 
June twentythird (sic) please approve this and lets get the houses started 
STOP We are fast losing public sentiment on account delay, (sic)33 
The Tupelo Journal ran a glowing account of the efficiency and economy 
practiced by Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi and the Division of Subsistence Housing. 
The newspaper noted: 
Although the fact has not been officially announced, it is learned that a 
considerable portion of the $80,000 appropriation for the Tupelo project 
will be turned back to the government. It is officially learned that the 
Tupelo Homestead has been constructed at lower cost than expected.34 
The Tupelo Journal was evidently not aware of the "sliding" budget for the Tupelo 
project. In the same article, The Journal reported that officials in Washington were," . . . 
loud in their praise for Jimmy Lawson," the project director.35 The newspaper was not 
aware of other communication from Washington. The DSH bluntly informed Lawson 
that if he had been: 
. . . able to go through with the government purchasing materials and contracting 
labor, you could have had your houses half finished and still remained under 
budget. . . . Your overhead of $4,500 is entirely out of line . . . 
The letter did go on to say that the blame could be placed on the DSH because," . . . we 
have dragged this project along with various regulations of different kinds until the 
Ibid., Telegram I. R. Bradshaw to N. S. Jenkins, 25 June 1934. Bradshaw telegraphed 
Jenkins from Laurel, MS, where another project had been approved. 
Tupelo Journal, 21 November 1934. 
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overhead could not be cut"36 The "various kinds of regulations" reflected Ickes's 
increasing concern about the fiscal and managerial integrity of DSH operations. 
Despite the increasing bureaucratic minutiae incurred as a result of Ickes's 
dismantling of Wilson's streamlined protocols, despite the waffling over how many 
houses to build and where to place them on the property, and notwithstanding the 
fluctuating proposed budget, the work proceeded at a remarkably fast pace. On 18 July 
1934, Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi awarded a contract of $50,600 to Tupelo 
Lumber Company for construction of twenty-five houses, septic tanks, and outbuildings. 
The houses, designed by local architect Frank Kincannon, were completed October 15.37 
David O. Puckett owned the Tupelo Lumber Company; his son, David O. Puckett 
Jr., remembers the whirl of activity involved with the construction: 
I had my own delivery truck, it wasn't new but it was mine and I 
remember making many a delivery of building supplies to the site. I was 
only fourteen at the time but I had been driving forever. I remember that 
during those days you couldn't hire a decent carpenter in Tupelo, we had 
all of them working for us.38 
The New Deal's significant presence in Northeast Mississippi, or at least the 
promise of it, preceded the announcement of approval and construction of the Tupelo 
Homesteads. On October 27,1933, the city of Tupelo signed an agreement with the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) contracting for power and mapping of a huge direct 
J0RG 79, SH-MS-6,1. R. Bradshaw letter to J. B. Lawson, 25 June 1934. 
Ibid., "Summary and justification." 
•30 
David O. Puckett Jr., interview by author, 1 September 1999, Tupelo, MS. The tape 
recording is in the author's possession. 
power transmission line. This agreement supplied Tupelo with a public relations slogan 
still used by the city to this day: "Tupelo, First TVA City." Then, even as now, Tupelo 
gloried in the possibilities offered by this government business. The local newspaper 
reporter waxed enthusiastic; little journalistic objectivity colored his account: 
The New Deal in-so-far as Tupelo and the surrounding trade territory are 
concerned is in a fairer way toward achievement than had been conceived 
in the minds of any, with the exception of the most optimistic, and, before 
the new year has hardly been ushered in, the long proposed reduced rates 
will apply to city and farm homes alike. 
The subheading of the story promised the line would be in operation by February and a 
smaller header promised a 68 percent rate cut.39 The TVA actually performed more 
rapidly than it promised. On 27 September 1934, before the Tupelo Homesteads were 
completed, the Tupelo Homesteads Corporation granted an easement to the TVA, to 
supply electrical power to the homesteads.40 
The confluence of these two New Deal programs, the DSH and the TVA, along 
with a third New Deal-generated project, proved to be an enormous boon to the Tupelo 
Homesteads. In the early 1930s, the Natchez, Mississippi, Chapter of the Daughters of 
the American Revolution (DAR), began enlisting the aid of other chapters and interested 
groups to pressure the federal government to map and preserve the historic Natchez 
Trace. As a result of their efforts, the Emergency Legislation Act of June 1934 
39The Tupelo Journal, 31 October 1933. 
40RG 79, SH-MS-6, C. T, Ames, "Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi Inc."; "Charles 
Pynchon letter to J.B. Lawson. As the project neared completion, under the new 
regulations imposed by Ickes, the local group was required to form a local corporation 
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authorized initial construction funds. Further legislation in 1938 established the Natchez 
Trace Parkway as a national parkway under the National Park Service. The physical 
confluence of three separate strains of New Deal thought in Northeast Mississippi was, 
arguably, an indication of the importance and power of Congressman John Rankin and 
Senator Pat Harrison. 41 
With the creation of the TV A, the New Deal harvested the fruits of progressive 
labor. Tennessee Valley area representatives and progressives had supported ideas 
similar to the TVA for years. During the Great War, the U.S. Army built a hydroelectric 
dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River in order to supply the armed services with 
weapons-grade nitrates. At the end of the war the military, no longer needing the nitrate 
fixing facilities, mothballed the installation. The disposition of those facilities actuated a 
struggle between capitalistic entrepreneurs and progressive conservationists for control of 
the dam. Pursuing notions first advanced by Gifford Pinchot, Chief U.S. Forester under 
President Theodore Roosevelt, progressives, led by Senator George Norris, insisted that 
the shoals area of the Tennessee River and the hydroelectric dam built there redound to 
the good of man and the health of the environment. As head of the Senate Agriculture 
with different provisions than the one involved in initial planning and construction. The 
Tupelo Homesteads Corporation replaced Tupelo Homesteads of Mississippi. 
41Federal Recalled Records, NATR, Accession #290, Box 40, Natchez Trace Parkway 
Archives; "Natchez Trace Parkway Home Page," accessed 14 October 1999. Martha 
Swain, "Hubert D. Stephens: Mississippi's 'Quiet Man' in the Senate, 1923-1935," 
Journal of Mississippi History, 63, (4), (Winter 2001): 276-77. For a discussion 
concerning Pat Harrison's value to FDR in congressional approval of New Deal 
legislation see Martha M. Swain, Pat Harrison: The New Deal Years (Jackson: The 
University and College Press of Mississippi, 1975): passim. Chester H. Gray, "Putting 
More Muscle in the Shoals," Bureau Farmer, 3 (4) (Dec 1927): 12-13. Tupelo was also 
awarded other New Deal works projects. They included a mattress factory and a meat 
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Committee, Norris occupied a key position in which to block acquisition of the shoals 
facilities by strictly commercial interests. When Henry Ford, seeing the commercial 
opportunities inherent in a hydroelectric facility, offered $5 million for a project that had 
cost the government $130 million, Norris thundered that the committee's acceptance of 
the bid would " . . . amount to the greatest gift ever bestowed upon mortal man since 
salvation was made free to the human race."42 
On 10 April 1933, the hopes of Norris and the old time progressives turned to 
substance. When FDR asked Congress for "legislation to create a Tennessee Valley 
Authority - a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the 
flexibility and initiative of private enterprise" Congress enacted the legislation on May 
18,1933.43 
At about the same time that Congress created TV A, the DSH gave a description 
of the proposed Tupelo homesteads: 
. . . a house and outbuildings located upon a plot of land on which can be 
grown a large portion of the foodstuffs required by the homestead family. 
It signifies production for home consumption and not for commercial sale. 
In that it provides for subsistence alone, it carries with it the corollary that 
cash income must be drawn from some outside source. The central motive 
of the subsistence homestead program, therefore, is to demonstrate the 
packing facility. The meat packing facility processed cattle that the government 
purchased from drought-stricken Midwest cattlemen. 
42
 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), 134-139. The quote is from: Tennessee Valley 
Authority, "A History of the Tennessee Valley Authority," 50th Anniversary Edition, 6, 
no publication data given. 
'Tennessee Valley Authority, 17. 
economic value of a livelihood which combines part-time wage work with 
part-time gardening or farming.44 
The Tupelo Homesteads' construction adhered to the definition. The community 
initially consisted of twenty-five houses on lots averaging a little over three acres each, 
and included nine three-room houses, eight four-room houses, and eight five-room 
houses. Each house received water from a deep well equipped with an electric pump 
capable of delivering 225 gallons per hour and a pump-house enclosing the mechanism. 
As the planners anticipated that each homesteader would keep a cow, chickens, and hogs, 
each unit came equipped with a cow stall, chicken run, and hog pen. The DSH provided 
each homestead with fruit trees, berry bushes, farming equipment, fertilizer, seed, a cow, 
two shoats, and twenty-five chickens. Project managers arranged with the DSH, the 
County Extension Service, and Mississippi State College to provide guidance in 
gardening, canning, and preservation of food. Each kitchen came furnished with a 
pressure cooker, a relatively new innovation, and supplies for home canning. 45 
Unlike most of the other industrial homesteads, Tupelo Homesteads had running 
water, electricity, and single-party phone lines. The Homesteads were near enough to 
Tupelo for the children of the community to utilize the transportation facilities of the 
Tupelo Municipal School District. Likewise, proximity to Tupelo precluded the need for 
construction of community cultural, medical, and religious facilities. Construction crews 
Conkin, quotes at 110-111. 
;RG 79, SH-MS-6, Schedule XVI"; Ames, 1-2. 
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built an earthen dam across a ravine, which provided a recreational lake for the 
homesteaders. 46 
On Friday, 16 November 1934, the first homesteaders moved into their new 
homes. Two days later, the President and Eleanor Roosevelt, along with Interior 
Secretary Harold Ickes, came to Tupelo; the President came to extol the virtues of the 
TVA and Mrs. Roosevelt to visit the homesteaders. Before speaking to an estimated 
75,000 people at Robbins Field in Tupelo, the party visited the Tupelo Homesteads.47 
Prior to the visit, the Tupelo Garden Club had extended an invitation for Eleanor 
Roosevelt to speak at a special meeting in her honor, which she declined. Knowing of 
her interest in the Arthurdale Project, and wanting to honor the First Lady, the women of 
the Tupelo Garden Club carefully prepared and decorated two of the vacant homesteads 
for her inspection. Mrs. Roosevelt, however, insisted on visiting a homestead family. 
She stopped, at random, at Number 20, the Barron residence. Mrs. Roosevelt became so 
engrossed in conversation with Mrs. Barron and in examining the house and the 
appliances that she strained the patience of the President. FDR, waiting impatiently in his 
car, sent one of his staff members to "fetch her."48 
FDR's visit constituted the high water mark of the Tupelo Homesteads of 
Mississippi. Contrary to expectations, none of the initial residents bought their homes. 
^Tupelo Journal; (Jackson) Daily Clarion Ledger; New York Times; (Jackson) 
Commercial Appeal, all of 19 November, 1934. Ickes, 226. 
46Ibid. The dam broke in the early 1960 and was not repaired. 
46
 Tupelo Journal, November 19,1934 
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They thought the price the government placed on the project too high, and they did not 
fully understand that they were expected to buy shares in the entire corporation and that 
only after 75% of the aggregate debt had been paid would they receive title to their 
property in fee-simple. The project passed with bewildering rapidity to the control of 
other government agencies, and with such transfer became associated with welfare 
programs. By 1937, the homesteads had become a place to rent until one could make 
better arrangements. 
By the President's own hopes and the DSH standards, Tupelo was not an ideal 
place to nurture the aspirations of the economically challenged via this type of 
governmental assistance. When FDR outlined the homestead program to Congress he 
spoke of potential clients who earned from $600 to $1,000 ($15,555 -19,333) per year. 
By providing a way for a person to buy a home at low interest rates (3%) on long terms 
(40 years), the president expected that there would be a surfeit of qualified applicants. 
He was correct; there was a surplus of applicants. The president also talked about the 
fiscal and moral qualifications of applicants; he stressed that this was not a relief 
program. The government, he said, would recover all its money; the beneficiaries of this 
program were to be persons of good moral character, financial integrity, and strong work 
ethics.49 
Tupelo Journal, 19 November 1934. 
4
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Volume 2: Year of Crises, 1933 (New York: Random House, 1938), 290-294. Originally, 
the DSH planned for 40-year mortgages, however, all actual agreements called for 30-
year amortization. In the 1930s thirty-year mortgages financing personal residences were 
nearly non-existent. Contemporary long-term home mortgages became more-or-less 
standard only with the return of service men from their war-time service. 
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There were plenty of such people in Tupelo, they just were not likely to submit to 
regimented and standardized detail, nor were they likely to submit to ownership 
provisions at variance with fee-simple occupancy. Tupelo was different from most other 
small Mississippi towns. With a population of 6,000, over 2,000 were industrial workers. 
The average per capita income of the first homesteaders was actually between $1,300 and 
$1,900 ($20,022 - 29,555) per year. Contrary to the initial guidelines, every head of 
household in the Tupelo Homesteads held full-time employment. Compared to the 
residents of other industrial projects established by DSH, many of which were located in 
far more prosperous regions than Tupelo, the Tupelo Homesteaders' incomes ranked 
among the highest. Of all the DSH projects, the Tupelo Homesteaders ranked fifth in 
terms of family income. Clearly, the Tupelo Homesteaders did not represent the clientele 
the president had originally envisioned.50 
Applicants for homesteads at Tupelo underwent the same rigorous examinations 
as applicants for all DSH and RA subsistence projects. The homestead association 
forwarded applications to a committee of local volunteers; the volunteers forwarded 
selected applications back to the homestead association. The state committee, chaired by 
I. B. Bradshaw and Mississippi State College home management specialist Anne Jordan, 
RG 79, "Summary and Justification."; Groves, 60. The Tupelo Journal, 19 November 
1934 listed the initial homesteaders and their employment status. The newspaper listed 
James Barron as a part-time employee of the Nehi Bottling Company. However, Mr. 
Barron's application and occupancy contract listed his annual income as $1,600 per year. 
It is likely that Mr. Barron worked a full week. If not his income from part-time 
employment compared very favorably to full-time workers. There seems to have been 
some subterfuge with regard to some of the applicants' statement of financial resources. 
Many of the homesteaders, Mrs. Perkins, for instance, owned other property. 
then screened the applications. Finally, the national DSH Committee, chaired by 
Charlotte Smith, made the final selection. 
Banks Livingston, a long-time Tupelo resident and local historian, remembers the 
Tupelo Homesteads and the attitude of the community toward the Homesteaders. They 
were not, he said, thought of as being on relief; there was no stigma attached to being a 
homesteader. In fact, he thought, the community viewed the homesteaders as one might 
view contest winners. Times were tough; maybe they could make this pay off to their 
advantage. They might choose to stay there and they might not. 
Strangely, it was the infamous tornado of April 1936 that spelled doom for the 
Tupelo Homesteads. The tornado created a wide swath of destruction in Tupelo, 
demolishing hundreds of homes and businesses. The resulting building boom created a 
localized economic revival. Scores of new homes and apartments, many of higher 
quality than the Tupelo Homesteads, came on the market. The original homesteaders 
now had a better economic environment and more housing options.52 
Banks Livingston, interview by author, 10 November 1999; the tape is in author's 
possession. 
cry 
Kathleen Perkins, interview by Sara Amy Leach and Leslie Blythe, 17 April 1977, 
transcript, Natchez Trace Parkway, General Files, Tupelo, MS. Vaughn L. Grisham, Jr., 
Tupelo: The Evolution of a Community (Dayton: Kettering Foundation Press, 1999), 87, 
134. The intense but short-term lack of housing created a barrage of letters to the 
Resettlement Administration and from prominent Tupelo citizens and Congressman 
Rankin and Senator Harrison. The RA had approved an additional project for Tupelo in 
1936. This new project, Tupelo Industrial Garden Community, was to provide seventy 
homes for white and thirty for black occupancy. Although land had been placed under 
option and the budget approved, the RA used the funds to help provide relief for farmers 
in the drought-stricken Midwest. The new Tupelo project was never built. It would have 
been the fourth of TugwelPs Garden Cities. See: RG 83, Records of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Statistics, USDA Files, NARA, College Park, MD. 
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By 1937, the circumstances of the typical homesteader had changed. None of the 
original homesteaders contracted to buy their homes. Since many of the new residents 
replacing the original homesteaders were employees of the TV A and the National Park 
Service, and were assigned to the Tupelo area on a temporary or rotational basis, they had 
no intention of buying their homes and opted for month-to-month rental occupancy. 
The homesteaders were initially given two contract options. Contract A called for 
a two-year lease, after which time the homesteader was to pay twenty-five percent of the 
selling price of the homestead and begin mortgage payments. This sales price, not 
established until the local corporation assumed ownership of the entire project, was an 
item of contention. The two-year lease period was designed by the DSH to allow 
residents time to accumulate the down payment. Equally important, the two-year period 
was to serve as a sort of probationary period. Some homesteaders might prove unreliable 
or disruptive. The building boom in Tupelo after the tornado caused the homestead 
property to be less valuable. From 1936 to 1940, the local Homesteaders were in 
constant conflict with the government over the fair market value of the properties.54 
Contract B was a month-to-month rental agreement. Both contracts were non-
binding on the homesteaders. Only after entering into a purchase agreement were the 
Homesteaders required to fulfill long-term obligations. None of the Homesteaders 
RG 79, copies of applications, leases, and letters of inquiry; Perkins interview, Natchez 
Trace Parkway, General Files,. 
54Ibid. 
exercised their purchase option and, thus, the Homesteaders were free to move at then-
convenience. The federal government had become, in effect, a tenant landlord. 
In May 1937, the Resettlement Administration (RA), which had taken over from 
the DSH, formed the Tupelo Homesteads Corporation, to replace the defunct Tupelo 
Homesteads of Mississippi, Inc., and authorized the newly-formed association to buy the 
project for $110,000. In view of the fact that the project had cost $149,290, the RA 
administrators believed that they had offered the local corporation a very good deal. The 
local association turned it down. On October 1,1938, after arguments, reappraisals, and 
reconsideration, the association finally agreed to purchase the project for $73,182. In 
terms of 2006 dollars, the RA offered houses, which had cost an average of $59,882 to 
construct and equip, for sale for $31,480.5 
The Tupelo Homesteads Corporation had no more success with the project than 
had its federal predecessor. While vacancies were rare because of the low rents and the 
Conkin, 334. As mentioned earlier, the estimated budget for the Tupelo Homesteads 
was in the $50,000 to $80,000 range; why the discrepancy? Part of the answer is in the 
increased inefficiency that came as a function of more centralized control following the 
Comptroller General's rulings and Ickes' micro-management. However, the biggest 
reason is that in 1936 under pressure from Tugwell, Director of RA, ten additional units 
were built at Tupelo. These new units were technically not part of the DSH program, 
they were designated as a "garden community" under the auspices of the RA. Some 
evidence indicates that Tugwell intended for the new addition to actually be the fourth of 
his "greenbelt communities." The drought cattle purchase effort dried up funds intended 
for the project. However, since they were situated on the property bought for the Tupelo 
Homesteads and since they were separated from the original houses only by U.S. 
Highway 45, they were added to the Tupelo Homesteads and offered to the association as 
part of the Homesteads. These ten houses, unlike the originals are composed of brick 
veneer. They are obviously of another mind-set regarding subsistence housing. 
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need for temporary quarters for workers involved in constructing the TV A and the 
Natchez Trace Parkway, no one, it seemed, cared to own a "subsistence homestead." 
The delays, regulations, and duplication of efforts actuated by the DSH insistence on 
centralized control removed the efficiencies available through local knowledge. The 
homesteaders found better construction at lower prices available in the community. Even 
by its own admission, the homesteads were inferior in materials and construction to 
homes available through the private sector.57 
In late 1939, the National Park Service commenced conversations with the Tupelo 
Homestead Corporation concerning the Parkway's acquisition of the homesteads. The 
Tupelo project still experienced trouble with delinquencies, turnovers, and the continued 
lack of home buyers. The Parkway employees complained of high rents in Jackson and 
Tupelo was very near the center of the Trace. These two factors, coupled with the nature 
of the Tupelo Homesteads' occupancy problems, made the acquisition of the homesteads 
by the Park service attractive. On 31 October 1940, the National Park Service assumed 
ownership of the Tupelo Homesteads and made them a part of the Natchez Trace 
Parkway. To accommodate the inclusion of the properties, surveyors diverted the path of 
the Trace eastward so that the property now fell within the path of the Trace.58 
The Natchez Trace also moved its headquarters to Tupelo. Workers from a "stub" 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp at Plantersville helped Parkway workers 
57Perkins interview; A Place on Earth, 47-49. 
58Holley, 120; "Summary and Justification"; National Register of Historic Places 
Registration Form; Banks Livingston interview; "Report on the Tupelo Homesteads, Lee 
County, Mississippi," January 29,1940, Natchez Trace Parkway General Files; Natchez 
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combine three of the houses to form office space, moved four dwellings to widen the road 
shoulders, and the Park Service retained fifteen as employee quarters. The surplus 
houses remained available for rent until the last of the pre-trace acquisition renters 
vacated in 1953. Since 1953, all the remaining houses have been used as employee 
quarters.59 
Today, the Tupelo Homesteads look very much like they looked in the 1930s. In 
the mid 1950s, the Park Service made some changes, primarily the addition or enclosure 
of porches and the addition of windows. The Tupelo Homesteads, along with the 
Cumberland Homesteads, are the only New Deal communities of the one hundred built 
that retain their architectural, structural, and environmental integrity. Park Service 
ownership kept the Tupelo Homesteads from sale to individuals, thereby avoiding 
significant structural alteration.60 
Transference to the National Park Service made relationships between landlord 
and tenants even more grievous. Tenants did not understand the new provisions imposed 
by the National Park Service. Since Park employees assumed priority, some tenants, 
even those who had invested in purchases for improvement of their homesteads, were 
asked to vacate their homes, even though other houses were vacant. Many tenants were 
not informed of the changed nature of the property. When Mr. B. M. Anthony and his 
wife were reprimanded for conducting target practice (on an oak tree) on their "property" 
Trace Parkway Bulletin, Vol.1, no. 1, June, 1940, Natchez, MS; Natchez Trace Bulletin, 
Vol 1, nos.2&3, November 1940 and January, 1941, Jackson, MS. 
59Ibid., nos. 2&3; Date given by Roger Stubblefield, Natchez Trace Parkway, in 
conversation with author. 
National Register of Historic Places. 
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they were not convinced that the Park Ranger, Claude A Wagner, Jr., had the authority to 
interfere, and allowed that it was, "none of his damn business, anyway." Ranger Wagner 
responded by informing Mr. Anthony that the Park Service would dictate to him what he 
could plant and, furthermore, the efforts he made to enclose a cow and other animals 
were moot, since no farm animals would henceforth be allowed on Parkway property. 
After Ranger Wagner explained that the property was part of the National Park Service 
and that certain regulations regarding firearms were mandated by federal law and after a 
soothing letter of explanation from Acting Superintendent Malcolm Gardner, Mr. 
Anthony was somewhat mollified. However, Ranger Wagner, in his report of the 
incident to Gardner, indicated a certain appreciation of regional peculiarities and a bit of 
wariness about them: "Mr. Anthony is, I believe, a warm blooded southerner, native to 
this region, and a firm believer in individual rights, and from his attitude I knew he 
resented being asked to stop his target practice. His letter more than sustains my analysis 
of his character and temperament."61 
This neighborhood, quiet and secure, free from traffic, sits behind the Tupelo 
Visitors Center on the Natchez Trace Parkway. There are no signs informing passers-by 
of the genesis or philosophical motivations or the human drama associated with the 
Tupelo Homesteads; there is no information linking the Trace itself or the hidden houses 
to efforts of the government to help people endure the Great Depression. There is no 
B.M. Anthony to Malcolm Gardner, Acting Superintendent,. 11 November 1940; 
Memorandum for Mr. Smith from Claude A. Wagner, Jr., Park Ranger, Nov 13,1940; 
other letters of complaint from tenants as well as the Anthony, Wagner, and Gardner 
communications, all in: NATR Accession #290, Box 8, Folder 98, Natchez Trace 
Archives. 
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remembrance of the President or the First Lady at #20. There is no monument in the 
back yard of #7 to mark the gravesite of a baby girl.62 
The Tupelo Homesteaders were middle class white people who were temporarily 
distressed by the Great Depression. The qualifying procedures ensured that the colonists 
were ambitious and hard-working people with some economic skills. As a result, the 
Colony failed to attract permanent residents. The Tupelo Colonists were not willing to 
lower their aspirations to that of subsistence gardening and part-time work. They were 
too successful and confident to settle for a subsistence homestead 
The DSH projects were not designed to address the country's number one 
economic problem; they were not created to give succor to the downtrodden. The 
clientele of the DSH projects in general, and the Tupelo Homesteads in particular, were 
middle class folks who needed a place to regroup and reassume their particular notions of 
good living and community. About the same time that the first homesteaders moved in at 
Tupelo, other folks were moving into new homes just over in the Arkansas Delta. The 
Colonists at Dyess were among the most destitute and most desperate plain whites in the 
United States. At Dyess, Arkansas, the New Deal tried its own form of alchemy. The 
bosses at Dyess did not try to turn base metal or precious metal into gold; they tried to 
The interviewee, by last account (1999) is still living. The author sees no good reason 
for revealing his identity in view of the fact that such revelation serves no valid historical 
purpose and that such revelation would most likely revisit an area of intense emotional 
pain and guilt. It was illegal in the 1930s, as it is now, to bury corpses privately. 
, Interview by Sara Amy Leach, transcript, Natchez Trace Parkway Archives, 
General Files. A copy of the transcript is retained by this writer. 
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resurrect and recreate an American not seen since the late seventeenth century - the 
American peasant-yeoman. 
CHAPTER IV 
"FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE PEACE, HEALTH, AND 
SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC OF ARKANSAS" 
"What class of people will be elegitable to thease farms (sic)? Melvin Raley, De 
Queen, AR, 17 September 1934 
". . . we are share croppers on the Ark River bottoms. Mr. Griffin (my husband) is now 
in his Iff1 year. We are too old and broke down to continue this kind of work. We have 
put forth effort far beyond our strength to keep off relief. [We] have never had to ask 
any one for any help. But now we are broke down..." (Mrs.) W A Griffin, Sherrill, 
AR, 23 September 1934. 
"How down and out must a man be before he can get in on it?" F. M. Wauhole, Fargo, 
OK, 7 July 1934. 
"The corn didn't tassle (sic). The oats didn't get big enough to mow. The peas 
didn't come up. The tomatoes are standing just like we put them out, haven't 
grown at all. The peanuts haven't a peanut on them. . ." Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Barton, 
Springdale, AR, 1 August 1934.l 
Dyess Colony, the largest of all New Deal relief/rehabilitation communities, 
proved to be one of the most troublesome and contentious of the agrarian programs. It 
cost a little over $3 million, it was only mildly successful, and that success was 
glimmering, passing, and short-lived. Dispossessed whites encountered a bewildering 
succession of agencies, assorted paperwork, and differences of opinion as they worked to 
gain yeomanry status. The new, and to some cloistering, close association of government 
employees, regulations, terminology and the ever-changing nature of New Deal 
ministrations created tensions between the plain whites and their bosses. The 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the American Farm Bureau Federation 
1
 Letter to W. R. Dyess from Melvin Raley, 17 September 1934; letter to Bureau of 
Agriculture from W.A Griffin, wife and 14 year old son; letter to W. R. Dyess from F.M. 
Wauhole, 9 July 1934; letter to W. R. Dyess from Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Barton, 1 August 
1934, all in University of Arkansas, Special Collections, WPA Administration File, MS 
UN 3, hereinafter referred to as "WPA Administration File." 
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(AFBF), the Agricultural Extension Service, and the southern Democratic power base 
attacked both the programs and the philosophy of New Deal agrarian relief/rehabilitation 
programs. While the New Deal contended with internal divisions and external attacks, 
dispossessed whites in Dyess were left to mind their own business and to do as the 
supervisors said. Some of them sought to cooperate fully with the government no matter 
in what alphabet agency manifestation it appeared, others murmured and agitated for 
change. Some tried to manipulate the system - and some did. 
Dyess, Arkansas had no traditions. There were no stories and legends of early 
founders, no heroic tales of fleeing the floods or surviving malaria - or Yankees. It had 
no history. Almost overnight, a thriving community of about 3,000 souls became 
residents of an instant city. Apparently, the town was born mature; there was no 
transition from crude trading posts and hovels of rough lumber to modern buildings. All 
Dyess buildings were brand new. The town was a little odd; Rexford ("Rex the Red") 
Tugwell's New Deal co-conspirators had equipped the town with a gin, swimming pool, 
school, community center, gristmill, slaughterhouse, blacksmith shop, lumberyard, 
railroad depot, hospital, service station, garage, general store, cafe, grocery store, and 
other ancillary services and thirty-two houses. "Government men" occupied the houses.2 
2
 "Dyess Colony Inc," typed narrative with references to letters, RA inspection reports, 
RG 96, FSA and Predecessor Agencies, Project Records, 1934-1940, AK 80, Box 181, 
ACC 59A-I2I3. This Document in divided into several sections. Hereinafter this source 
cited as "Dyess Colony Inc," with the appropriate Section. "Dyess Colony Inc, 
Background History"; "Resume of Procedures and Problems of Planning Inspection Trips 
and Moving Families to Dyess Colony; F. J. Hemmen, "Detailed Report of Visit to the 
Dyess Rural Industrial Community Near Osceola, Arkansas Under the Direction of 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration," all in RG 96 AK-80 003, hereinafter RG 96 ; 
The (Dyess, AR) Colony Herald, 22 May, 1936; The Commercial Appeal, 5 November 
1936; The Mississippi County Sentinel, 22 May 1936; "National Register of Historic 
Places Inventory - Nomination Form, Dyess Colony, n.d." RG 96; Southwest Times 
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It seemed like a good idea at the time. William Dyess, levy contractor, mule 
dealer, politician, cotton baron, and Director of the Arkansas Emergency Relief 
Administration, had access to a huge Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) 
grant, thousands of acres of abandoned and tax-defaulted Delta land, and thousands of 
dispossessed plain whites within a fifty-mile radius of his Mississippi County, Arkansas 
home. According to H.C. Baker, a close associate, William R. Dyess, 
conceived the idea of building an agricultural community. A colony of 
five hundred homes - homes which were to be modern, liveable (sic) 
homes with electricity, running water, private sewage and other 
advantages usually associated only with urban communities, and which 
would raise the standard for farm homes to a new high level. He 
conceived in his plan a hospital, schools, churches, in fact a new order of 
things for those who through no fault of their own found it almost 
impossible to make their way.3 
There is no evidence of how Dyess managed to reconcile the obvious dilemmas 
that his notions created. His success as a planter was in large measure due to his 
exploitation of the very labor system that his project threatened. He imagined, at first 
800, then 700, and finally 500 families in neat modern houses reaping a competence from 
the most fecund agricultural land in the world. Dyess and his colleagues very quickly 
Record, 20 May 1934; Arkansas Gazette, 10 June 1977; Arkansas Democrat, 29 
December 1934. References to "government men" are ubiquitous in the correspondence 
files, for example see: letter to W. R Dyess from Jesi A. Chance, 14 October 1934, 
University of Arkansas, Special Collections, "U.S. Works Progress Administration File, 
hereinafter "WPA Administration File. Like many things at Dyess, notions changed 
quickly. Dyess planed for 40 residences, but in fact the Colony only built 32. See 
"Resume of Procedures" RG 96. 
3
 H. C. Baker, "Dyess Colony," in Traveling Recovery Road: The Story of Relief, Work-
Relief and Rehabilitation in Arkansas, August 30, 1932 to November 15, 1936 (Little 
Rock: Emergency Relief Administration, 1936), 153. The original plans called for the 
establishment of 750 families on a 20-acre plot. Originally, there was to be no 
modification of farm sizes because of exceptional circumstances. For reference to the 
change in philosophy, see: Letter to Harry Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937, RG 
96. 
altered their notions about the cookie-cutter one-size-fits-all economic units and planned 
for 500 families on plots of land consistent with family needs and the labor force of each 
family. His colonization project, as suggested by its name, Colonization Project No. 1, 
was to be only the first. Although President Roosevelt had promised a New Deal from 
the bottom up, he bowed to political necessity and expediency. The New Deal 
aggressively propped up the traditional pillars of wealth and control of agrarian America, 
most energetically in the Delta. Perhaps Dyess felt comfortable with his potential 
conflict of interest activities because the cotton barons had much better-connected, 
financed, and powerful advocates — the American Farm Bureau Federation and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). Dyess identified, personally, with the 
Arkansas cotton barons. At the time of Dyess Colony's creation, his colleagues and 
neighbors were busy brutalizing evicted cotton cultivators; in response to such wholesale 
violence dispossessed white and black cotton cultivators formed the Southern Tenant 
Farmers' Union (STFU) in adjacent Cross County. Asked about the alleged wholesale 
evictions of neighboring sharecroppers, Dyess claimed that he saw no more cropper 
migration this season (1934) than any other crop-year. By providing to prosperous 
farmers (cotton barons in particular) generous benefits, it most likely appeared to Dyess, 
with good reason, that the AAA would more than adequately safeguard the interests of 
cotton barons. Presumably freed from intolerable pangs of conscience, Dyess submitted 
plans and received approval for "Colonization Project No. 1." Harry Hopkins, supported 
by Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, approved the project in March 1934. 4 
4Letter to Hon. Harry L. Hopkins from Floyd Sharp 20 May 1937, RG 96; letter to 
Colonel Lawrence Westbrook from William R. Dyess, 30 November 1934, University of 
Arkansas Special Collections, WPA Management File. Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's 
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The Bosses at Dyess 
At least two phenomena differentiate the Dyess Colony from most other New 
Deal programs. The leadership of and at Dyess was atypically constant. The top echelon 
of officials at Dyess tended to leave their posts only on the most dramatic conditions; 
William Dyess died and the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony fired Colonel Lawrence 
Westbrook. (Even after The Dyess Board fired Westbrook from his consultant position, 
the Colonel continued to be an ally.) The continuity of the officials and the colony's 
existence outside the direction of New Deal Agencies (WPA and RA), made Dyess 
Colony an inviting target for New Deal critics. In 1939, the political danger cited above 
caused Dyess Colony to seek refuge under the aegis of the Farm Security A6!ministration 
(FSA), created in 1937. Furthermore, the odd legal status for Dyess meant that the 
Colony was treated as any other entity in its application for government acreage 
allotments, relief eligibility certification, and yet was required to apply to its clients the 
provisions of the current agricultural relief program. Although technically free from 
direct authority of the FERA, WPA, RA, and the AAA, each of those agencies imposed 
particular and specific procedures. For example, each of the agencies in its turn and by 
its own guidelines determined the amount of "furnish" available to each of the Colonists. 
Thus, even though their situation at Dyess Colony created different problems but offered 
expanded opportunities compared to FERA, WPA, and RRC clients, the same guidelines 
and regulations applied. Likewise, the Colonists were required to execute the same 
budget and farm plans, as were the RRC Rehabilitators and RA clients. All of the cotton 
Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1975), 33, 36. 
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cultivators and would-be yeoman farmers were constrained by the acreage quotas 
assigned by the AAA county production committees, dominated by cotton barons, 
County Extension Agents and American Farm Bureau Federation officers and 
functionaries. In addition to the foregoing grounds of dissension, the fierce political 
battles in Arkansas between the "Federal crowd" and the "statehouse bunch" complicated 
the Colony's existence. U.S. Senators Joseph T. Robinson and Hattie Caraway were die 
most prominent members of the Federal element. William Dyess, Ben Butler (a 
Mississippi County implement dealer and vocal supporter of the colony), and Floyd 
Sharp led the local "statehouse" forces. The resulting statehouse brouhaha denigrated the 
colony and the colonists in the eyes of many. Among the more important bosses with 
whom plain whites negotiated were Floyd Sharp, Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, H.C. 
Baker, E.S. Dudley, W.A. Rooksbery, R.C. Limerick, Harry Hopkins, Arkansas 
Governor J. Marion Futrell, and construction supervisor Cone Murphy. Colonists' 
encounters were more frequent and more intense with some of these bosses than with 
others. An inverse ratio regulated exchange between the government men and 
dispossessed whites; the greater the luminance of the government men, the less was 
intimacy with the plain whites of Dyess. Four of the Dyess leaders are of particular 
interest.5 
5
 Arkansas Gazette, 16 January 1936,23 March 1939,10 June 1977; The Commercial-
Appeal, 6 June 1999; RG 96, Archives II, letter to Harry L. Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 
20 May 1937, letter to Colonel Lawrence Westbrook from Floyd Sharp 20 May 1937, 
The Colony Herald, 1 May 1936; Arkansas Democrat, 16 March 1939; RG 96, Archives 
II, National Register of Historic Places Inventory - Nomination Form, "Dyess Colony"; 
RG 96, Everett Dewey Henson, "Memories of the Dyess Colony"; Conklin, Tomorrow a 
New World, 137-38; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 31-26; Otto, The Final Frontiers, 
103-105. 
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William Reynolds Dyess was bom near Hazlehurst, Mississippi in 1894 and died 
in a plane crash on his way back to Arkansas from Washington a little after dark on 14 
January 1936. The plane crash that killed all seventeen aboard, including Dyess and the 
Chief Accountant and Director of Finance and Reports, Robert H. McNair, Jr., was, at the 
time, the worst aviation tragedy in American history. The errand that sent Dyess to 
Washington and the proximate cause of his death involved arranging the financing for the 
new schools at the colony. The circumstances of his death, Dyess's magnetic and 
attractive physical presence, and the dynamic ease with which he managed his far-flung 
agency made Dyess a legendary character in the minds of most folks, even among those 
who later bitterly opposed the colony management. Floyd Sharp, Dyess's successor, paid 
homage to the almost mythic figure in explaining to Harry Hopkins just why the Colony 
needed a different legal identity than the one provided by general oversight of the 
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. "In March, 1936, with all the respect in the 
world to Mr. Dyess, we decided that circumstances made necessary the changing of some 
of his original plans." The primary change in original plans intended that the new legal 
entity of the colonization project escape the control of the Arkansas ERA and successor 
agencies. More precisely, Sharp intended the new corporate status to protect his own 
ability to dispense patronage. 6 
Dyess was a fine example of a New South agrarian. After graduating from 
Mississippi A & M, he entered military service and served as an orderly to General John 
'Black Jack" Pershing in the Philippines. During the World War, Dyess was a cavalry 
6
 Letter to Hon. Harry Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937, RG 96. The Arkansas 
Gazette, 16 January 1936. 
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captain and taught at a military school in Georgia. After the war, Dyess took to Arkansas 
the skills he had learned from his father, cotton planting, mule trading, and contracting -
particularly levees, railroad beds, and gravel roads. He migrated to Arkansas and 
prospered in completion of contract work on the levees along the Mississippi and White 
Rivers. He bought thousands of acres of Delta wilderness and turned it into profitable 
cotton land. While building his financial status, Dyess also became a prominent figure in 
both local and state politics. He denied, however, just before bis death, that he had any 
serious gubernatorial ambitions.7 
Floyd Sharp was a lawyer from a modest background. He worked as a composer 
at the Arkansas Gazette - he maintained a life-long relationship with the Little Rock 
Typographer's Union - and after the war earned his baccalaureate and law degrees. After 
a brief private practice, discontinued due to ill health, Sharp joined the Arkansas 
Department of Labor as a statistician. His initial experience with relief work was with 
the state Emergency Relief Commission, a pre-New Deal agency funded by President 
Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Sharp's compassion for the 
dispossessed seems to be highly selective. In 1936, at the peak of wholesale tenant 
evictions in Northeast Arkansas, he refused to provide WPA benefits to members of the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). Upon Dyess's death, Sharp replaced him as 
Director of the Arkansas WPA. His colleagues elected him President of Dyess Colony, 
Inc. at its formation and he retained that position until the FSA liquidated the project. J. 
(Junius) Marion Futrell was Governor of Arkansas at the creation of Dyess Colony. He 
7
 The Colony Herald, "Colonists Celebrate Second Anniversary Today," 22 May 1936; 
The Commercial Appeal, 5 November, 1936; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 30-33. 
was a Dyess ally and remained a colony friend. After his defeat for re-election in 1936, 
Futrell became legal counsel for Dyess Colony, Inc. Some of the political rivalry of his 
past complicated the colony's existence.8 
Colonel Lawrence Westbrook, also using Federal Funds under state direction, had 
already established a project near Houston, Texas. Because Westbrook had experience in 
establishing a government funded and managed rural relief project, and because of 
Westbrook's resume of experience, Henry Hopkins recruited him as an assistant in the 
FERA and its successor, the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Westbrook's 
relationship with Dyess Colony is interesting. While he worked to bring economic 
security and societal enhancement to plain folks, Westbrook also exploited his 
relationship with them.9 
Lawrence Westbrook was not at all opposed to earning some money on the side 
and Floyd Sharp gave him an opportunity. Upon creation of Dyess Colony Inc., the 
ultimate control of the project passed from the Arkansas WPA to the corporation, the 
stock held in trust by the Secretary of Agriculture. Such re-organization took Westbrook 
from direct authority, but he retained his authority over matters that involved the WPA 
and rural relief and rehabilitation in general. The colonists at Dyess were still subject to 
8Grubbs, Cry From the Cotton, 95; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 30-32. 
9
 Paul K. Conklin, Tomorrow A New World: The New Deal Community Program, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), 132-33,135-37; Donald Holley, Uncle Sam's 
Farmers, 31-34,280-83. Westbrook was an engineer, Texas state legislator, and a cotton 
baron. His Woodlake Project (1934) was physically very similar to the DSH projects. 
However, the Woodlake Project represented a much more aggressive or progressive 
effort. At Woodlake, the clients paid rent from agricultural surpluses and cultivated 
communal fields. The contemporary literature often mentions Westbrook and his 
"French-style" project. Westbrook was also largely responsible for the creation of the 
Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia and Cherry Lake Farm, Florida projects. 
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the same benefits and obligations as were any other of the Rural Relief clients. For 
example, notwithstanding the various cooperative arrangements imposed by Dyess 
Colony, all Rural Rehabilitation Clients, including the Colonists at Dyess, remained RRC 
clients until its absorption by the FSA and had to execute household budgets and yearly 
farm plans. Initially, County Extension Agents approved the plans; after March of 1935, 
this approval came from the County Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor. Sharp urged 
Lawrence Westbrook, Assistant Administrator of the WPA and close associate of Harry 
Hopkins, to resign his high office and move to Dyess to be its Resident Director. 
Westbrook declined but did offer Sharp an alternative. In early June 1936, Westbrook 
presented Sharp with a contract for his personal services. He told Sharp, according to 
Sharp, that he had cleared the proposition with Harry Hopkins who thought the 
arrangements outlined in the proposed contract would be of great advantage to the 
colony. Westbrook proposed that he assume the position of "Management Consultant." 
For a salary of $5,000 per year, Westbrook proposed to provide the Colony with ninety 
days per year of continuous on-site service and management. Sharp, supposing that 
Hopkins approved the arrangement voted, as did Board Member H.C. Baker, to approve 
the contract. "Captain" R. C. Limerick, a member of the Board of Directors and also the 
Arkansas WPA Chief Engineer and Director of Operations, demurred. He thought, "for a 
salary of $5,000 a year we can get a man with talent and energy to work full-time." 
Outvoted on the issue 2-1, Captain Limerick, "being the gentleman that he is . . . made 
the motion that we enter into the contract and it was seconded by Mr. Baker." H.C. 
Baker and R.C. Limerick refused to approve one particular provision in Westbrook's 
proposed contract. Westbrook's proposal provided a $75.00 per diem reimbursement for 
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each day beyond ninety days expended on colony business. At the insistence of Baker 
and Limerick, the Board required advance approval for "extra days" compensation. 
Floyd Sharp granted E. S. Dudley a leave of absence from his Arkansas WPA 
position to move to Dyess as its Resident Director. On 9 June 1936, the Board of 
Directors of Dyess Colony, Inc. entered into the "management counsel" agreement with 
Westbrook. One year later the Board, with the silent concurrence of Harry Hopkins, fired 
him. On March 20 1937, Sharp wrote to Harry Hopkins to explain the Board's decision 
to fire Westbrook. The five-page letter is deferential, explanatory, and emphatic. Sharp 
emphasized, emphatically, that he and the Board were under the impression that Hopkins 
knew of and approved the contract and the concept. Sharp complained that Westbrook 
had reduced his actual time at the Colony to "five or six days a month" and attempted to 
manage the colony's interest from his Washington office. Westbrook, Sharp said, had 
sent people to the colony and made changes without informing the Board. He was 
particularly upset about Westbrook's "cancellation of an expensive accounting system." 
The colony had re-established the same system at a considerable expense. Sharp's letter 
described the complexity of managing a good-sized town, a new school system, and all 
the related civic as well as social and economic considerations that required the attention 
of competent management. Since Westbrook had not fulfilled these obligations, the 
management gap had to be filled and toward that end, he informed Hopkins that the 
Board had agreed to compensate board members Sharp, Baker, and Limerick at the rate 
of $100 per month for their services, but only when and as necessary. Sharp enclosed a 
series of Westbrook's expense reports and told Hopkins that he did not question the 
10
 All quotations in Letter to Harry Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937, RG 69. 
This letter, one written on the same day to Westbrook, and other letters in RG 69. 
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expenses as such but did question if the Colony could justify expenses beyond the control 
of the Board of Directors. For Hopkins' information and approval, Sharp enclosed a 
letter to Westbrook declaring the contract breached and the reasons. Remaining 
deferential to the end, Sharp asked Hopkins to send the enclosed letter to Westbrook or 
return it to Sharp for delivery. He, Limerick, and Baker, remained committed to 
whatever Hopkins thought best, but would resign should he disallow cancellation of the 
contract.11 
In the enclosed letter to Westbrook, Sharp was more specific, emphatic, and 
petulant with regard to the Board's dissatisfaction. Westbrook's attempt to manage by 
correspondence resulted in people arriving at the colony and claiming direct authority 
from Westbrook to institute changes without consultation with Resident Manager E. S. 
Dudley or with the Board. The Board understood that Westbrook would spend ninety 
days in residence at the colony, not just an occasional visit. Sharp complained that 
Westbrook did not see him on his last trip to Little Rock: "The evening you came 
through here, I waited in my office and called the hotel every thirty minutes until eleven 
o'clock, but, as you recall, you had gone to Hot Springs without checking out, and I did 
not get an opportunity to talk to you." The real problem with the contract was articulated 
in the third paragraph: "I must join with the opinion of the other two Board members that 
it is not fair to them for you to draw a good salary, under contract with the Colony, in 
excess of the amount they draw for the positions they hold with the Works Progress 
11
 Letter to Hon. Harry L. Hopkins from Floyd Sharp, 20 May 1937; letter to Lawrence 
Westbrook from Floyd Sharp, enclosed with letter to Hopkins, RG 96. 
Administration. . ." Assuring Westbrook of the "warmest personal feelings" of the 
board, Sharp declared that the contract was, for reasons stated in the letter, breached. 
The lucrative compensation bothered Sharp from the beginning, but, as he told 
Hopkins, he thought that Hopkins had approved both the nature of the contract and the 
compensation. In terms of current dollars, Westbrook's part time compensation of 
$5,000 per year is roughly equivalent to $72,727; his stipend of $75.00 for all days over 
ninety is equivalent to $1,090. By contrast, E.S. Dudley, Resident Manager earned $325 
per month, less than $4,000 per year. It was, in the vernacular of the age, "good work if 
you could get it."13 
Oddly enough, the close relationship continued. Correspondence reveals that 
Westbrook, Sharp, and Dyess Colony continued some sort of working relationship. 
Within a year Westbrook's name and position as Management Counsel reappeared on the 
Colony stationary. Sharp asked Westbrook for advice and help with the Arkansas 
Corporation Commission and Westbrook responded. Westbrook helped negotiate the 
sale of colony cotton and he devised a scheme to establish housing projects in West 
Memphis, and Hot Springs. Profits were to be divided between Dyess Colony, Inc and 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Calculations are from: 
http://www.prqiects.ex.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/current/howmuch.html. Salary figures are 
taken from: "Administrative Personnel," typewritten roll of monthly salaries in RG 69, 
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, "Dyess Colony." Sharps' petulance is understandable. 
It appears that Westbrook made a similar agreement with the other two "independent" 
projects, Cherry Lake Farms, Florida and Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia. I discovered 
this arrangement, at least a hint of it by accident. See: Letter to Mr. Laurence Powell 
from Floyd Sharp, 22 July 1936, WPA Management File. If Westbrook's compensation 
was near the level he bargained for with the Dyess Colony, then the extent of his larceny 
is truly breath taking and merits further examination. A look at Cherry Lake and Pine 
Mountain holds promise. 
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the particular politician so involved, a Judge in West Memphis and the Mayor in Hot 
Springs. The project would compensate Westbrook based on the profits accruing to 
Dyess Colony, Inc. Westbrook commented on the selection of families, helped to market 
the products of the colony's workshops, and continued to give solicited advice on various 
problems with the colony. It was a strange relationship. Sharp had cross words with 
Westbrook over an expense report related to the public housing project in April 1939 and 
yet Westbrook continued to consult and be a friend to the colony. Perhaps Sharp's 
outrage over the handsome compensation demanded by Westbrook would have been 
softened had he considered the rich compensation paid by the English Fine Spinners 
Association to AAA official Oscar G. Johnston. Beginning in 1927, the British 
manufacturers paid Johnston $40,000 per year, an amount equivalent to $464,248 in 
current dollars. Assuming that Delta sharecropper families earned $500 ($5,803 in 2006 
dollars) per year during the 1920s, (the most liberal estimate I have yet found) 
Westbrook's part-time income - his wages for ninety days - was a relatively modest, by 
today's standards, 12.5 times the annual income of the typical sharecropper family. If 
one accepts the more orthodox estimate of Delta cropper family income, $120-$l,912in 
2006 dollars, then Westbrook's part-time salary on a present-dollar annualized basis 
exceeded that of the cropper by a factor of thirty-eight. If Westbrook had managed a 
similar arrangement with other New Deal entities, he could have achieved an annual part-
time income of $290,908 in 2006 dollars, exclusive of his government salary. There is 
some evidence that he did. Of course, one of the barons of the cotton aristocracy, Oscar 
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G. Johnston, earned exclusive of his government salary, a little over 80 times the income 
of the most successful Delta cropper family.14 
Whether money or compassion for the poor motivated people to get in the relief 
business, there were ample opportunities to exert influence and to build political strength 
in job patronage. Whether one "got on" or "got in" at Dyess could be a function of 
influence. Governor Carl E. Bailey had reason to suspect that Floyd Sharp and others 
were building political power by using the facilities of Dyess. 
Dyess Colony - a brief political history 
Three distinct crises illuminate the political history of Dyess Colony. Two of 
them - the second following the first almost immediately, in March 1939 - came as a 
function of Arkansas Governor Carl E. Bailey's attempt to savage the political career of 
Floyd Sharp and to appropriate the awards of the patronage system. The third crisis was 
actuated by a revolt of some of the colonists. The first battle came as Governor Bailey -
narrowly winning a consecutive term, miffed by the opposition of Floyd Sharp, et. al., 
and jealous of the power-building patronage inherent in the relief and rehabilitation 
programs - instigated a plan to have Dyess Colony investigated and then placed under the 
control of Arkansas officials. In the second effort to destroy the colony, the Governor 
revoked the colony's charter. 
14
 Ibid.; letter to Dear Floyd from Lawrence Westbrook, 20 April 1939 and a series of 
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Poverty, (Baton Rouge: The University of Louisiana Press, 1978), 10-11. 
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Plain whites were only tangentially involved in the first two crises; they were the 
substance of the third. The third crisis is a principal consideration of Chapter Five. 
Throughout Dyess colony history a coterie of bureaucrats managed, directed, supervised, 
and improved, or tried to improve, the dispossessed whites. As New Deal agencies 
succeeded one another in bewildering rapidity, Dyess Colony was exempt from some of 
the agency-transition problems. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided 
the funds that purchased the land and built the project by providing a grant to the State 
Emergency Relief Administration; Arkansas had no legal mechanism for operating a 
commercial enterprise. To provide a legal entity, the state of Arkansas (like most other 
states) established a Rural Rehabilitation Corporation (RRC) under Delaware laws; The 
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation passed Federal funds to national and state 
relief and rehabilitation efforts and held title to Colonization Project No. 1. Upon the 
creation of the Resettlement Administration and the tragic death of William R. Dyess, 
Floyd Sharp, Dyess's successor, joined with H.C. Baker and R.C. Limmerick to 
incorporate Dyess Colony, Inc. with all three shares of stock pledged in trust to Harry 
Hopkins. 
The corporate status of the project both simplified and complicated the 
experiment's existence. The Arkansas RRC provided funding, for not only construction 
and implementation of the colony, but also allowed for some flexibility for emergencies 
and the colonists' debt. Primarily, the fund was to ensure the colony's existence. The 
Board of Directors invested the sizable remaining balance of the FERA grant in 
government bonds; the Board of Directors was authorized to use the bonds as security for 
loans to the Colony. In emergencies, the Board was authorized to sell the bonds to fund 
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capital needs. Floyd Sharp, H.C. Baker, R. C. Limerick, and W. A. Rooksberry, 
constituted the board of the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. Thus, three of 
four board members of the RRC became the Board of Directors of Colonization Project 
#1; Floyd Sharp was President and H. C. Baker, and RC. Limerick completed the 
directorship. W.A. Rooksberry, Director of the Unemployment Security Division of the 
state Labor Department, friend of Floyd Sharp, and political enemy of soon-to-be 
Governor Carl E. Bailey declined Board membership; he preferred, said Floyd Sharp in a 
letter to Harry Hopkins, to remain as an associate and advisor. The formation of Dyess 
Colony was not part of Dyess's original conception. There is no evidence that he ever 
conceived of the colonization project as anything other than part of an organized multi-
unit re-orientation of small-scale agriculture. The incorporation of Dyess, apart from any 
umbrella U.S. agency authority, was the product of Floyd Sharp. Baker and Limerick 
both remained employed by the Arkansas Emergency Relief Agency and its successor the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA). Further legal maneuvering involved separate 
corporations for the operation of the various Dyess Colony attendant business and 
operations such as the colony store, gin, and the business interests of the colonists. 
The Board of Directors decided to incorporate, under the laws of Arkansas, two 
cooperative associations, one to operate the colony's store and the other to gin and 
market the colonists'cotton-a consumer's and a producer's cooperative. By 1938, the 
Colony would have its own credit union, also cooperatively owned. The use of Arkansas 
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incorporation laws rather than those of Delaware was to leave the colony vulnerable to 
the vengeful actions of Governor Carl E. Bailey.15 
Governor Carl E. Bailey was the leader of the Arkansas "statehouse crowd" that 
vied with Sharp's associates for control of patronage and power. Although it is not to his 
credit, the actions of Bailey as a state governor, were similar to those of many governors 
who were jealous of the power held by the WPA chiefs. Fearful of potential vulnerability 
should the colony remain a part of the Arkansas RRC, Sharp requested help from allies in 
Washington. Dr. H. M. Colvin, an attorney with the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA), helped Sharp around the thorny problem of how to keep continued control of the 
colony. Colvin assured Sharp that incorporating under Arkansas laws rather than those of 
Delaware was proper and provided the greatest legal protection for the continued 
governance of the colony by Sharp and his colleagues. The language seemed to require 
that the Board of Directors of a chartered cooperative be chosen from the ordinary 
membership. Colvin explained to Sharp that the Arkansas statutes provided loopholes 
that avoided any diminution of the control of the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony, 
Inc. This attempt to evade democratic governance made the Colony vulnerable to attack 
from New Deal opponents and was ultimately responsible for the disintegration of Dyess 
Colony. This incident is also indicative of the advantages that Sharp held in the New 
15
 Dyess to Westbrook, 30 November 1934; "Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, 
Dyess Colony, Incorporated," 17 February 1936; 25 March 1936; 17 March 1937; 
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Deal hierarchy. Although free of the control and direction of the WPA, Sharp still had 
access to WPA staff for advice and research. l 
In April 1936, President Roosevelt created the Resettlement Administration and 
appointed Rexford G. (Guy) Tugwell as its Director. The Resettlement Administration 
assumed all the agrarian community efforts of the WPA, FERA, and DSH with three 
exceptions: Cherry Lake Farms at Madison, Florida; Pine Mountain Valley near 
Columbus, Georgia; and Dyess Colony. The corporate set up saved Dyess, possibly, 
from destruction at the hands of the cotton-baron dominated political machine under the 
administration of Carl E. Bailey. Bailey (inaugurated in January 1937) intended, 
according to reportage in the Arkansas Gazette, to destroy Floyd Sharp; he had already 
driven W.A. Rooksberry from his influential position, and to injure the colony's new 
attorney, former Governor J. Marion Futrell. Since the two cooperative associations were 
incorporated under Arkansas law, Bailey attempted to force a complete investigation into 
all manner of alleged improprieties at Dyess. He had authority to do so, he said, because 
the State of Arkansas might or might not have "an interest" in those corporations. The 
colony escaped Bailey's intended maledictions, oddly enough, through the efforts of 
some of Bailey's traditional supporters. The House Version of the Bill (HB 616) that 
authorized an investigation of the colony is instructive, especially its title and Section 3, 
produced below: 
A bill for an Act to be entitled; "An act to determine the extent of 
the State of Arkansas' interest in establishment, management, and 
disposition of Dyess Colony." 
H.M. Colvin to Floyd Sharp, 8 May 1936, RG 69 WPA Central Office Files. 
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Section 3. Whereas, it appears that the initial investments in what 
is now Dyess Colony were made with funds allotted to the state of 
Arkansas by the Federal Emergency Relief Adrninistration for general 
relief, said funds being endorsed or paid over to the Arkansas Rural 
Rehabilitation Corporation; and provision is made in the charter of that 
corporation for title in Dyess Colony to pass to the state of Arkansas after 
certain conditions have been fulfilled; and Dyess Colony, Inc., has 
succeeded the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation in control of the 
colony, and it is imperative, if Arkansas has any immediate or prospective 
interest in the colony that said interest be determined and protected; now 
therefore this act is necessary for the preservation of the peace, health and 
safety of the public of Arkansas and it shall be in force and effective from 
and after its passage.17 
There is nothing apparently sinister about Section 3. Reasonable and disinterested people 
could easily find value in ascertaining the ultimate disposition of Dyess property. 
However, the purported reason for the bill, i.e., an investigation into whether or not the 
state of Arkansas had "an interest" in the colony was disingenuous at the least. The 
corporate structure of Dyess mandated that at the suspension of operations the title fell to 
the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States; the assets to be distributed via 
agreements between the Governor of Arkansas and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. 
The House passed the bill but upon presentation in the Senate, the bill met with open 
hostility by those who recognized the vicious political vendetta that it represented. The 
bill called for an investigation conducted, not by the Attorney General, but by the 
Corporation Commission, a board recently "refreshed" by Bailey appointees. Such 
blatant, malicious, and transparent political debauchery was too much even for the rough 
and tumble Arkansas politicians. Arkansas governors, since the Reconstruction 
Constitution (from 1874 and until 1984), served terms of two years and could serve 
successive terms. The bi-annual election required that contestants for political power 
Copy of Arkansas House Bill 616, RG 69, WPA Central Office Records. 
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(not always represented in holding office) keep close tabs and short accounts with their 
political allies.18 
At its creation Dyess Colony filed papers with the State Corporation Commission 
claiming non-profit status. The cooperatives were simply an entity for managing and 
directing cooperative economic activities for individual cooperative members. All 
profits, dividends, and surpluses were distributed among the members. Angered by 
Sharp's support of his gubernatorial opponent, Bailey had his functionaries introduce a 
bill that called for an investigation of the Dyess Colony by the State Corporation 
Commission.19 
By 7 March 1939, Floyd Sharp was confident that nothing would come of 
Bailey's assault. He informed Lawrence Westbrook, "It seems that my friends conceived 
the idea of putting an amendment on the Bill transferring the question... to the Office of 
the Attorney General, on the theory that it was a legal question and not one for the 
Corporation Commission to investigate with auditors." After opposing the amendment, 
the administration changed its view and urged its adoption in order to have a vote on the 
bill before adjournment. Even though the general consensus held that the addition of the 
amendment was the death-knell of Bailey's attempt to disgrace Sharp, Bailey faced one 
final frustration in his attempt. On the last day of the legislative session, State Senator 
Ellis Fagan, a long-time friend of Governor Bailey, began a filibuster. Fagan's loyalty to 
the Governor, notwithstanding, he allowed only three brief interruptions while he slowly 
and deliberately read the introductory remarks from the Colony's last audit. Ellis Fagan, 
Arkansas Democrat, 6- 9 March 1939; Arkansas Gazette, 6- 9 March 1939. 
Ibid. 
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a loyal Bailey supporter and "statehouse crowd" stalwart proved by his actions that he 
was capable of rising above petty Arkansas political considerations. The Arkansas 
Legislative Session ended at noon on 9 March 1939; the Colony had been spared. 
Floyd Sharp wrote to Lawrence Westbrook in words that are easily interpreted as 
"crocodile tears" or simply a smirk. He reported to Westbrook on 9 March: 
I feel badly about it for several reasons. First, Senator Fagan, who 
led the floor fight has been a close personal friend of Governor Bailey for 
years... 
I thought it wise, in self-defense, to show a little strength and 
defeat this measure, and was successful, but it will only serve to intensify 
their feelings against me. 
The next day Governor Bailey dropped the other shoe. The State Corporation 
Commission revoked the Dyess Charter. Bailey had carefully replaced members of the 
commission with his own allies and had them revoke the charter claiming the Dyess 
Colony had failed to file a report for three years and had not paid the $ 11.00 annual fee 
required of Arkansas Corporations. The Dyess Colony Board of Directors promptly 
published two letters from the Arkansas Corporation Commission to the Colony 
informing that the Colony was indeed classified as a non-profit and therefore, exempt 
from taxes and reports. The letters, dated 9 February and 21 February, addressed to J.M. 
Futrell and Dyess Colony, respectively, were followed by a strange and in retrospect 
downright goofy epistle from W.S. Miller, of the commission. He said that since they 
had informed the Colony and its attorney in February that the colony qualified as a non-
profit, that they had thought about it some more and decided that the Colony was not 
20
 Ibid. Arkansas Gazette, 10 March 1939. 
21
 Letter to Lawrence Westbrook from Floyd Sharp, RG 96. 
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exempt. The letter informing of the revised status dated 10 March 1939, arrived a full ten 
days too late for Dyess Colony to comply with the reconsidered regulations. Miller's last 
sentence in the letter explained why he had bothered to write, "I feel you are entitled to 
know the position taken by the commission." In the meantime, Ellis Fagan received 
praise for his political integrity and it did not cost the Governor at all. 
Sharp, in Donald Holley's description, now subdued and depressed, assembled 
advisors and with Limerick and Baker formed Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. 
In turn, the Board of Directors of Dyess Colony Incorporated sold the property to Dyess 
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation.23 The disposition of the Colony was clearly 
articulated; at the end of operations, mandated by the revocation of the Charter to 
conclude within three years, the assets would devolve to the Secretary of Agriculture of 
the United States. Floyd Sharp remained President of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation until its functions were subsumed into the Farm Security Administration 
(FSA) in 1944. "In 1951 the Farmers Home Association (FHA) simply closed its files on 
the Dyess Colony."24 
Blanks and Bureaucracy at Dyess 
22
 "Minutes" 22 March 1939; W.S. Miller, Secretary Tax Division, Arkansas Corporation 
Commission to Dyess Colony, Inc., 9 February 1939; W.S. Miller to J. M. Futrell, 21 
February 1939; and W.S. Miller to J.M. Futrell, Legal Advisor, 10 March 1939, all in 
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24
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The Great Depression may have been the worst of times, but not as bad for some 
as for others. Cotton barons, the politically connected, and government bureaucrats fared 
better than most. From every rattle of the New Deal cup there poured letters designating 
a new level of federal bureaucracy. Each alphabet agency required its own directors, 
administrators, assistants, and a horde of clerical personnel, caseworkers, home 
demonstrators, inspectors, and accountants. Some plain whites of the Delta meekly 
submitted to the status of wage-labor relief and the psychological and physical malaise 
into which it cast them. A phalanx of self-consciously competent and solemnly serious 
bureaucrats inspected their houses, rummaged through personal possessions, asked 
pointed and embarrassing questions about spending and personal habits; they wanted to 
know: how "enthusiastic" they were in their religion, how much they drank, and what 
diseases and disabilities were present. The "government men" directed, or tried to, their 
lives. Dyess Colony and government men introduced plain whites to one of the most 
irritating attributes of modernity; they produced "blanks." Government men required 
blanks, or forms, for the commodities program, a blank for Rural Relief registration, a 
blank for WPA eligibility, another one for certification, a blank for, it seemed, about 
everything one touched in the New Deal.25 
In the New Deal, blanks represented power and assumed an aura of authority 
equal to at least that of the Minor Prophets. It seemed to the dispossessed that blanks 
were the key to actuating the programs of the New Deal, and plain white petitioners had 
^"Blank" was the generic term most used for application forms. See: James Truly to W. 
R. Dyess, no date, WPA File. "Pertinent Agricultural Data," typewritten draft of form 
used in interviewing potential clients, RG 96.The reference to "government men" and 
"the girl in the office" are ubiquitous in the archives. For example, see: Levi Skyron to 
W.R. Dyess,14 October 1934. 
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great difficulty locating them. Representative of this appreciation of the near miracle-
working power of the blank is the supposition of T.H. Davis of Prattsville, Arkansas. 
Davis asked W.R. Dyess when the application blanks would be distributed for sale. The 
reverence that plain whites gave to blanks was a subset of the value that they gave to the 
printed and official word. One of the most obvious markers of success was the inclusion 
of one's name on the letterhead. 26 
Official letterhead clothed the bearer with authority not necessarily justified by 
the verbiage, as illustrated by Mrs. Emery Hall of Lake City, Arkansas. Mrs. Hall was in 
a fix. She had told her landlord, who was insisting that she vacate the property, about 
Colonization Project No. 1, and showed him a letter on official stationary from W.R. 
Dyess. Dyess's letter was a standard generic response to queries about becoming a 
colonist. The form letter said, among other things, that the first colonists would arrive in 
October; Mrs. Hall, accordingly, had made plans to move. She showed her letter to her 
landlord who agreed, based on the power of the official printed word and Mrs. Hall's 
interpretation of it, to allow her to stay on her place until October. Mrs. Hall was 
desperate by 6 October. She had not enrolled her children in the local school because she 
could not afford to buy two sets of books - one for the local school and another for use in 
the colony's schools. She had not heard from Dyess, was she going to get one of the 
farms? Her landlord wanted her to move. What was she to do? She wanted help and 
advice; she asked the man whose name was emblazoned on the official script.27 
26
 Letter to W.R. Dyess from T.H. Davis, 24 September 1935, WPA Administration File. 
27
 Letter to W.R. Dyess from Mrs. Emery Hall, 6 October 1934, Ibid. Mrs. Hall's effort to 
gain entrance to the Colony continued. See Chapter Five. 
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Blanks, or the lack of them, had already driven both government men and their 
clients to distraction. In the 1931 England, Arkansas "food riot" local Red Cross officials 
ran out of blanks and, according to administrative orthodoxy, had no choice but to halt 
distribution of emergency subsistence vouchers - blanks in the vernacular of plain folks. 
The plain whites of England, Arkansas did not yet appreciate the sacrosanct nature of the 
blank; they failed to see how the lack of a form was credible reason for their children to 
go hungry again. The merchants of England, rather than see their stock of goods 
appropriated by the crowd prevailed upon the Red Cross locals to accept receipts, in lieu 
of vouchers. In the summer of 1933, with three weeks left in the cotton acreage reduction 
sign-up period, a shortage of blanks brought howls from the County Extension Agents 
frantically trying to implement the program. T. Roy Reid, director of the Arkansas 
Extension Service wired Cully Cobb, head of the Cotton Section of the AAA and former 
director of the Mississippi Extension Service: "Need contract blanks immediately. 
Campaign being greatly retarded by shortage of blanks. Please rush supply." Stymied 
because of the lack of the semi-sacred script, Reid, a few days later, reported on the 
sluggish progress, "committeemen could finish this week if blanks available." Finally, 
someone from this large group of college educated government men courageously broke 
the bounds of orthodoxy and suggested that the county agents make their own blanks, 
using any form of suitable paper. They could make the plow-up pledges legal by 
transferring them to the proper blanks (forms) later. It is difficult for contemporaries to 
understand the power of perceived "official words." Plain whites felt reverence and 
stood in awe of the power of the printed word. 28 
28
 Keith J. Volanto, "The AAA Cotton Plow-up Campaign in Arkansas," The Arkansas 
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Mississippi County, Dyess's home county, was an ideal place to hatch 
Colonization Project No. 1. Later, Arkansas investigators would quiz William Dyess 
about the happy circumstances of its physical location in Dyess's home county. Dyess 
avoided sanction not only because it appears there was no collusion involved but also 
because it would be hard to imagine a better deal on Delta land. How much land Dyess 
bought, from whom, and how much he paid for it became grounds of contention. Dyess, 
using funds from the original FERA grant, negotiated the purchase at $2.50 per acre. The 
public perception that Dyess had bought the land for $2.50 an acre obscured the truth. 
Before Dyess could deliver the property to the Arkansas Emergency Relief 
Administration, there was a matter of accumulated levee taxes, drainage district fees, 
survey costs, and myriad incidentals. Mirroring the complaints of the Tupelo and 
McComb Division of Substance Housing projects, and citing the $2.50 land price, Dyess 
colonists viewed the final purchase-price as an outrage. Further misunderstandings arose 
because of the reportage of the land sale. The Memphis Commercial Appeal reported 
that Dyess purchased about 20,000 acres of land; The Southwest Times Record reported 
that the purchase included 10,000 acres; the Colony Herald reported 16,000 acres, and a 
history of the colony says Dyess bought 16,000 acres from "drainage district no.9 at an 
average price of $8.50 an acre in back taxes. Some references cite 17,000 acres, others 
about 17,000, and still others quote 17,500 acres. The foremost historian of the New 
Deal agricultural efforts in the lower Mississippi Valley, Donald Holley, has untangled 
Historical Quarterly, 4, (4), (Winter, 2000): 389-406; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 3-5; 
17-24. 
29
 Henson, "Memories of the Dyess Colony," RG 96. Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 35. 
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the web. Dyess originally planned to purchase 20,000 acres belonging to Lee Wilson 
Company, Creamery Package Company, and drainage district Number 9. He was not 
able to negotiate that purchase. Finally, Dyess purchased 15,144 acres of tax-forfeited 
cut over and swamp land. The final cost, not price, of the improved land was 
$136,994.49, $9.05 per acre. Perception is often far more important than reality; the 
perceptions about price and costs incited dramatic Dyess revolts. 30 
In addition to the confusion over the size of the purchase, some thought that W.R. 
Dyess had acquired the property in order to benefit his personal associates. Responding 
to questions about the project by Senator Thomas P.Gore of Oklahoma in debate over the 
proposed Bankhead Bill in the U.S. Senate, Dyess wrote, not to the Oklahoma solon, but 
to the Arkansas boss, Senator Joe T. Robinson. He hastened to assure Robinson that the 
land purchase was a disinterested business transaction. 
When the titles, passed on by our Legal Department in amount of 
approximately 16,000 acres, were presented to us for payment, the Federal 
Court, through its receiver, gave us a title to this property. The Drainage 
Commissioners of both Districts No. 9 and Nos. 3 to 9 gave us title to this 
property, and at no time has any part of this property been purchased by 
us from any individual whatever?1 (Italic emphasis added) 
Dyess's letter to Robinson also anticipated and answered another implied criticism. The 
land had been offered for sale at $5.00 per acre, yet Dyess acquired it for half that 
amount. Dyess explained thus: 
Hemen, "Detailed Report the Dyess Rural Industrial Community," RG 96.; Holley, 
Uncle Sam's Farmers, 35; Henson, "Memories of the Dyess Colony," RG 96; Southwest 
Times Record, 20 May 1934; The Mississippi County Sentinel, 22 Mayl934; Arkansas 
Gazette, 9 January 1939; "National Register of Historical Places Inventory - Nomination 
Form," Dyess Colony, University of Arkansas Special Collections. 
31
 W.R. Dyess to Joe T. Robinson, 30 April 1935, RG 96. 
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While it is true that the Commissioners and the Receiver did have 
to do some trading to deliver us this property tax free, this Administration 
dealt with no people in this purchase except the Federal Receiver and the 
Commissioners of those districts.32 
There were other reasons that recommended Mississippi County. In the first 
place, Mississippi County, according to the 1930 Census, was the most productive 
(pounds of lint per acre) cotton county in the entire nation; its 899 square miles of 
territory also made it the largest county in Arkansas. The particular tract, bisected by the 
Tyronza River - eight miles from its nearest point to the Mississippi River, on which the 
Colony rested, was mostly cutover stump land and the few virgin areas contained gigantic 
hardwoods. The top soil, measured in various sections of the tract, ranged from forty to 
over 100 feet deep. The citizens of Mississippi County were accustomed to cultivating 
the Delta buckshot black land, were acclimated to the environment, familiar with the 
vagaries of Delta farming, and numerous. The total population grew from 47,320 in 1920 
to 69,289 in 1930 - a 46% increase. In 1930, only 2% of its 69,289 residents worked in 
industry. Mississippi County was one of those desperation destinations for plain whites 
fleeing the sterile and drought-baked lands of the South. In the ten year period from 
1920-1930, the white population of Mississippi County grew from just under 16,000 to 
43,144 - an increase of over 170%. The black population actually fell by a little over 
5,000 during those years. If ever there was an ideal place and people among whom to 
conduct a bold relief and rehabilitation agrarian experiment, it was Mississippi County, 
Arkansas. Thousands of "pure anglo-saxon (sic) rural whites and just plain American 
negroes" (said FERA inspectors) lived near acres and acres of black land, knew the 
32
 Ibid. 
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peculiarities of living in the Delta, and were surprised to find that there was no place for 
them at Dyess. The Mississippi County folks confronted, perhaps, the first of the 
puzzling ways of government men. The project was not for Delta folks, but for the entire 
state of Arkansas. There were many other instances of those puzzling ways. 
Building Dyess from scratch 
The New Deal confronted Americans with bureaucracy. Small town and rural 
America were accustomed to a mild form of line-standing regimentation. Voting, 
ginning, and various items of civic and personal business required a certain stylized 
behavior. One waited in line, dressed appropriately, and conducted one's business with a 
person. Plain whites had little interaction with the governmental bureaucracy; they had 
little reason to do so. Most every item of business, private or governmental, was 
dispatched directly and with a name, a face, and in most cases, a reputation. When plain 
whites received a letter, they took it seriously. When they had a question, they attempted 
to do what they always did - ask the man in charge. To modern eyes, the responses and 
queries of plain folks in the 1930s appear simple and naive. Some, no doubt, were. 
However, that which we dismiss as simple, romantic, or just naivete is just as likely a 
function of personal responsibility and integrity. In the late summer and fall of 1935, 
President Roosevelt wrote clergymen across the United States asking them for an 
evaluation of progress. Thousands of them gave the President the benefit of their views. 
Revered Henry Felgar Brooks, Pastor of the First Methodist Episcopal Church, South of 
Tupelo, Mississippi did not feel competent to give the President advice. He could only 
33Ibid. "Background History, Construction Plan and Progress, FSA and Successor 
Agencies, Project Records, 1935-1949, AK 80, Box 181, RG 96, hereinafter 
"Construction Plan and Progress." 
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report on the comments and attitudes of his parishioners. His only criticism concerned 
the requirement that only those who had been on relief were able to obtain work relief. 
He reminded the President: 
The "Works Program" meets a general need, but there is a pretty general 
criticism on it that it applies only for those have been on relief rolls. There 
are hundreds and thousands of people who have not asked the government 
for one penny of help. Some of them have nothing scarcely to live upon. 
Others have but little, but out of their self-respect and regard for the 
government of our nation, they have not asked for anything. These are in 
need... I personally feel that they ought to be included in the "Works 
Program." 
Perhaps you might remember me if I should recall to your memory that I 
chanced to be the minister who gave the Invocation in the big open field 
where you addressed masses on the occasion of your visit to our city . . ,34 
Some of the President's correspondent Ministers really thought that the President would 
read and respond. Plain whites wrote letters. Some of them are pitiful, some are 
eloquent, some are manipulative, some are honest, and all of them - even the ones meant 
to deceive - are revealing. 35 
Visions of ownership of a farm at Dyess came with the announcement of the 
project; however, the first promise of economic relief for the dispossessed of Mississippi 
County was in the building of it. The scale of the task is greatly underappreciated. The 
depression witnessed truly spectacular feats of construction. The Boulder (Hoover) Dam, 
the dams and transmission lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and even the 
privately constructed depression-era Chrysler and Empire State Buildings tend to 
34
 Letter to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt from Henry Felgar Brooks, 27 September 1935, 
President's Personal File (Clergy Letters) FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. 
35
 For examples of such letters, see University of Arkansas Special Collections, "Works 
Progress Administration File and President's Personal File (PPF), "Clergy Letters, FDR 
Library. 
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overshadow the impressive feats of human organization and productivity in the Arkansas 
Delta. During the summer and fall of 1934 and into the fall of 1935, Construction 
Superintendent Cone Murphy managed the work of as many as 1,500 men at a time in 
building an agricultural community from rugged swamps and a modern town complete 
with necessary and optional amenities. 
Starting in the northeast corner of the property, Cone put crews of unskilled men 
to work cutting trees, digging drainage ditches, building bridges and constructing roads. 
Six gasoline operated sawmills - two of them portable - and one steam sawmill rendered 
the hardwoods into building materials for the colony or for sale. Crews began laying out 
the property into twenty-acre plots, and clearing a two-acre house site for each farm. 
Officials soon realized, even before any colonists moved in, that the regimentation of 
twenty acres per family was not a workable notion. To accommodate different sized 
families, Dyess provided standardized homes in three versions, and later after much 
discussion and complaint, the colony relaxed its rules and allowed the division of 
property into plots of 20,30, and 40 acres. There was no direct correlation between house 
and farm size. The labor force of a family determined the acreage; the aggregate number 
determined the bedrooms. The size of the farm depended, just as it had under the 
sharecropping system, on the family's labor force. A couple with a teen-aged son could 
live decently in one of the three room hoses, yet they had labor sufficient for the efficient 
cultivation of more than twenty acres. On the other hand, a young family with four small 
children could apply only one person to cultivation, yet justify a four or five room house. 
36
 "Construction Plan and Progress", RG 96. Baker, Traveling Recovery Road, 153-55; 
Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 35-38; Otto, The Final Frontiers, 103-105. 
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Indeed, the farm size envisioned for the colonists at Dyess is emblematic of the clash of 
notions relative to the role of agriculture in the social and economic fabric of the country. 
Farm sizes at Dyess Colony reflect a misapplication of the work of Howard Odom, 
Arthur Raper, T. J. Woofter, and others. Erosion, thin soil, and the boll weevil plagued 
Raper's Georgia counties. The land at Dyess flooded - it did not erode; the topsoil at 
Dyess was from forty to over 100 feet deep - its phosphorus content could support cotton 
crops for ninety years without enrichment. The boll weevil, like the Death Angel that 
passed over the obedient Children of Israel, barely disturbed the cotton culture or the 
economy in the Delta; it devastated the "cotton-South." 37 
The logging crews were unskilled men taken from the rolls of the Mississippi 
County office of the National Reemployment Service; the skilled workers came, 
primarily, from the rolls of the Arkansas State office. Using some of the 65,000 board 
feet of lumber produced daily by the colony sawmills, Murphy also built facilities for the 
workers. Until the camp was established, workers arrived every day by truck from 
Osceola. Assertions that the project was located near any established community were 
generous. According to the Project Records, the "nearest urban center" was Lepanto, 
seven miles west; Tyronza and Basset, each about twelve miles away, Wilson was 
approximately ten miles. The nearest significant town, Osceola, was twenty miles away; 
Blytheville was thirty and Memphis lay on the east bank of the Mississippi seventy-five 
miles to the east while the Arkansas WPA and ERA managers resided in Little Rock, 169 
miles to the northwest. Until Murphy's crews built the road, one could not get to Dyess 
from anywhere. By mid June, crews had completed a temporary headquarters building, 
37
 "Construction Plans and Progress RG 96. 
barracks for the workers, and a kitchen that served three mess halls. Two of the dining 
facilities served white laborers, the other one fed black workers. The workers lived in 
one of four bunkhouses, equipped with an iron cot, cotton mattress, blanket and clean 
sheets. Laborers paid seventy-five cents a day for board and lodging, deducted from 
paychecks. The total cost of feeding and lodging crews during the construction period 
amounted to $26, 820.66, of which $16, 274.14 was reimbursed via payroll deductions.38 
The construction pace picked up apace with the growing work force. In less than 
eighteen months Murphy's crews built 500 farm cottages, about 65 miles of graded and 
graveled main roads (26 feet wide), an almost equal number of secondary roads (22 feet 
wide), 25 main bridges, 35 small ones, about 35 miles of drainage ditches, barns, chicken 
coops, and all of the structures, including the "community center" residences for the 
government men in the town. The roar from two caterpillar diesel tractors, three 
draglines, two ditch dredges, one pile driver, seven sawmills, concrete mixer, planning 
mill, and six International Harvester trucks mingled with the slap of the wheels and tires 
of sixteen eight-wheeled log wagons, thirty-two lumber wagons, three road wagons, two 
wheel-barrows, and a horde of mules. (The mule lot built near the community center 
could accommodate 300.) According to State Auditor, Robert H. McNair, the above 
listed equipment, excluding the mules but including a "Plymouth Coach Automobile" 
cost $94,358.49. For an indication of the size of this project in contemporary terms, 
38
 Ibid;, W.R. Dyess to H.S. Steed, 25 August 1934 and Cone Murphy to W.W. 
Campbell, 3 August 1934, all in WPA File; Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 332-35. 
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consider. Calculated based on the consumer price index (CPI), the cost of this equipment 
today would be a little over $142 million. The Plymouth cost the colony $675.50. 39 
Project Director Cone Murphy carried out the construction of Dyess with great 
celerity and efficiency. Murphy's crews were so accomplished that they completed the 
farm cottages well before the social workers identified and transported the colonists to 
their new homes. Using the plans drawn by Dyess's associate, Architect Howard 
Eichenbaum, Murphy assembled a crew of twenty-five carpenters and closely supervised 
them as they completed a model of each basic design. Then Murphy assigned each of the 
carpenters his own crew, gave each crew a set of Eichenbaum's plans, and sent them out 
to build three, four, and five room farm cottages, even though the weather was 
"abnormally" hot and both men and work animals were handicapped. There were several 
cases of heat prostration and the workers " . . . were not pushed to their full capacity."40 
By 1 August 1934, four colony residences were completed. The forty town-center 
residences were built in close vicinity to the Community Building and were no different 
in construction or design from the farm cottages. The residences were designed for the 
associated administrators, teachers, and operators of the various commercial enterprises. 
Laborers used the first house as sleeping quarters; planners used it to determine the cost 
of furnishing a house. The government men decided that, "Three bedrooms, a living 
room, and a kitchen were provided for in a very satisfactory manner at a cost of $195."41 
39
 "Construction Plans and Progress" RG 96. The present value calculations are taken 
from http://measuringworth.com/calculators/ppowerus/result.php, accessed 19 
December, 2007. 
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 "Plans and Progress" RG 96. 
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Murphy listed the expectations he imposed on his crews. His expectations were 
identical to the supervising architect's estimate of actual time schedules. According to 
Eichenbaum: 
Each crew of seven men can lay three foundations per day. 
A ten - man crew can construct the frame for a five-room house in 16 
hours. 
Four men can shingle a house in 6 hours. 
Eight men can place the siding in 16 hours. 
Eight men can complete the ceiling and floors in 16 hours. 
Three men can install the hardware, doors, and windows in 16 hours. 
Five carpenters and two laborers can complete the barns in 6 hours. 
Six men can prime a house prior to painting in 5 hours. 
Six painters can paint the house in 6 hours. 2 
After the initial routines were established, the construction crews proceeded much more 
rapidly than did those responsible for identifying and selecting potential colonists. 
Changes in philosophy over the acreage allowed caused some retardation of the building 
schedule, but no potential colonists had to wait for a home upon arrival at Dyess. 
Murphy's crews built it faster than the FERA or the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation (RRC) or the Resettlement Administration (RA) could fill it. By 31 
December, workers had completed 146 farm cottages and twenty residences; two cottages 
and four residences were under construction; and wired forty-three buildings for 
electricity. With much the same reasoning that had prompted the DSH to build the 
McComb Homesteads with wiring but no electrical power, both electrical wiring and 
indoor plumbing appliances were included in the construction. 43 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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Word got out and plain whites responded, quickly. By May of 1934, letters 
inundated Dyess's office asking for information, asserting intention to take up the 
government's offer, inquiring as to what type or class of people would be accepted, or 
expressing frustration with the lack of information. Thousands of Mississippi County 
dispossessed whites and blacks were near destitution. Some had lost their farms due to 
physical, climatic, or economic forces; others lost their commercial positions because of 
the drastic fall in economic activity. They longed to join the throng and the cacophony 
emanating from the sylvestrian swamps of Mississippi County. Colonization Project No. 
1 offered hope to the dispossessed in two ways. Some would find work, perhaps, as a 
fulltime employee. The structures built to house the economic and community activities 
of the colony - the thirty-two town residences built to house the workers and managers of 
those activities - meant that there would be some real jobs available at the colony. The 
distressed dispossessed looked for jobs. They were, in the vernacular of the time, trying 
to "get on" at Dyess. The other avenue of hope for plain whites lay in the possibility of 
obtaining a farm and a chance to become a personification of the Jeffersonian dream. 
Plain whites made application to the project in order to become an independent yeoman 
farmer. The second avenue of hope required that one "get in" at the colony; the first 
required that one "get on." u 
"Getting on" at Dyess 
Plain whites wanted jobs so they wrote. They wrote letters; they had other people 
write letters; they referenced common acquaintances, and they tried to use pity, outrage, 
See: WPA Management File Box 8; RG 96. 
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or past association to "get on" at Dyess. Local folks were gratified to see that most of the 
1,500 construction era workers were local men and that all of them were Arkansans. 
However, notwithstanding the procedure of hiring men from the county and state 
Reemployment Service offices, there was an area of discretion in selecting workmen. 
Certain supervisors, particularly those whose tasks were of a skilled nature, could 
"requisition" workers by name.45 This provision and the use of it make for interesting 
reading and subtle commentary. The construction phase of the project gathered men 
wholesale from the local office; it seemed that available jobs were assigned immediately. 
If one depended on the mail to facilitate a hunt for employment, the Dyess construction 
jobs would be taken before the missive arrived. However, Dyess was a new town, and 
needed all sorts of people representing a range of experiences and skills. The population 
growth was a bit slower than the planners expected but by the time that F. J. Hemmen 
visited Dyess to ascertain business prospects for his Memphis Sears and Roebuck Store, 
Dyess was a brand new and thriving, it seemed, town of about 3,000 people. There had 
to be jobs. Some people wanted construction jobs - some construction or remodeling 
continued throughout the life of Dyess Colony - some wanted a position, and some just 
wanted a life. 46 
43
 The ability to select specific workmen under the regulations is articulated in: letter to 
Jay J. Johnson from W.R. Dyess, 15 October 1935. " . . . and should Mr. Murphy desire 
your services, he could ask especially for your assignment, WPA Admin File, Box 8. 
46Letter to W.R. O'Donnell from Floyd Sharp, 10 March 1936, WPA Management File, 
"We are terminating for this year the construction program, having completed five 
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employment as staff carpenter. Hemen, "Detailed Report the Dyess Rural Industrial 
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The rules concerning employment with the various New Deal agencies were 
neither simple nor elegant but they did exist. In order to gain employment, applicants 
had to satisfy the regulations; many suspected that they also must satisfy the "code." How 
did one "get on" at Dyess; what was the combination to the code? W. R. Dyess clearly 
translated the regulations to an applicant who desired employment at the colony as a 
carpenter: 
It will be necessary for you to register with the Reemployment 
Officer in your County as Carpenter. You should have an investigation 
made by the Relief Administration as to your needs, at which time have 
your monthly budgetary requirements set by that agency, which will in 
turn certify you to the Reemployment office for employment in connection 
the Work Division in that County. 
Persons assigned to work in the colonization project out of 
Mississippi County must be done through the National Reemployment 
Service, whose State Office is in Little Rock.47 
Dyess's simplified articulation of the regulations made the laws more intelligible, 
but said nothing about other, if any, more-informal requirements. Some applicants 
concluded by virtue of perspicacity, intuition, or suspicion that one had to possess 
influence, "pull" in the vernacular of the day, to secure a position. Mr. J.B. Reynolds 
Most of the correspondence is found in the following: RG 69, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics; RG 96, Project Files; FDR Library, Clergy Letter File, the Gardner Pat 
Jackson Papers, Harry Hopkins Papers; WPA Administration File; Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Delta Cooperative Farm Papers; Duke 
University, Special Collections, Papers of the Socialist Party of America. 
47Letter to H.S. Steed from W.R. Dyess, WPA Administration File. These procedures 
applied only to skilled labor. W. A. Rooksberry, a Colony ally and advisor, was the head 
of the Arkansas office of the National Reemployment Service. 
133 
approached that issue directly in his letter of complaint and application, "Does it require 
political pull to get help from the government?" he asked. 
L. C. Hoover did not waste time with the niceties. He wrote Governor Futrell, in 
a refreshingly collegial style, and his first sentence instructed the Governor to "Please 
take up with Mr. Dyess and get me a job. I kneed (sic) work bad." He "would be very 
glad to get the job as 'Commissary Manger' at the Dyess Colony in Mississippi County." 
Hoover briefly reminded the Governor of his expertise and said that he would take "some 
other good job" if the "Commissary Manger" job was taken. He made sure that Governor 
understood that he fully understood the way one played the game. "Mr. Dyess has lots of 
jobs" he told the Governor,"... and if you bear down on him he will give me any thing 
you ask him for. You no (sic) I have a family and have a girl in St. Luke's Hospital, St. 
Louis, making a nurse we have to keep her up - & wasn't for what work my son gets we 
would not get by." Hoover urged Governor Futrell to "go get close behind Mr. Dyess 
and make him come across. . ." It appears that Mr. Hoover did not have as much "pull" 
with the Governor as he thought. The Governor "got close behind" Dyess by sending 
him Hoover's letter. He wrote to W. R. Dyess, "I am inclosing a letter from Mr. L. C. 
Hoover. He tells you of his experience, and you see his handwriting. I guess he is in 
need." There is no record of Hoover's employment at Dyess Colony.49 
48
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The term "Dyess Colony" was widely used even before the official name change upon 
Dyess's death. 
More sophisticated was the campaign conducted by Irvin Lay of Jerome, 
Arkansas. Lay gathered his forces and had twelve (intentional symbolism?) of his 
neighbors and fellow constituents petition Senator Joe T. Robinson. "We, the 
undersigned voters and citizens of Arkansas respectfully request your personal aggressive 
act in behalf of Mr. Irvin Lay of Jerome, Arkansas." (Italic emphasis added) "This 
gentleman, well-known to us has filed his application with President Floyd Sharp and 
with Hudson Wren concerning placement in Dyess Colony." Senator Robinson 
forwarded the request/petition to Floyd Sharp with the suggestion that: "If he is found 
qualified for the work he desires and there is a vacancy available, I should like to see him 
given recognition." Floyd Sharp's response to Senator Robinson was tantamount to a 
guarantee: 
Mr. Lay is well recommended as an Agriculturist and we have his 
application on file for consideration at the first opening in the Colony 
where his services can be used. Of course, like all other agencies at this 
time, the Colony is over-staffed, but apparently Mr. Lay, from his 
recommendations, is the type of man that we hope to be able to assist in its 
development.50 
Senator Hattie Caraway also wanted to recommend an agriculturist for the 
Colony. "Howard B. Arnold.. . states that he is well qualified for the place. I do not 
know his qualifications but presume you do. I will appreciate your looking into the 
case." Mr. Arnold had written to Dyess that his position with the National Industrial 
Recovery Administration (salary $2,600) "was discontinued." He was, said Mr. Arnold, 
a "graduate Agriculturist from a recognized agricultural college" W.R. Dyess's response 
50
 Letter to The Honorable Joe T. Robinson from M.A. Bates, James R. Riley, W. C. 
Deal, et. al, n.d.; letter to Floyd Sharp, State Director Works Progress Administration, 
From Joe T. Robinson 13 July 1936; Letter to Hon. Joe T. Robinson, 18 July 1936, all 
Ibid. 
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to Senator Caraway seems a bit terse: "We appoint only such persons as are suggested 
and recommended by the University of Arkansas and the Extension Department." Dyess 
addressed his letter to Mrs. Hattie Caraway. (Italic emphasis added)51 
J. T. Mitchell's confidence injudicial influence was misplaced. Arkansas 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Turner Butler wrote Floyd Sharp on Mitchell's behalf. 
He had been informed, said the Judge, that one of the farm supervisors at the colony had 
resigned. His letter attested to Mr. Mitchell's competence and character. Floyd Sharp 
was not aware of any resignations and regretted that "we cannot give Mr. Mitchell 
favorable consideration." E. W. Bradbury's position with the Rural Rehabilitation 
Corporation was terminated and he eschewed the influence of state and national figures 
in favor of the efforts of local attorneys. Perhaps all politics is local. E.S. Dudley, soon 
to be Resident Manager, wrote to one of Bradshaw's barrister boosters that ," . . . I would 
be very glad to place him on the Colony should I have the opportunity." G. V. Ludlum 
wanted to run the Colony's cleaning and alteration facilities. With his letter to Floyd 
Sharp, he enclosed six letters of recommendation from local clothing merchants. He had 
done the alteration work for all of them and they all praised his skills and speed in dry-
cleaning and altering clothing.53 
51
 Letter to Hon. W.R. Dyess from Hattie Caraway, 21 September 1934; letter to W. R. 
Dyess from Howard B. Arnold, 20 August 1934; letter to Mrs. Hattie W. Caraway, 25 
September 1934, all Ibid. 
52
 Letter to Leon B. Catlett from E. S, Dudley, Administrator, 19 April 1933, Ibid. 
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 Letter to Mr. Floyd Sharp from Turner Butler, 18 December 1936; letter to Floyd Sharp 
from H. T. Mitchell, 21 December 1936; letter to Hon. Turner Butler from Floyd Sharp, 
23 December 1936; letter to Floyd Sharp from G.V. Ludlam, with enclosures, 27 March 
1935, all Ibid. One final effort to "get on" at Dyess via the application of influence is 
worthy of consideration. It is worth attention for at least two reasons. First, it is most 
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The plain and not-so-plain whites discussed thus far seem to have been of the 
commercial and technical classes. They attempted to use influence because, in their 
estimation, they had it to use. They were not the most luminary among those who wanted 
to "get on" at Dyess. Frank Horsfall, past President of Monticello A. & M. College had 
Governor Futrell write to Dyess on his behalf. Dr. H. D. Burrus in application as 
Physician to the Colony did not include any letters of recommendation. He listed Little 
Rock and North Little Rock politicians as references, among them: one editor, two 
lawyers, three ex-county judges, and two postmasters, one of whom he "helped to make 
Mayor of North Little Rock three different times." Dr. Burrus barely mentioned his 
experience and made absolutely no references to his medical education or membership in 
any medical society. He did say, however, that he was "wearing a $5.00 hat I won on 
Roosevelt." J. G. Waskam, Attorney and Counselor at Law from Marked Tree was 
informed that former governor, "J. M. Futrell will be replaced in his official capacity as 
attorney for Dyess Colony, Arkansas." Floyd Sharp answered his application and 
representative of the manner in which plain whites attempted to use others' influence. 
The letter of application and the enclosed references are polite, to the point, and 
professional. The second reason this particular applicant attracts attention is his son's 
tragic end. Vincent W. Foster of Hope, Arkansas wanted a position as a purchasing agent 
for the Colony. He asked for an interview and enclosed highly complimentary letters 
from two building and lumber companies in Hope, Arkansas. There is no record of Mr. 
Foster's employment at Dyess Colony. The name is familiar because the son of this, at 
one time, un-employed dispossessed white achieved prominence and influence exceeding 
that of any of the letter-writers and petitioners. In the opening days of the Clinton 
Presidency, Vincent W. Foster, Jr., attorney and advisor to the most powerful man in the 
Western World met his death under by bis own hand on the George Washington Parkway 
in suburban Washington, D. C. Letter to W.R. Dyess from Vincent W. Foster; to W.R. 
Dyess from Al Harris, Hope Building Material Company; to W. R. Dyess from J. R. 
Williams and Sons, all Ibid. 
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informed him that "our present attorney is under a three-year contract, and there is no 
plan or possibility of his being replaced in the near future."54 
Other job seekers, without influence or not confident with it, tried different ways 
to crack the code. Letters from ex-servicemen cited their veteran's status as justification 
for some kind of job. Others described their skill as a barber or beautician, well driller, 
carpenter, painter - and some tried to convince officials of the value of specialized 
talents. Mrs. W.H. Shopach wanted to know if Dyess did not see the value of hiring 
someone to teach the colonists "how to can all sorts of vegetables, fruits and meats as we 
have owned and can with a steam presser (sic) cooker for the last five (5) years."55 
Regardless of the common wisdom propagated by Erskine Caldwell and H.L. 
Menken about rural southerners and hillbillies, people who tried to "get on" at Dyess 
appear to be unremarkably normal. There is very little dramatic and pity-inducing 
verbiage in their letters. They do admit to needing a job, and some emphasize that point 
most, but their letters are measured, thoughtful and focused, as were the people who 
wrote them. Some of the letters contained grammar, spelling, and syntax errors, but most 
supplicants carefully composed their letters; some approached eloquence. "You will be 
greatly esteemed if you will let me know whether there is a position open for an 'all-
around' instructor and leader for the educational, social, and home activities in your plans 
for the Farm Community in Mississippi County, Arkansas."56 Those critics who seek 
54
 Letter to W.R. Dyess from J.M. Futrell, 11 January 1935; Letter to W.E.(sic) Dyess 
from Dr. H.D. Burrus, 23 July 1934; letter to Hon. Floyd Sharp from J.G. Waskam, 25 
October 1938; Sharp to Waskom, 8 November 1938, all ibid. 
55
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Letter to W. R. Dyess from (Mrs.) Virginia Hay, 11 July 1934. 
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evidence of a degraded culture or a puny work ethic in the society and culture of 
unfortunate plain white victims of the Great Depression will be disappointed with the 
writing of those that tried to "get on" at Dyess. A much greater number of people tried to 
"get in" than tried to "get on." Their letters are more dramatic, complicated, poignant, 
pitiful, and interesting. 
Getting "in" at Dyess 
Fred Westbrook did "not want to come to the Colony myself until I get well." His 
letter of application suggested, instead, that he send his wife and ten children. He was 
confident that his family could clear the ground and make a crop the first year. He had 
six boys and two girls, ranging in age from two to twenty-three living with him. He was 
confident in his labor force, not as one would suspect, because of the supple and firm 
muscles of healthy and vibrant youngsters; he depended on his wife. "My wife is a hard-
working woman and that (sic) why I want her and the boys to get a good nice home 
where she and the boys can pay for it. My wife is 32 years old and she needs to be where 
she can work good land and make something. Every body will tell you she is a good 
woman and she will work..." Westbrook had not read, obviously, the 1931 Delta 
Experiment Station report; he expected that a 20-acre Delta farm could make a nice living 
for a family often. Perhaps he was an exception, his wife, after all was a hard-working 
woman. Westbrook's letter is illustrative of a disconcerting reality of the Dyess Colony; 
his letter making application for admission to the Colony was probably futile.57 
57
 Letter to Mr. W.R. Dyess from Fred Westbrook, 25 October 1934, WPA 
Administration File. M. G. Vaiden, J. O. Smith, and W. E. Ayres, Bulletin No. 290, 
"Making Cotton Cheaper: Can Present Production Costs be Reduced?" Delta Experiment 
Station, February 1932. The bulletin actually discussed the economics of a farm in which 
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Colonists were selected according to the larger dictates and goals of Harry 
Hopkins FERA and notions of land-use planning and a pleasure economy. The Dyess 
colonists were to come exclusively from those who were currently on the Rural 
Rehabilitation rolls. Even then, full consideration and opportunity for a potential client 
even to consider the proposition was left to the judgment, discernment, and common 
sense of a (often female) "government man." If one had, by heroic measures stayed off 
the relief rolls, such success disqualified them. Dyess was to be a place where 
industrious people, who through no fault of their own, had lost their security in 
agriculture. They, whatever the reason, had failed. Field workers from the Arkansas 
WPA - then professionalized by borrowing social workers from the Resettlement 
Administration - were to choose from the very best of the failures. These procedures 
rankled some; many felt that the Elder Brother had always gotten a raw deal. 
Dyess initiated a procedure, retained by Floyd Sharp, by which he answered an 
applicant's letter. A letter in response informed the applicant that blanks would not be 
available until September 1934. After that date, the response to the applicant directed 
him (occasionally her) to their County Rural Rehabilitation office. In response to queries 
from mayors, Congressmen and other government men, Dyess mailed a standard letter, 
The method of selecting families for that colony will be as follows: 
persons living in the State of Arkansas, who have through this economic 
emergency lost their property and who have been engaged agriculturally 
the major portion of their lives; those persons who were accepted for Rural 
Rehabilitation during 1934 and have made an outstanding success. The 
15 acres were devoted to cotton. Since most farms at Dyess, even after the modifications, 
were still of 20 acres, since the maximum acreage allotted to cotton was mandated to 1/3 
of the cleared acreage (modified downward by the AAA county production committee), 
and since five of the twenty-acres were mandated as garden and stock acreage, the 
practical economics of the Delta Experiment Station Bulletin are relevant. A typical 
Dyess Farm cultivated less than seven acres of cotton. 
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selection of families will be from all Counties in the State, possibly not on 
quota but on merit. This selection is to begin about the first of 
September.58 
The standard letter contained two notions that merit further consideration. Officials of 
the New Deal Agencies were aware of the fragile nature of public support. It was 
important, they thought, for these experimental - critics said radical - projects and 
programs to be successful and to do it quickly. Early success would keep political 
opponents and skeptics at bay. This pressure to perform is manifested in the otherwise 
counterintuitive principle of selecting only those Rural Relief clients who "have made an 
outstanding success." The Dyess Colony would select the best of those who had failed; 
there was no provision for the most desperate. 
The assertion that clients would be selected "not on quota but on merit" must have 
satisfied most folks; it was in consonance with traditional American notions of 
meritocracy and rugged independence. However, the problems in selecting colonists 
based on merit or quality of applicants proved to be the most difficult of the many 
exasperations that bosses faced over the course of the Colony's existence. 
Administrators and social workers struggled with questions concerning the nature of 
merit and how to measure it. As the Colony developed, a surprisingly large number of 
colonists proved unable or unwilling to adapt, to cooperate. After the first group of 
colonists arrived in the fall and winter of 1934, the lack of "quality control" in the 
selection of colonists was painfully apparent. Responsibility for selection devolved to the 
Resettlement Administration in October 1935. The newly created Resettlement 
Administration created a series of inventories (blanks, in the vernacular of plain whites) 
58
 Letter to James Engal from W. R. Dyess, 2 July 1934. 
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to be executed in part by the prospect, but mainly by a hierarchy of social workers and 
selection specialists. The infusion of personnel from the RA to Dyess resulted in quarrels 
and resentment. State relief workers resented the attitudes of the RA staff; the 
Washington bunch doubted the competence of their local colleagues.59 
For a brief period from early summer until November of 1934, people were 
encouraged to apply. The controls and standards that would soon dominate the "getting 
in" process were yet to be developed. The letters of plain whites asking for information 
or making application were actually a major point of entry into the colonization process; 
the writers of the early letters actually had a chance to influence the selection process. 
From about January 1935 and until the end of the process true applicants were selected 
based on the judgment of the local social worker. Social workers (Regional Interviewers 
in RA terminology) poured over the records of Rural Rehabilitation clients recommended 
by the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor and chose the applicants that, in their 
opinion, were most likely to succeed. A process of successively more invasive and 
personal inventories and interviews winnowed the applicants. Occasionally a letter to 
Floyd Sharp would interject a potential client into the evaluation system, but for the most 
part, the process began not with positive actions by the dispossessed but in passivity. 
As word got out and the job seekers assaulted the gatekeepers with letters from 
influential people or arguments, those who wanted or thought they wanted to get in at 
Dyess also suspected that there was a formula or code. The dispossessed did not know 
59
 Letter to Mrs. Azile Aaron, Resettlement Administration, Washington D.C. from Mrs. 
Theresa St. Clair, 4 December 1935; "Backdoor report from Eula Gallaher, 
Transportation Clerk, Dyess Colony to Anzie Aaron, 30, and 25 April and 6 May 1936; 
Memorandum to Family Selection Staff from Eula Gallagher 30 April 1936; to James B. 
Lawson from Azile Aaron, 1 May 1936; Lawrence Westbrook to Rexford G. Tugwell, 28 
October 1935 all in RG 96. 
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the preferred attributes required of the successful applicant. They did not know that the 
government men preferred men forty-five or younger with families. Government men 
much preferred traditional families and did not view grandmothers and grandfathers as 
appropriate colonists. The government men did not view the most destitute as apt 
colonists, nor did they consider those that managed to stay off the Rural Rehabilitation 
rolls. Families headed by females were ineligible, and men over the age of fifty had little 
chance of a place at Dyess. Some of the letters revealed information that disqualified, 
some letters came too late to affect selection, but all of them tell us something about plain 
whites.60 
The volume of letters of application or requests for information to and about 
Dyess Colony to the Arkansas Emergency Relief national offices was robust until mid-
November 1934. After that time, such letters are almost non-existent. By mid-November 
1934, the processes by which one became a colonist were regularized. Government men 
selected all potential colonists based on recommendations by social workers, family 
selection specialists, and to some extent, County Extension Agents. The main reason for 
the diminution in the flow of applicant and information letters was the success of Dyess 
officials (including WPA officials) in educating the public. 
The letters of application and information from the period of about June -
November 1934 are significant. Uncolored by the knowledge of the exact attributes 
required by a potential colonist, and not sure of what, exactly, it meant to take part in this 
60
 Dot Kennan, "The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for Dyess Colony 
Project - Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d., RG 96, Box 182, hereinafter "Procedure 
Followed." Untitled and hand annotated narrative of Dyess Colony selection process, RG 
96, Box 182, hereinafter "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative"; Henson, "Memories of 
Dyess Colony." 
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new government project, the writers were sometimes disconcertingly transparent. By 
virtue of this transparency, investigators are able to hear what plain whites said and, 
therefore, what they thought about themselves and their government. The letters also 
authenticate much of the common knowledge concerning the depression South. Some 
are from people who lived in the highlands; some from those farming in the southwestern 
river valleys, but many of them are from the dispossessed of the Delta. 
Arkansas farmers seemed to have blamed the drought as much as the depression 
for their current misery. "I have lost everything I have by the depression and the 
drought," wrote C.R. Astin from Prescott. Astin farmed "on halves" and "only made one 
bale of cotton this year." He wrote that Dyess could see,"what I have made for myself." 
Astin had a naive faith in the efficacy of his letter. He inquired whether he could keep 
his cow and if the government would provide transportation; if so would the 
transportation be by train or truck and could he bring his cow. Did one pay rent to the 
government, did the government furnish a team and tools? Concluding his letter he 
informed Dyess that he was ready to go anytime - "I would like to keep my cow if there 
is any chance" - and that he expected answers to his query by return mail, because, "I am 
in need of a place at once."61 
Mack Davis of McCrorey allowed that he was "living in the heat of this drought 
stricken district, won't make any feed or food for 1935." Davis blamed the drought and 
the "down fall in price of cotton of 1930" for his continued indebtedness. He felt that his 
explanation sufficed, "I feel like I deserve some help." Other references to the drought 
are fleeting but powerful. "I am a tenant farmer and have a team of horses and without 
61
 Letter to W. R. Dyess from C.R. Astin, 13 October 1934, WPA File. 
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any farming tools. The drouth (sic) came and I don't know what to do" said R. H. Shaw 
of Ferndale; Joe Bizzault wrote (Mrs.) Senator Caraway that, "by us having such a 
drouth (sic) it is going to be impossible for me to pay it this fall." The "it" Mr. Bizzault 
referenced was the $150.00 he owed the government from the previous year. Similarly, 
Wes Mauldin felt it necessary to address his arrears to the government before presenting 
his argument for inclusion in the colony project. "I am a rehabilitator here in Woodruff 
County and received a mule this year, but the crops burned so badly they are not of much 
value. However, it was no fault of mine." Typical are the numerous matter-of-fact 
references: "My crop I have in is completely burned u p . . . my garden burned up here on 
account of the drought." "Due to the 12 weeks drouth (sic) we have had we are making 
nothing to speak of." The letters mentioned above and cited in the footnote below 
contain much more than observations about the great drought that created the dustbowl.62 
The letters are rarely one-dimensional; most letters tie several depression -
drought phenomena together. The following letter, produced below in its entirety is 
typical as to content, and illustrative of the language skills extant in some of these plain 
whites. 
Dear Sir, 
We read in the Tulsa Tribune about the Colony at Dyess Ark. for 
the Rehabilitation of Tenant Farmers. We want to know if there is any 
way possible for us to get one of the farms. The project sounds wonderful. 
62
 Letter to W. R. Dyess from Mack Davis, 8 October 1934; letter to Mrs. Hattie Caraway 
from Joe Bizzault, 3 October 1934; letter to W. R. Dyess from Wes Mauldin, 26 
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from L. J. Burnett (?), all in WPA File. For the drought see: Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, 
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My husband and I are tenant farmers on the farm of Mr.& Mrs. E. 
V. Poyner, we were farming on the halves. We have never been on Relief 
before, but will have to ask for aid within the next few days. 
Everything we planted has been burned out by the drouth (sic). 
We had 14 acres of corn, 12 acres of oats, 15 acres of peas, 2 acres of 
tomatoes, 1 acre of peanuts, one acre of beans. We can't get our seed back 
from any of them, to say nothing of the fertilizer. We put about 3 sacks of 
fertilizer to the acre, under our oats, beans, tomatoes & potatoes. We 
planted 2 sacks of potatoes. 
The corn didn't tassle (sic). The oats didn't get big enough to 
mow. The peas didn't come up. The tomatoes are standing just like we 
put them out, haven't grown at all. The peanuts haven't a peanut on them. 
We got about 2 Vz sacks of potatoes. We had a lovely garden started, but 
only got two or three meals out of it and canned six quarts of green peas. 
We are a young couple, twenty-eight and thirty years old, 
respectively. No children, Healthy, able bodied, willing to work. 
Averagely intelligent, I hope. Averagely educated, my husband has a year 
in High School and I a year in College. We are both experienced farmers 
raised on the farm. My husband is a good mechanic, fair carpenter, good 
teamster, and experienced on the timber. I have kept books, taught school, 
and am a typist. 
We note that there will be about two hundred farms ready for 
occupancy by the first of Nov. We would love to get one of the first as 
one of us could work thru the winter and so escape being on charity. We 
have tried so hard to make our own way. The idea of charity is bitter. 
Neither of us have anyone to turn to for aid, except the government. We 
are so eager to get a place of our own, with the opportunity to pay for it. 
We are hoping, rather desperately, that this may be our chance. Will you 
please advise us if there is a chance, and our method of procedure? 63 
One would suppose, if the letter is an accurate reflection of their history, the Barton's, 
would have been ideal candidates for Dyess Colony. They had already bought into the 
notion of diversified farming as is evidenced by the crops planted. They were willing to 
pay the ancillary costs of agricultural production - they had used at least forty sacks of 
fertilizer - they were, as a couple, articulate and energetic. Mr. and Mrs. J. A. Barton had 
63
 Letter to W. R. Dyess from Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Barton, 1 August 1934, WPA 
Administrative File. 
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tried tenant farming on the thin-soiled highlands of Springdale, Arkansas. Would not 
their youth, health, industry, willingness to diversify, experience, and ancillary skills not 
make them ideal candidates through which to illustrate the validity of the New Deal 
notions as to the creation and preservation of the American yeoman? The answer was, in 
a word, no. The Barton's were not Rural Rehabilitation Clients. They had not failed 
soon enough to be eligible. 
The crop reduction programs of the AAA had little significance for truck-patch 
farmers from Northwest Arkansas. Life at Dyess colony, in the heart of the Great 
American Delta, presented circumstances foreign to the experiences and expectations of 
many of the applicants. Later the aberrant conditions in the Delta proved intolerable for 
some of the colonists. They were not used to mud, or malaria, or snakes in their fields. 
Like much of the public, they assumed that cotton cultivation was simply a variation on a 
theme. Letters from folks who lived in the Delta, who were familiar with the 
sharecropping system and the nature of cotton cultivation, discuss issues and offer insight 
that should have made them more attractive to the family selection specialists. Some of 
the applicants understood the fundamental differences in farming "black land" and the 
soils of the timber or prairie. Some had experienced the devastating effects of the AAA 
contracts. The third crisis, referenced above, was a function of a series of 
misapplications, misunderstandings, egregious arrogance, and the frailty of human 
nature. The selection specialists could not have chosen only those familiar with the 
vagaries of the Delta even if they had desired to do so. The RRC mandated colonists 
proportionally from the entire state of Arkansas. Problems soon emerged. 
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Building Dyess Colony offered jobs and political influence. Floyd Sharp in 
particular and the Board of Directors in general maneuvered to remove Dyess Colony 
from the supervision and control of other federal officials and agencies. Such 
independence and the potential political power actuated a struggle for control. This 
chapter has examined letters of application from plain whites and their interaction with 
the bosses and government men. 
The first colonists moved into their new homes at Dyess just about the same time 
that the homesteaders moved into their new houses in Tupelo. Understanding the 
common reasons, if any, for the failure of the Tupelo Homesteads, the best of the DSH 
projects and Dyess Colony, the largest and most promising of the New Deal agrarian 
communities, requires a consideration of the life and times at Dyess colony. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIFE AND TIMES A T DYESS C O L O N Y 
"Oh! Mr. Dyess I have just been crazy since I read about this in the papers." Mrs. 
Emery Hall, Lake City, Arkansas, 21 June 1934. 
"Since I can't write an official letter about the situation at Dyess, I'm going to slip a 
note through the backdoor." Eula Gallagher, Resettlement Administration 
Transportation Clerk, Little Rock, 6 May 1935. 
"Personally I cannot understand why out of all the families that we have at Dyess we 
cannot find four clerks." Lawrence Westbrook, WPA Administrator, 18 April 1938. 
"Someone like this is the cause ofdissention among what few deserving colonists that 
you have. People with one good eye and half sense should know that they have a good 
chance over there if everyone would cooperate." (Mrs.) Velma Bullard Pittman, 21 
April 1938.l 
Between 21 June and 6 October 1934, Mrs. Emery Hall wrote four letters to W.R. 
Dyess, Arkansas ERA Administrator and founder of what would be known as Dyess 
Colony. The thirty-six pages of small but neat handwriting on school-tablet paper is a 
commentary on the struggle of dispossessed whites and one witness to the conditions in 
the Great American Delta. Mr. Hall "doesn't write well," she explained, no doubt 
uncomfortable (or pretending to be) with speaking on behalf of the family. Her letters 
continually asked Dyess for advice; should she enroll her children in school in Lake City, 
or should she wait until they moved. They were going to get to move, weren't they? 
Should she sell one of her three hogs to buy feed in order to fatten the other two? "I can't 
1
 Letter to W.R Dyess from Mrs. Emery Hall, 21 June 1934; letter to Azile Aaron, Liaison 
Senior Family Selection Specialist, 6 May 1934; letter to Floyd Sharp from C.E 
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afford to buy books in both places." She had canned blackberries and kraut and pickles. 
People said that folks who had a mule would not get one of farms; the Halls had a 
government mule, did this disqualify them? She saved the sorghum tops for planting on 
the new place. If she could hear soon from Mr. Dyess she would not sell her chicken-
coop; she would take it with her to the new farm. Could her bachelor brother and 
widowed mother move with them? The government didn't give enough feed to fatten 
hogs. People said the farms were only for "families of 2, 3, 4, and 5 people." There were 
eight in her family. Her mother could keep house and her brother could help her clear the 
land while Mr. Hall worked "public work to keep up expenses." She was tired of moving 
from "here and there," and tired of "making a living for the other man." Could Mr. Hall 
do public work to "keep up our expenses," while she and her mother and bachelor brother 
and three children cleared the land for spring planting? She wanted to get there in time to 
put in a winter garden, she said. She would, she said, "do just anything to get one of the 
farms," and if Mr. Dyess would just give her some encouragement, she would "not say a 
word to a soul about it." "Reckon," she asked, "just when we will get to move?" They 
had to move and had no money to pay rent; the new schoolteacher was moving into her 
place, and nobody wanted to rent to them because they did not want truck patches. 
"Please don't get out of patients (sic) with me," she implored repeatedly, "I know you are 
worked to death and I am just one of the poor people you are trying to help." Should she 
send her thirteen-year-old daughter to the Convent where she could learn practical things 
like sewing and cooking instead of the schools at the new farm? "I sure hope we will be 
one of the lucky ones." "Does it have to be the man that works? I can do anything any 
other woman can do, I could be a visiting housekeeper, or wash dishes at the cafe, my 
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mother can keep house while I work and Mr. Hall and my brother can work the farm. Oh! 
Mr. Dyess, I so want one of the farms, if you only knew how we have struggled you 
would help us." 2 
Mrs. Emery Hall and her family moved into their new home at Dyess Colony, 
House No. 10, on 12 December 1934. They brought with them their Rural Rehabilitation 
debt of $826.27 and their government mule.3 
Plain whites moved to Dyess and began community building; their interaction 
with government men and bosses is one consideration of this chapter. The officials at 
Dyess ignored basic fundamental realities about farming in the Delta and client selection. 
As a result, the Colony's population was unstable; most of the clients were unable or 
unwilling to establish and maintain a subsistence farm. This chapter also notes the 
federal government's first rational assault on rural poverty in the South. 
Moving to Dyess 
By October 1934, Cone Murphy and his crew had completed the cottages and 
infrastructure for eighty-three farms. "The Original Thirteen," so-called because they 
came from thirteen Arkansas counties, families moved to Dyess on 25 October 1934 and 
by April 1935, Dyess Colony was home to 132 families, all selected by the Arkansas 
Emergency Relief Administration. W. H. "Harve" Smith, one of the original thirteen, 
was an unqualified success story. Smith was a Bassett County cash renter and had been 
2
 The narrative and quotes are taken from a series of four letters from Mrs. Emery Hall to 
W.R. Dyess, Arkansas WPA Administrator, 21 June, 21 August, 25 August, and 6 
October 1934, all in WPA Administrative File. Mrs. Hall consistently spelled Mr. Hall's 
name Emery, the Dyess records consistently spell it Emory. Mrs. Hall's spelling is 
probably the correct one. 
3
 Henson, "Dyess Colony 1934, Sorted by Name"; "Analysis of Colony Accounts"; all in 
"WPA Administrative File." 
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so all his adult life. The ruinous cotton prices of 1933 left Smith in a precarious financial 
condition. He had to sell his team and tools to repay debts, and he was unable because, 
said an RA report, of planter preference for black laborers to secure a cropper position. 
In May of 1934, Harve Smith received a loan from the Arkansas Rural Relief 
Corporation (RRC) and immediately proved that he was a competent farmer. Smith, 
rented land from the RRC, bought a mule, one hundred chickens, a cow with calf, enough 
feed for the upcoming winter, and had canned a large stock of vegetables and fruit. He 
also paid his Rural Rehabilitation loan. Smith was one of the very best that had failed -
and an ideal candidate for the Dyess Colony. Smith's family moved from a leaky three-
room shack - when it rained they had to move all the furniture into the one room with a 
sound roof- into a brand new five-room house on thirty acres of Delta land.4 
J. R. Echols, father often and another of the original thirteen Colonists moved to 
Dyess in October of 1934. Echols attended an Arkansas college and worked for that 
institution as Farm Manager; he lost his job when the funding for his position expired. 
He had been a good Rural Rehabilitation Client, and his family seemed to prosper at 
Dyess. The government men quickly came to understand, but were often reluctant to 
admit, that poverty did not always signify incompetence. The Echols children were quite 
remarkable; they had to leave Dyess to prove it.5 
4
 Dot Kennan, "The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for Dyess Colony 
Project - Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d., RG 96, Box 182, hereinafter "Procedure 
Followed." Floyd Sharp and Associates, "Traveling Recovery Road," 156-158. Untitled 
and hand annotated narrative of Dyess Colony selection process, RG 96, Box 182, 
hereinafter "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative"; Henson, "Memories of Dyess Colony." 
5
 "Dyess Selection Narrative"; Henson, "Memories of Dyess Colony." One daughter 
married an Air Force Chaplain who became a Lt. Col. One son became an electrician and 
retired as a Major in the U.S. Army. Another son earned his Ph. D. in forestry from Yale, 
Dyess Colony used the Harve Smith family as an example of the promise of 
Dyess. Notwithstanding Smith's success, W.R. Dyess and the Arkansas Emergency 
Relief Administration and Rural Rehabilitation Corporation were not pleased. Farmland 
that could be in cultivation lay fallow; the economic activity predicted for the town had 
not materialized because there were few colonists at Dyess. Among the few colonists at 
Dyess some, apparently, were not interested in a life-long commitment to subsistence 
farming; some were troublemakers.6 
The actual process of selecting and transporting families to the colonies proved to 
be too complex for the limited resources and expertise of Arkansas Rural Relief 
Corporation and its parent, the Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration. Despite the 
Smith family's success story, the family selection process was both slow and, generally, 
unsatisfactory. During the eight months October 1934 through May 1935,162 families 
had moved to Dyess, but twenty-nine families returned to their old homes. Some left 
because they could not get a straight answer about the terms and price of their new farms; 
some could not stand the mud and snakes; and some did not understand southern social 
customs. A colonist identified only as "being from the western part of the state" clearly 
did not understand or care much for southern social customs. He solicited the black 
workmen at the colony as boarders and allowed them entrance to his house; he was 
and other children were journalists and educators. The NYA paid for Katherine Echols' 
tuition at the Sate Normal School and she was a member of the faculty at Dyess Schools 
until 1940. 
6
 Kennan, "Procedure Followed"; "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative," all RG 96. Sharp 
and Associates, "Traveling Recovery Road." "Plans and Progress" type-script narrative 
FSA and Predecessor Agencies, Project Records, 1935-1940, Arkansas, RG 96, 
hereinafter, "Plans and Progress." 
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dismissed. There were other problems with the family selection process that only time 
revealed. Two families were "somewhat extreme" in their religious fervency and they 
"kept the entire community stirred up," and Mrs. Emory Hall's neighbor, S. B. Funk,who 
moved his family into No 8 on 11 November, proved to be a radical agitator. Clearly, the 
process needed alteration.7 
The New Deal seemed to be catching its breath during late spring of 1935. W. R. 
Dyess and the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation halted the selection and 
transportation of colonists to Colonization Project No. 1. Changes were in the wind. On 
8 April 1935, Congress passed the $4.8 billion Emergency Relief Appropriations Act. 
Soon a flurry of progressive legislation, Executive Orders, and reorganization culminated 
in what many historians label the Second New Deal. Among the new entities in the 
alphabet soup were the National Youth Administration (NYA), Rural Electrification 
Administration (REA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). By the summer 
of 1935, the intent of the New Deal to undertake social reform was apparent. Legislation 
and Executive Orders focused on social security, securities, banking and tax reform, and 
labor legislation. The New Deal also began its rational and organized assault on rural 
poverty with the formation through Executive Order 7027,30 April 1935, of the 
Resettlement Administration (RA). Under the direction of Rexford Tugwell, the RA 
assumed control of the FERA rural programs, administration of the FERA land program, 
7
 "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative"; Everett Dewey Henson, "Dyess Colony 1934, 
Sorted by Name, Sorted by Date Became Colonist, and Sorted by Homestead Number," 
WPA Administrative File. "Plans and Progress." Letter from E. S. Dudley to H. C. 
Baker, 3 May 1938, RG 69 "WPA Central Office Files." 
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functions of the land section of the AAA, and the Division of Subsistence Homesteads 
communities.8 
While the transition to RA management caused a slight retardation in the 
development of the Tupelo Homesteads, it proved remarkably efficient in filling up the 
farms at Dyess. By September, a new selection process was well underway. Lawrence 
Westbrook with Harry Hopkins and the WP A entered into an agreement with Rexford 
Tugwell of the RA that facilitated the family selection process. The Management 
Division of the Resettlement Administration agreed to assume the responsibility for 
selection and transportation and installed Senior Family Selection Specialist Clark C. 
Tucker at Dyess. The Management Division "borrowed" and placed on the payroll nine 
social workers from the Arkansas ERA, a public health nurse from the same agency, and 
augmented that force with four RA Family Selection Specialists. Jimmy Lawson finished 
his work at Tupelo, moved to Little Rock, and joined the Management Division staff of 
Region VI of the Resettlement Administration. 
From Washington, D.C., Liaison Supervisor Azile Aaron, after a visit to Dyess, 
organized the processes and training for the new and borrowed RA selection personnel. 
Aaron recruited Eula Gallagher to head the incredibly complex movement of families and 
their possessions to (and sometimes from) Dyess. With employees in place, new blanks, 
and revised procedures and training materials in order, the RA began bringing new 
colonists to Dyess in January 1936. RA officials orchestrated the plan to correct the 
deficiencies in the selection process and to fill the colony between the crop seasons. 
8
 Several scholars have provide fuller discussion of the programs assumed by the R.A. In 
addition to the works of Paul Conkin and Donald Holley, cited previously, the most 
comprehensive and analytical discussion is that of: Bernard Stershner, Rexford Tugwell 
and the New Deal, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 279-306. 
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Dyess Colony's "independent status" caused Rexford Tugwell some trepidation. 
However, Tugwell, and, indeed, the entire Washington community, assumed that Dyess, 
upon completion of its construction and occupation stage, would naturally fall under the 
control of the RA. Tugwell grudgingly accepted the notion that the RA would acquire 
Dyess upon completion of family selection process. Item 3 in the agreement concerning 
the RA's role in colonist selection clearly reveals the intent. In a letter to Tugwell, 
Westmoreland wrote, "We agree to provide funds for the maintenance and subsistence of 
these families until the project is finally completed and transferred to your administration 
for management." (Italic emphasis added) One wonders what might have been 
Tugwell's response had he known of Floyd Sharp's notions about Dyess's future. By 
forming a corporate entity for Dyess Colony, Floyd Sharp had effectively made Dyess 
independent of any governmental entity short of the Secretary of Agriculture of the 
United States. Dyess Colony, Pine Mountain Valley, and Cherry Lake Farms were the 
objects of intense ridicule and bitter criticism. The three quasi-independent agencies 
were identified with the RA, and yet Tugwell and his staff had no management authority 
or fiscal oversight. Critics often used the aggregate expenditures and the relatively few 
clients of the three projects to exaggerate the inefficiencies of the huge resettlement 
program. By including the costs of the three orphan agencies in analysis of the RA, 
critics exaggerated the per-capita costs of the program. Tugwell and the RA were in the 
classic management conundrum; they were responsible for the projects but had no 
authority over them. By May of that year, the process was complete. 
In five months, the RA selected and moved 347 families to Dyess. In contrast, 
the Arkansas FERA had placed 132 families over an eight-month period. Tugwell's 
reference to the projects ultimate completion is significant. Dyess's original plans, as 
approved by FERA, envisioned the completion of the project after about four years. 
During that time, the Colonists would have signed their land contracts, assumed 
ownership of the ancillary business (icehouse, shops, store, etc), and established a live-at-
home agricultural program that maximized the returns on the limited cotton acreage. 
According to the plans, a twenty-acre farm would cultivate about eight acres of cotton. 
In reality, the local AAA cotton production committee slighted the Dyess farmers in 
allocating tax-free acreage. Ultimately, with fervent appeals and complaints from Floyd 
Sharp and Lawrence Westbrook, the Colonists were granted more reasonable allotments. 
Typically, the production committee allotted acreage cotton at the rate of eight acres per 
20-acrefarm. 9 
"Government mules" posed few problems for newly employed Resettlement 
Administration Transportation clerk Eula Gallaher. As early as July of 1934 the 
Arkansas RRC had distributed over 2,000 mules at an average cost of $175.00. The 
"synthetic mule," i.e., "one that exists only on paper" caused most of the aggravation and 
expense. Stock trucks arrived to transport the work stock to Dyess only to find that the 
9
 "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative." Letter to Rexford Tugwell from Lawrence 
Westbrook, 28 October 1935; Letter to Westbrook from Tugwell, 4 November 1935. 
"Memorandum concerning the relationship between the Management Division of the 
Resettlement Administration and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in the 
matter of four communities temporarily retained by the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration for the purposes of completion of reconstruction." signed by Rexford G. 
Tugwell and Harry L. Hopkins, 12 July 1935, all in WPA Administration File. For the 
struggle to get adequate cotton allotments, see: Floyd Sharp to C.C. Randall, Chairman, 
State Allotment Board, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1 September 1937, 
WPA Administrative File. For TugwelPs reluctance but ultimate willingness to assume 
responsibility for Dyess see Bernard Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal, 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 194-237; 292- 95. 
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government mule had been repossessed, or stolen, or had died, or "got lost." Trucks 
returned to Dyess often only partially loaded. From her office in Little Rock, Eula 
Gallagher designed, implemented, and supervised the complex ballet of visits, inspection 
trips, and moves. In conspiratorial and mildly sarcastic prose in her periodic "back-door 
notes" to Liaison Family Specialist Azile Aaron, she reported on the few virtues and 
numerous faults of the Arkansas WPA crew.10 
The RA benefited from the experience of the Rural Rehabilitation Corporation 
(RRC) in selecting and moving families to the Colony. For example, the blanks used by 
the RRC personnel in winnowing prospects failed to include comprehensive queries 
about the occupation of the head of household. Some applicants were more interested in 
working for wages than in building capital; some of the first group had only a tenuous 
connection with farming. Likewise, the RRC blanks did not include provisions for listing 
various farm implements owned by the prospect. Sometimes the moving truck and crew 
from Dyess arrived to move a Colonist's agricultural stock and implements only to find 
that among the possessions were such bulky and difficult-to-transport items as farm 
wagons. The new policies mandated by the Washington office required that all colonists 
visit and undergo a final examination of their attitudes about cooperation, farm life, 
religion, drinking, morality, personal hygiene, and intelligence; the Colony physician, L. 
L. Huebner, conducted a physical exam of each prospect. The prospective colonists 
visited to make sure they could tolerate the physical and fiscal aberrations connected with 
10
 "Back Door Report," letters to Azile Aaron, from Eula Gallagher, 21,25 April, 1 May 
1935; letter to Lawrence Westbrook from John H. Caufield, 7 July 1934, all in WPA 
Administration File. Caufield seems to have worked officially as a photographer, but 
also as an informant to Westbrook. 
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colonization. They visited, also, to choose the particular farm and house they would, 
perhaps someday, own. The prospective visitors to Dyess came, ostensibly, to inspect 
and decide whether the opportunity was worth the risk. The staff at Dyess used the 
inspection trip to conduct the final examination of potential colonists.11 
The tasks confronting the RA Family Selection Specialists were daunting, but 
their tasks were relatively simple in comparison to the logistics problems confronting 
Gallagher. The newly crafted and revised procedures for family selection, the product of 
the RA Management Division staff in Washington, introduced a new group of 
government men and another series of blanks to execute. Operating from ten regional 
offices throughout Arkansas, the Field Interviewers investigated the credentials of 
families recommended by the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor. There were, of 
course, blanks for each stage of the process. For a brief while, the RA continued to use 
the blanks created by the Arkansas RRC. The blanks involved Forms A, B, and C. Each 
form - A, B, and C - required numerous supplements. For example, Form C, "Case 
Workers Analysis" required six "schedules." The RA forms were more detailed. By 
November of 1935, the RA unleashed its own flood of blanks, which were fed to a 
distribution list that required copies be dispensed to the caseworker, county welfare 
supervisor, county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor, the Region VI Office of the RA in 
11
 Kennan, "Dyess Colony Selection Narrative," WPA Administration File; "Procedure 
Followed, RG 96. Social Research Report NO. 1, John B. Holt, "An Analysis of 
Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects," 
(Washington, D.C: United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Security 
Administration, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Cooperating, 1937). How much 
and what kind of intelligence was a difficult item for Family Planning Specialists to 
attack. See the two documents referenced above. 
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Little Rock, then finally, to Dyess Colony. The Senior Family Selection Specialist, Clark 
Tucker, made the final decision. 12 
Some of the original group of colonists had moved to Dyess without benefit of an 
inspection visit. New RA rules demanded that all prospective colonists - husband, wife, 
and teen-aged children visit the colony and undergo a physical exam. Since the language 
of the original FERA grant mandated that the program benefit Arkansas residents 
statewide, each county in Arkansas was assigned a quota at Dyess. The task of 
efficiently getting the prospective colonists to Dyess was colossal. Dyess is in the 
extreme northeast corner of Arkansas; the distances were, sometimes, enormous. 
The Colony bought two brand new school buses, and following a carefully drawn 
route, picked up poor folks all over the state of Arkansas and brought them to Dyess for a 
two-night visit and return from whence they came. Twice a week, on Sunday and 
Thursday, the Colony school buses brought a new group to inspect and be inspected. 
Eula Gallagher contacted the proposed colonists, determined, more or less, how close the 
bus could actually get to the prospects' homes, and informed the prospects of when and 
where, roughly, they were to meet the bus. She then stood by awaiting the problems that 
inevitably occurred. One family, in an area that was inaccessible by the bus, agreed to 
meet the bus at a service station on the nearest paved road. Anxious lest they miss the 
12
 "Dyess Selection Narrative," WPA Administration File, Kennan, "Procedure Followed, 
RG 96. The forms themselves give and idea of the winnowing process. Form A "Case 
Worker Analysis asks the "case-worker" to give an opinion as to attitudes and even 
personality. For example, the form asks the caseworker to evaluate the family's "general 
intelligence," and to comment on such subjective areas as to whether or not the religious 
affiliation of the family was "extreme or emotional." Form B is a rather short (13 items) 
general questionnaire about previous and current occupation, special skills, etc. Form C is 
an exhaustive financial analysis with six separate schedules. 
bus, the family decided to camp out at the designated spot the night before. That night 
the area received a rare four inches of snow and the family had not brought tents. They 
huddled around a fire built on the lee side of the station's wall and completed their 
inspection trip. Gallagher attempted to have every bus arrive full or nearly so. The 
remarkable fact is that she, mostly, succeeded. In the five months, January to May, the 
two Colony school buses traveled an aggregate of 26,532 miles. 
The aggravations and problems of the inspection visits paled in comparison to the 
actual moves. It took on the average two and one-half trucks and three days to move a 
family to Dyess; it took ten trucks a week to move four families. A moving crew 
composed of Dyess work-relief clients rushed to unload the trucks and send them back to 
the wilds of rural Arkansas. Invariably trucks got stuck. A client who lived relatively 
near Dyess gave written directions to his house and commented that the five-mile dirt 
road to his house was fine as long as it did not rain; but, after the first mile, it began to 
rain. The buckshot ground captured the truck and only after hours, and the frantic search 
for a tractor, did the family finally arrive at Dyess. In a cold, rainy March afternoon and 
night and into the morning, the mother tried to keep her five-month old infant warm and 
contented in the cab of a freight truck. At 2 a.m., a tractor extricated the truck from the 
mud. At the peak of moving in the spring of 1936, the Colony used sixty FERA trucks 
and crews to move colonists to Dyess. In one week in April, eighteen families moved to 
13
 Eula Gallagher, "Resume of Procedure and Problems of Planning Transportation and 
Moving Families to Dyess Colony," typescript in and Predecessor Agencies, Project 
Records, 1935-1940, Arkansas, RG 96, hereinafter "Resume of Procedures." 
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Dyess. The cavalcade of tarpaulin-covered trucks and the thrice-weekly buses full of 
inspectors made for confusing and exciting times at Dyess. 
The selection process was complete and Eula Gallagher was in the process of 
closing up shop on 30 April 1936. She had just used her considerable diplomatic skills to 
wheedle information from Jimmy Lawson. Lawson had called the day before to obtain 
the mailing addresses of the field inspectors. Her suspicions, which she had discussed 
with Azile Aaron, were confirmed: the RA was "out" at Dyess. Careful conversation 
and interrogation revealed that Lawson was preparing a "pink slip" for all the RA staffers 
and most of the borrowed ERA personnel. Her note to the family selection staff informed 
them of their termination as of 1 May, wished them well, and expressed satisfaction in 
their associations. She also felt a need to soften the ripples that her abrasive personality 
had inflicted on her colleagues. "If I have made myself obnoxious in my efforts to get 
the staff to furnish adequate directions, and inventories, I wish to say that it was never 
personal, and only done for the good of the cause. I trust it will not linger in your mind 
when you think of me in the future." 15 Eula Gallagher often demonstrated her acerbic 
wit and droll personality in her commentary. On hearing that her colleague, Miss 
Topping, would take on a more permanent job with the RA in Arkansas, she related to 
Azile Aaron that she had tried to get in touch with Miss Topping: " . . .since she was 
coming here I wanted to congratulate the state of Arkansas and offer her my sympathy 
uIbid. 
13
 Memo to The Family Selection Staff from Eula Gallagher, 30 April 1936, Project 
Records, RG 96. 
and condolences." Perhaps Gallagher was a martinet, but there was reason for 
satisfaction. Azile Aaron reported that as of 1 May 1936, all the farm cottages except for 
fifteen kept in reserve, were occupied. The RA had proved remarkably efficient in the 
family and selection process.17 
By the time that the dual ceremony memorializing W.R. Dyess and dedicating the 
colony took place on 22 May 1936, Dyess, Arkansas was beginning to resemble the 
community that Dyess had envisioned. The robust school age population had sent Dyess 
to Washington D. C. where he managed to get a commitment from WPA officials to 
build modern new schools for Dyess Colony. On 14 January, Dyess was returning from 
D C. with good news for the Colony; early that evening the small commercial flight 
crashed into Arkansas Delta swamps about forty miles west of Memphis. Lawrence 
Westbrook came from Washington and joined Floyd Sharp, H.C. Baker, R.C. Limerick 
and Arkansas Governor J. Marion Futrell to honor the memory of the Colony's founder 
and to dedicate the renamed agrarian experiment. It would be officially what it always 
had been in the minds of the clients and staff, Dyess Colony.18 
In retrospect, one can argue that the high-water mark for Dyess Colony was May-
June 1936. Never again would the population of Dyess be as great as in the early 
16
 "Back Door Report," letter to Azile Aaron from Eula Gallagher, 25 April 1936. 
17
 Letter (Back Door Report) to Azile Aaron from Eula Gallagher 25 and 30 April 1936; 
letter to Azile Aaron from Therese St. Clair, 25 April 1936; letter to James B. Lawson 
from Azile Aaron, 1 May 1936, all in RG 96. 
18Arkansas Gazette, 16-17 January, 22-23 May, 1936; Colony Herald, 1,22 May, 1936; 
Mississippi County Sentinel, 22 May 1936; Commercial Appeal, 22-23 May 1936; Press 
Scimitar, 22-23 May, 1936. Henson, "Memories of Dyess," RG 96. "Minutes: Meeting 
of Board of Directors, Dyess Colony, Incorporated, 25 March 1936," WPA 
Administration File. 
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summer of 1936. The festivities marking the dedication were impressive, but they failed 
to generate the enthusiasm or the crowds that inundated Dyess in early June. Eleanor 
Roosevelt stood on the porch of the Administration Building on 9 June and told the 
crowd of more than 2,500 that she expected that the success at Dyess would spill over 
into the nation at large. "I hope that you down here will derive gains which may be used 
to help other people. For as you grow you will find your greatest pleasure in giving 
others a helping hand."19 Even though dinner for the First Lady and various Dyess 
bosses was waiting at the Colony caf<§, Eleanor Roosevelt insisted on shaking hands with 
everyone. Her insistence on intimate contact wrecked her schedule, just as it had 
inconvenienced the President in Tupelo twenty months earlier. 
Living at Dyess 
Affairs looked good in the late spring and early summer of 1936. Five hundred 
farm cottages, sporting brilliant white paint and trimmed in brown, red, or green clustered 
in quartets at the intersections of the latticework gridiron of spirit-level straight roads. 
The exterior of the farm cottage was of cypress, the interior pine. Windows were 
screened, the roof was ceiled, and water was available just outside the kitchen door. Each 
farm cottage had a hand-pump operated well, a claw-footed enameled bathtub, a hot 
water container designed to feed the tub, a toilet, bath lavatory, and a septic tank. It was 
true that the water did not taste good and washing with it rendered clothing any thing but 
"white as snow," but it was handy and, according to the government men, healthy. After 
19
 Colony Herald, 11 June 1936. 
20Arkansas Gazette, 10-11 June 1936; Colony Herald, 11 June 1936; Commercial Appeal, 
10 June 1936; Press Scimitar, 10-11 June 1936. For Eleanor Roosevelt and the delay, see 
Chapter Three. 
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all, said Dyess Family Selection Specialist Clark Tucker, the water was simply the same 
water that all Delta people used. Some women rather doubted that assertion. The water 
system provided for the government men in the town center reinforced those doubts. 
Each cottage was wired for the advent of electric lights and an electric pump, waiting 
only the extension of the power transmission line to the colony. No one could say just 
when the Colony would get power, but the expectation that the colonists would soon have 
power was evidenced by the wiring. There were no basements at Dyess but on each of 
the farms Cone's crews had built a barn and a poultry house. Like the Homesteaders at 
Tupelo, the RA " . . . expected each family to have a flock of chickens, a brood sow, and 
at least one milch cow." The actual construction costs for a three room house with 
wiring, septic system, plumbing, hen house, barn, and approach bridge was $1,221.64 
($18, 393 in 2006 dollars); a four room house equipped in the same manner, $1,365.05 
($20,551), and a five room house cost $1,459.92 ($21,966). 21 
The houses came in three sizes, but avoided monotony by twenty-seven variations 
on the three themes. Placement of doors, windows, roof styles, and the trim gave 
individuality to the farm cottages. The furnishings evidenced even more creativity. 
^"Construction Plans and Progress," RG 96; Letter to James B. Lawson from Azile 
Aaron, 1 May 1936, WPA Administration File; F.J. Hemmen, "Detailed Report of Visit 
to the Dyess Rural Industrial Community Near Osceola, Arkansas Under the Direction of 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration," RG 96, AK-80 003, hereinafter "Detailed 
Report." "Interview With a Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor"; "One of Several Interviews 
With References Concerning Mr. Doe;" both in WPA Administration File. Both the 
previous references are paraphrased synthesis of actual interviews. RA Family Selection 
Specialists wrote these Interviews for training the Family Selection personnel for the 
Dyess project. Hereinafter, "Interview With a Rehabilitation Supervisor" and "One of 
Several Interviews." The costs above were direct costs and reflected only expenditures on 
those particular houses. Costs increased during the process, mainly because the Colony 
was forced to adopt NIRA wage scales. The cost of houses was a point of contention for 
some. 
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According to Home Economist Fern Salyers, the furniture and households goods moved 
by the family were threadbare and the decorative taste of some women was, at least, 
questionable. One of her biggest challenges, she reported, was in convincing some 
colony women not to paper their walls with newsprint. The few rugs were filthy and 
ragged and even when new were garish and unappealing. Most colonists had little 
furniture; the ERA furnished mattresses at no charge, supplied most with beds and stoves 
and charged to their accounts. Another detriment to fashionable and comfortable homes 
was the presence of huge and, most often, abused upright pianos. They were out of tune 
and "out of key" with interior decorating possibilities, said Salyers. Having a bedstead in 
the main visiting room was not conducive to modern living, thought Salyers, so she had 
the Colony shop build models of easily and inexpensively duplicated day beds to double 
as sitting space during visiting hours and a bed at night. Salyers furnished her own home 
with theatrical gauze curtains appliqued with morning glories, simple and easily 
replicable furniture, and a "congoleum" rug; she used her town-center residence to 
demonstrate good taste and comfortable living to women with limited budgets. 
Even before the influx of new Colonists came in late 1935 and early 1936, the 
first group of Colonists had provided cultural and spiritual development. When 
Lawrence Westbrook and Governor Futrell came to Dyess in May of 1936, four different 
manifestations of Dyess Colony's civic pride honored their presence by demonstrating 
their skills. A male quartet, a string band, and several soloists entertained the dignitaries 
22
 "Plans and Progress"; The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937. Home Economist Fern Salyers 
lived in House #2, Block No.l at the Community Center. She paid $27.00 per month rent 
for the five-room house. She furnished her house cheaply; for example, dull black plain 
spool type beds in her house cost $11.50, "Dyess Colony, Inc, List of Community Center 
Houses Occupied, and the Renter's Occupation" RG 96. 
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and the crowd. The four Dyess women's clubs supervised the cafeteria-style supper, 
proceeds pledged to the Dyess Library Fund. Another dedication preceded the supper; 
the Dyess Girls' Club presented the funds previously collected for the library. Dyess 
residents had a high regard for the printed word and seemed to be more informed than 
their peers, even those on other government projects. According to The Arkansas 
Gazette, a 1937 survey conducted by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of six 
government projects revealed that Dyess families were twice as likely to subscribe to 
newspapers as project residents elsewhere. 
Building on the solid base established by the people who came in late 1934 and 
early 1935, the influx of colonists in late 1935 and early 1936 extended and refined the 
efforts of initial colonists. By 1937, the Colony Herald reported on the activities of 
twelve Dyess Women's Clubs named No 1 through 12; they convened monthly en masse 
in the "Colony Council of Home Demonstration Clubs" and separately once each week. 
The Home Demonstration Clubs pursued a brisk agenda of cultural and community 
enrichment aims. Typical, it seems from the recorded proceedings of other Dyess Clubs, 
was the Wednesday 6 M y 1937 meeting of Club No. 10. Mrs. A.L. Holland of 238 
Roosevelt Road hosted the twenty-one members attending the regular meeting. In almost 
classic passive-voice language, the Colony Herald reported tha t . . . "the songs, 'Old 
Black Joe,' 'Love's Old Sweet Song,' 'School Days,' and 'Love Lifted Me' were sung by 
all." Mrs. Cecil Wilkins provoked the piety of the assemblage by her account of "how 
Jesus went about doing good." She made application: 
23Henson, "Memories of Dyess;" "Plans and Progress;" "Detailed Report;" Colony 
Herald, 22 May 1936; "Plans and Progress;" "Selection Narrative." The Arkansas 
Democrat, 5 December 1937. 
We, too, as his followers can do our share to lighten and brighten the lives 
of our loved ones, neighbors, and friends... now that the revival is over, 
we should not let its good be forgotten, but strive, each one of us, every 
day, to carry on its spirit in love and service.24 
The main order of business for Club No. 10 was the selection of a delegate to 
attend "the State-wide Home Demonstration Club Rest Camp at Camp Pike." The 
twenty-one members elected Mrs. A. W. Ledford. The remainder of the meeting 
devolved into a discussion of the ways and means to meet the club representative's 
expense. " . . . The group devised a musical program and an old-fashioned box supper on 
the night of August 2, at the community building." The transactions at Club No. 2 may 
have been a bit tenser. "Mrs. Clarence Drewery was elected president to succeed Mrs. 
Earnest Norton, who had resigned." The club did not elect a delegate; Mrs. Almos 
Overton was appointed to represent the Club at the Rest Camp at Albany. First names of 
women, it seems, were relevant only for single women - except, of course, for the 
government men women.25 
The middle and high school children, led by Miss Katherine Echols, daughter of 
Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Echols who moved into No. 74 on 26 October 1934, recruited and 
directed a Dyess student orchestra. In 1936, she joined the faculty of Dyess Schools after 
finishing one year at state Normal College, funded by the National Youth Administration. 
By 1938, according to The Colony Herald, the Dyess Girl's and Boy's 4-H Clubs were 
24
 The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937. By 1937 the Colony Herald was a mimeographed 
legal sized bi-weekly paper, sometimes reaching 10 pages. The original newspaper was 
discontinued in late 1936. During its brief existence, the original Colony Herald was a 
highly professional weekly publication. The paper folded after one year, Donald Holley 
suggests that it may have been too professional. 
25
 Ibid. Almos Overton was employed at the Colony's lumberyard and lived in town 
center. He was laid off in 1938 as part of a cost-cutting effort at the Colony. 
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the largest in the world and the Dyess Clubs often won awards at the State 4-H Club 
Conventions. The government men had stressed the importance of community spirit 
during the interviews; the colonists had been assured that there would be ample 
opportunity for leadership and civic responsibihty. 
For the first time, medical attention and medicine was available to Colonists as 
needed. After a $35.00 per-family-per-year fee, all Dyess people were treated free of 
charge at the hospital - drugs, physician services, ambulance and operations included -
the excess costs born by the colony. By 1937, the Dyess contribution was in excess of 
$20,000 per year, and by 1938, the Colony health system had achieved remarkable results 
compared to other Delta communities. In 1938, there were no deaths among the seventy-
five cases of pneumonia reported at the colony as compared to " . . . numerous deaths 
from this disease in other parts of the same County."27 In 1935, the Colony medical staff 
had been overworked because of the rampant malaria at the Colony. Draining swamps 
and screened windows were, indeed, proving effective in battling malaria; there were no 
malaria cases reported in 1938. There were no post-operative deaths at the hospital from 
the over 100 operations requiring a general anesthesia. The colony's live birth-rate of 30 
per 1,000 exceeded that of Mississippi County's of 24 per 1,000; the colony's maternal 
death rate was 0 percent compared to 4.1 percent for the County. Only one person of 76 
cases of dysentery died at Dyess, and that, in the opinion of the medical staff, was solely 
26
 Henson, "Memories of Dyess"; The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937; "Detailed Report"; 
"Selection Narrative"; "Plans and Progress." 
27
 "Dyess Arkansas, Vital Statistics," type-script narrative and statistical report, 13 
August 1938, RG 69, WPA Central Office Records, Roll 1745, Box 339, National 
Archives II, hereinafter "Dyess Arkansas, Vital Statistics." 
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because the family would not allow the child to be hospitalized. According to Dyess 
physicians J. H. Wilson and Steve F. Turner, "Dyess Colony has the lowest death rate of 
any community in the U.S.A. per same class of people per thousand." In December 
1938, citing excess costs, Floyd Sharp announced that the Colony would not subsidize 
the hospital after 1 July 1939. He hoped that the Colonists could make other 
28 
arrangements. 
Of equal pride and interest to the Dyess community was the Dyess School system. 
Conditions during the first school year of 1934/35 were cramped and awkward. The 
students in grades one through eight attended one of three makeshift schools located over 
the colony. About half the high-school age students rode a Dyess truck to Wilson, the 
other half traveled in the same manner to Shawnee. The driver rigged a tarpaulin cover 
over the bed of a two and a half ton truck in cold or inclement weather. The two school 
buses purchased for the inspection duty were used to transport students to and from the 
three temporary Colony schools. By autumn of 1938, Dyess Colony operated three new 
ward schools and boasted an $80,000 town-center school for first grade through 
graduation. Colony schools enrolled 351 students in 1935, including forty-one who 
attended High School at Shawnee and forty-two enrolled at Wilson. By 1937, fully one-
third of Dyess's 3,000 residents were school-aged children; by 1939, Dyess schools 
enrolled slightly over 1,600 students; and the Colony provided, through the WPA, 
modern classrooms and employed thirty-seven competent teachers. The RA assigned 
28
 Letter to W. R. Dyess from L.L. Hubener, M. D., 28 June 1935; "Dyess Arkansas, 
Vital Statistics" both in WPA Central Office Records. Henson, "Memories of Dyess." 
Minutes: Board of Directors Meeting of Dyess Colony, Inc, 24 May 1937; WPA 
Administrative File. Dr. Huebner left Dyess for private practice in 1937. Memorandum 
to all Colony Families, from Floyd Sharp, Dec 3,1938, WPA Central Office Records. 
Educational Specialist J. L. Bond to the Colony to establish the public school system. 
Bond organized the available records from former schools, instituted a schedule of 
inoculations, and made sure that student records were maintained in consonance with the 
state of Arkansas. He did not want graduates of the future Dyess High to be required to 
take the certification examination required of graduates of unaccredited high schools. 
Bond informed Dyess in November of 1935 mat he was well-pleased with the progress 
the Colony schools had made and was only concerned with the lack of appropriate 
facilities. To accommodate the often-near impassible conditions of the new and graveled 
roads, the Dyess schools opened at 9:00 a.m. and closed at 3:00 p.m. Bond expressed 
satisfaction with the educational background of the six female teachers. Four of the 
teachers held L.I. degrees, one a B. A., and one a B. S. E. degree. The teachers, none of 
whom were married, lived in a town-center residence, a five-room house that rented for 
$27.00 per month. At the suggestion of W.R. Dyess, the Colony bore the costs of 
furnishing the "teacherage." Dyess said that the total living costs for the teachers should 
average about $21.00 per month. The Colony paid the Superintendent, Mr. John G. 
Womack $125.00 per month. The six women of the teacherage earned $60.00 per month. 
They would be comfortable, he said. 
29
 Arkansas Gazette, 9 January 1939. Letter to W. R. Dyess from J. L. Bond, Educational 
Consultant, Resettlement Administrationl5 November 1935, RG 96; "Selection 
Narrative:" "Plans and Progress." Minutes: Meeting of Board of Directors of Dyess 
Colony, Inc., 30 March 1936, WPA Administration File. By comparison, the Colony's 
septic tank foreman also earned $60.00 per month. Mrs. Alice Perkins, the secretary and 
stenographer for Fern Salyers, earned $90.00. The Dyess Schools, after 1938 a part of 
the Mississippi County Schools, seem to have been among the very best in the state of 
Arkansas. 
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Despite the wariness of government men about denominational religious 
activities, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians sent missionaries to live at Dyess and 
soon all three particular evangels of God's grace were negotiating with the government 
men for a spot to build a church. In the meantime, the Methodists' notions having gained 
foothold first, the disciples of Wesley allowed their neighbors to use their facility. The 
congregants of one church quickly proved their rural southern Protestant Orthodoxy. 
Misunderstanding over dispensation of charitable funds raised by the women's group 
caused some hard feelings and threatened to divide the congregation. The 
misunderstandings were soon resolved, in part, out of concern for the community's 
reputation. The religious Colonists did not totally eschew the ecumenicalism strongly 
preferred by the government men. Representatives of the Moody Bible Institute of 
Chicago dwelt among the colonists and led community-wide Vacation Bible Schools, 
pinch-hit for various congregations and, upon leaving for other fields, left the library 
volumes of piety. 
The bosses at Dyess also made provision for men. The United Brotherhood of 
Dyess Colony organized men "into a social group to discourage dissenters and to 
encourage those who are not fully resettled." Only with the approval of the United 
Brotherhood of Dyess Colony could other organizations operate at Dyess. The only such 
organization to gain approval was the American Farm Bureau. The American Farm 
Bureau proved remarkably adept in the depression in securing membership dues from 
30
 Dyess Colony, Inc." The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937; The (Memphis) Press Scimitar, 
20,21 April 1938; The Press Scimitar, "Reader Answers Dyess Criticisms - Fault is 
With Malcontents, Not Administration," by Mrs. Velma Pittman Bullard, 2 May 1938. 
Dyess Colony, Inc refused to sell land to churches, they would and did however, lease it. 
See Minutes of Meeting of Board of Directors, 13 May 1936, WPA Administrative File. 
those whose interests were diametrically opposed to the AFB's vision of agriculture and 
agricultural labor. The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) did not ask 
permission.31 
The government men intended that the small farmers at Dyess have the same 
advantages as did some of the cotton barons. While the plan for Dyess called for about a 
third of the acreage to be planted to cotton, the aggregate amount should make Dyess a 
major cotton producer. The government men assumed that the local production 
committees organized by the AAA, composed primarily of cotton barons, county agents, 
and AFB stalwarts, would treat the colonists fairly in assigning acreage allotments. The 
assumptions proved totally without foundation. Floyd Sharp and Lawrence Westbrook 
had to appeal to Washington in order to obtain a more reasonable cotton allotment from 
the AAA. The local production committee allowed one Colonist less than an acre for the 
crop year 1938. There were certain advantages that could be accrued to individuals only 
based on cooperation. The cooperative association mandated that Colonists plant the 
Colony approved hybrid cottonseed variety and restricted the colony gin to processing 
only that specific strain of cotton. Cooperation would allow the Colonists to command 
the same prices as the best of the cotton barons. The ability to sell a "pure" cottonseed 
and to market a uniform long-staple cotton crop required some investment from the 
Colonists. They must join and be ruled by the Producer's Cooperative. They were told, 
31
 "Dyess Colony, Inc." Letter to Lawrence Westbrook from H.L. Mitchell, Executive 
Secretary Southern Tenant Farmers Union, 30 March 1938, "WPA Central Office Files" 
RG96. 
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just as they were when farming cotton on halves, what to grow. Soon Mr. Jake Terry, the 
Farm Manager, would be more direct, specific, and insistent in his instructions.32 
The initial economic advantages of the colony compared to the sharecropping 
system from which most of the colonists had escaped were stunning. Each family had 
access to three separate credit accounts. Every month each colony family prepared a 
family budget for necessities but also included such "extras" as clothing, school supplies, 
and the poll tax assessed by the state of Arkansas. The colony social worker and family 
specialists approved the budget and the head of the family was assigned enough hours on 
the colony's workforce, at standard relief work wages of thirty cents per hour, to fund 
about half the monthly budgetary requirements. The other half was disbursed, until 1935, 
in the form of coupon books, redeemable at the colony store. With the infusion of RA 
personnel at Dyess, the furnish system was changed to a cash basis. Twice a month the 
man received a check for his labor; twice a month the family received a check from the 
colony for one-half of the remaining budget. The amounts were charged to the "Regular 
Furnish Account." In the spring of 1936, T. Harry Reid, Director of Region VI of the RA 
(formerly of the Arkansas Extension Service), informed Lawrence Westbrook that the 
Colonists should no longer depend on wage work. The construction phase was over and 
the Colonists should devote all their time to farming. The government men at Dyess 
proved to be reasonable to settlers in paying off their previous debts to the government, 
they even allowed colonists to adjust the terms for payment on their "Capital Goods 
32
 "Plans and Progress"; "Dyess Colony, Inc."; letter to Lawrence Westbrook from Floyd 
Sharp, 29 April 1938; letter to H. C. Barker from E. S. Dudley, 3 May 1938; all in RG 69, 
WPA Central Office Files. Letter to C.C. Randall, State Allotment Board, AAA, from 
Floyd Sharp, 1 September 1937, WPA Administration File. 
174 
Accounts" (see below), but they were insistent that the furnish account, including the poll 
tax, be fully settled in December of each year. Insist they did, but most often Colonists at 
Dyess carried small furnish balances over year-to-year. The insistence upon paying the 
furnish account is significant in view of president of the American Farm Bureau Eugene 
O'Neal's fraudulent claim that the WPA and FSA paid poll taxes for over 6,000 rural 
relief recipients in order to build a political machine. At the same time that O'Neal made 
his outrageous claims evidence existed that the AFB had over 13,000 black sharecroppers 
in six Mississippi counties paying dues to his organization. The AFB claimed to croppers 
that the AAA payments came by virtue of the AFB and provided on-the-spot check 
cashing facilities so that the croppers could conveniently pay their annual American Farm 
Bureau dues. A large banner festooned the walls of the Clarksdale, Mississippi AAA 
office, "Pay your AFB Dues Here."33 
Since all the colonists were RRC clients, most of them brought previous balances 
on their RRC loans. These amounts, transferred to Dyess Colony and debited to "RRC 
Account," after 1935, were designated "Deferred Balances." The designation is 
interesting because it allowed the resolution of previous debts to be delayed until the 
Colonists had shown sufficient economic progress to amortize it. The uncertainty about 
the "Deferred Balances" combined with what some colonists thought was deliberately 
33
 "Dyess Colony Incorporated, Rural Loan Receivables, Schedule C, 1936-1939;" letter 
to Lawrence Westbrook from T. Harry Reid, both in RG 96. Letter to Robert F. 
LaFollette, from John A. Boutwell, Chairman, Agricultural Committee of the Mississippi 
House of Representatives, 9 February 1942, Gardner Jackson Papers, FDR Library, Hyde 
Park, New York. Historian Lawrence J. Nelson sees no wrong in the AFB's exploitation. 
He approvingly cites Oscar Johnston's view that his sharecroppers wanted to be members 
of the AFB - that they looked forward to getting their Farm Bureau paper. Lawrence J. 
Nelson, King Cotton's Advocate: Oscar G. Johnston and the New Deal, (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1999), 114-115. 
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confusing and fluid conditions for ownership was to be a prime reason for the growing 
disaffection among some. 
If a man needed a mule, or a bigger one, (one client was affirmed in his suspicions 
mat his two 800 pound mules would not be able to handle the Delta buckshot) or a plow 
he had only to gain the approval of the Farm Manager. Armed with the sequentially 
numbered and multi-copied blank, the Colonists could draw on the warehouse or mule lot 
for his capital needs. Thus, the charges appeared in the colonist's name as "Capital 
Goods Account." Again, the amortization of this account would be discussed in the 
future, after certain conditions were met. In the meantime, the account accrued annual 
interest charges of 5 percent, a dramatic reduction from the cotton-baron furnish 
•54 
system. 
The government men - teachers, nurses, drag line operators, bookkeepers, farm 
supervisors, porters, police, commissary manager, colony physician, clerks, drivers, 
foremen, Family Counselor (the post-May 1936, title of the Senior Family Selection 
Specialist), the management staff, and assorted other employees lived in the town-center 
residences. The residences, the community building, and other structures had electrical 
service and water system that delivered cold and clear water from an artesian well. The 
town-center well water was sweet and devoid of the iron deposits that saturated the farm 
cottage wells. Potential colonists were advised to make sure they sampled the water at 
one of the farms because the water in the town's artesian well was not the same as the 
water from farm cottage wells. The town center water system cost $26,810.60; it would 
have cost $215.60 to equip each farm with an electric pump, including the cost of the 
'One of Several Interviews," RG 96. 
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intra-colony power transmission lines. The sixteen blocks - thirty-two residences - of 
the town-center were of the same design and construction as the farm cottages, with one 
exception. There were no outbuildings on the lots in town center. None of the Dyess 
colony houses had basements, and less than 1% had fireplaces. The people, said Cone 
Murphy, always bricked up the fireplaces and installed a wood stove. The five room 
houses rented for $27.00 a month; the four room houses for $22.00 and the three room 
houses for $17.00. Thirty-two Dyess employees (thirty-seven if one counts all the 
occupants of the teacherage) of the 114 employed as of May 1936, rented residences at 
Dyess. The mixture of occupational and income levels represented at Dyess is a 
reminder of a time when class distinctions were not so vividly manifested as later. In 
Block No.21, resided the highest salaried official at Dyess, Dr. L.L. Hubener drew $525 
per month; Resident Manager E. S. Dudley earned $325 and lived adjacent to a 
Commissary Clerk who earned $100 per month, the Disbursing Officer received $200 per 
month, and a Landscaper, salary not specified.35 
The colony newspaper monitored the pulse of the club and school activities and 
accomplishments; locals formed bands and individuals pulled out fiddles and guitars or 
gathered around one of the beat-up upright pianos and blended Protestant hymnody with 
country and Delta blues. The school questionnaire surveyed each child about his or her 
musical ability or interest in acquiring it. Perhaps Ray Cash's boy, Johnny, owed part of 
35
"Dyess Colony, Inc, List of Community Center Houses Occupied, and the Renter's 
Occupation;" "Dyess Colony, Inc;' both in RG 96."Administrative Personnel" typescript 
roster of names and salaries in RG 69, WPA Central Office Records, Roll 1745. "Dyess 
Colony, Inc., Budgets." The list referenced above does not list the name of the 
landscaper, but it does include the salaries of other workers, presumably of same skill 
level. Workmen's' wages ranged from $60.00 to $125.00 per month. 
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his future legendary success to the musical incubator that was Dyess. Families, 
especially those from non-Delta areas, gloried in the size of the vegetables and melons 
that sprouted from the black Delta buckshot ground. It took a while for some of the Delta 
natives to match their plains and hill-country brethren in vegetable gardening. However, 
many of the Delta natives had difficulty cultivating vegetables - most of them had little 
experience. One of the oft-repeated cliches about planters and croppers, found in the 
works of such writers as Jonathan Daniels and David Conn, concerns planters' provision 
of garden plots and seeds for cropper maintenance. Cohn even relates that Delta cotton 
barons encouraged their croppers to raise pigs and chickens, but his exceptions proved 
the rule. Delta cotton barons of the 1920s and 30s, particularly in the Arkansas and 
Mississippi Delta, did not encourage and in most cases did not even allow croppers to 
raise their food. The land was too valuable; most Delta cotton barons insisted that 
croppers grow cotton to the cabin door. Only after the AAA acreage reduction and under 
the soil conservation program did planters allow significant space for cropper gardens. 
The American Red Cross supplied vegetable seeds to croppers after the 1927 flood. The 
results were disappointing. Red Cross officials discovered that a great many Delta 
residents, tillers of the richest soil in the world, did not know how to grow vegetables. 
Indeed, after the 1927 flood, Oscar Johnston hired two Alcorn A & M graduates to teach 
his sharecroppers how to cultivate and process fruit and vegetables.36 
36
 "One of Several Interviews"; "Dyess Colony, Inc."; "Plans and Progress." For 
references to club, school activities, and music, see The Colony Herald July 1937 -
October 1938. Sara E. Morris, Paper "Underwear, Quilts, Vegetables, and Milk: 
Mississippi Home Demonstration Work During the Great 1927 Flood," SAWH Seventh 
Conference on Women's History, Baltimore Maryland, June 8-10,2006. David L. Cohn, 
Where I Was Born and Raised, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), 135. 
References to the South, the Delta in particular, importing food (corn was imported not 
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Spurred on by Home Demonstration Clubs, the Colony sponsored contests 
judging or simply rhapsodizing about, the fruits and vegetables produced by kitchen 
gardens; twice a year the Colony conducted a "Yard Beautiful" contest. Many of the 
Dyess residents had moved from the hills and plains areas of Arkansas. They were 
accustomed to sweeping their bare yards, a physical impossibility in the Delta. Dyess 
Colony yards were composed of buckshot; mud when it rained and deep-gashed crevices 
when it did not. The answer to the dilemma, discomfiting and yet beneficial to some 
non-Deltans, was to plant grass seed. Not only did the grass moderate the mud and 
cracked ground, it also provided a proper foundation for poultry. The Farm Supervisors 
estimated that each family would need about 300 chickens in order to achieve a 
population of thirty good laying hens. Throughout his association with the Colony 
Lawrence Westbrook promoted egg production for the St. Louis and Memphis markets. 
Chickens could not survive out of doors on bare buckshot land. The Deltans among the 
Dyess colonists were not overwrought by me stiff soil or the mud or snakes, or wild 
animals. A nine-year old Dyess boy found a baby bobcat in the woods with its eyes still 
closed during the very week that the Governor and Lawrence Westbrook came to 
memorialize W. R. Dyess and to dedicate the project. The lad intended to raise it for a 
pet, he said. 
only as animal feed - it also constituted a major portion of croppers' diets) are 
ubiquitous. Holley, Uncle Sam's Farmers, 91. Johnny Cash was four years old when his 
family moved to Dyess, 24 March 1935 - house #266. See: Henson, "Memories of 
Dyess" and "Dyess Colony 1934, Sorted by Name." F. J. Hurst, "Mississippi's Largest 
Cotton Plantation," Progressive Farmer (5), (February 1940): 3, 8. 
37
 The Colony Herald, 9 July 1937. The Colony Herald July 1937 - October 1938. "One 
of Several Interviews"; "Dyess Colony, Inc."; "Plans and Progress." 
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The economic condition and standard of living for Dyess residents was, by 
middle-class American standards of the time, woefully deficient. Despite the pristine 
white houses and arrow-straight graveled roads, the houses at Dyess were built cheaply of 
local lumber not properly seasoned. Cheaply constructed houses made of improperly 
processed materials require intense maintenance in order to remain neat and attractive. 
Dyess Colony homes did not remain pristine or attractive for very long. However, 
compared to conditions they had experienced in the American South that were worse than 
anywhere else in the world, some colonists reveled in the roofs that did not leak, water 
just outside the kitchen door, a good school and teachers for their children, and confident 
of a decent supper. Many of the Dyess colonists had lived in such substandard conditions 
all their lives, but many had not. For some of the colonists the conditions at Dyess were 
best measured not against the immediate past but against their lives before the boll 
weevil, prior to the crash of cotton prices, prevenient to the ministrations of the New 
Deal. Some colonists still believed that they had a right to pursue the American dream. 
Some had much greater aspirations than a life of secure but blighted subsistence 
competence. Some, like some of those at Tupelo, did not have a problem with authority 
as such; they just did not like people telling them what to do.38 
The Third Crisis 
"Down in Tupelo everybody seems to be feeling grand," reported Lorena Hickock 
to Harry Hopkins; people were buying electrical appliances in anticipation of cheap TVA 
38
 Letter to Clarence Senior from Naomi Mitchinson, Labor File, STFU (1935-1938), box 
443, Socialist Party of America Papers, special Collections, Duke University. The houses 
at Tupelo Homesteads, built by local building supply and construction firm were of far 
better materials and construction than the cottages at Dyess, although they shared 
architectural features. 
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power, and she approved of the economic plan designed for the Tupelo Homesteaders. 
The homesteaders were simply replicating the wage-work/subsistence gardening 
traditionally practiced by most of Tupelo's workers. They had a chance, said Hickock, to 
"pay out." On the surface, things were looking grand at Dyess; how people felt was 
much more complicated. 
There was always some sort of trouble at Dyess. Some Dyess colonists were 
anxious when they discovered that their move to Dyess, often a great sacrifice in 
abandoned memories and family, did not mean that they were secure. They were on 
probation, an inconsequential matter it seemed. Serious consideration of the their 
probationary status came only with the dismissal of some of their neighbors. Even if one 
agreed that a particular family was not a wholesome influence or good neighbor, the fact 
that someone could be evicted for exercising a personal preference rather than for 
violation of a law or regulation was sobering. Mr. S. B. Funk believed that the price of 
his farm was far too high and totally unjustified and refused to sign the purchase 
agreement; his eviction brought protest from here-to-fore cooperative citizens. In 1938, a 
non-colonist neighbor, Mr. Paul Finch, demanded that all the officers and members of the 
Board of Directors resign or else he would inform newspapers in Memphis, Chicago, 
Kansas City, Cleveland, and St. Louis of the gross fraud and outrageous exploitation 
inflicted upon the colonists at Dyess in particular and upon the taxpayers of the United 
States in general. Mr. Funk and Mr. Finch were rousing up the colonists. More than 100 
colonists supported Finch's notions and petitioned President Roosevelt to conduct an 
investigation of the Colony. Eleanor Roosevelt directed similar complaints to the bosses 
39
 Letter from Lorena Hickock to Harry L. Hopkins, esq., 11 June 1934, Harry L. Hopkins 
Papers, FDR Library. Morris, "Underwear, Quilts, and Vegetables." 
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at the RA and at Dyess. The farms cost too much. The government men demanded 
$90.00 per acre for land that the government bought at $2.50. The government men said 
that the purchase price would not be more than the actual cost - and they offered the 
government men's own words as proof. Why could a colonist not plant whatever variety 
of cotton that struck his fancy? Why was an American cotton cultivator not free to gin 
his own cotton where he pleased? Why was the independent land-holding cotton 
"farmer" of Dyess dependent on government men and bosses for marketing the crop? 
Why could a man who had obligated himself to a lifetime of mortgage payments not get a 
traditional fee-simple occupancy? The government men had a rational answer to each of 
those questions. There is no evidence that the bosses actually responded with the obvious 
(to the bosses) answer, "Because you have proven to be incompetent." In every case, 
said the bosses, the colonists had agreed to the conditions, or extenuating circumstances 
had required alteration of the original language. Within a year after the dedication 
ceremony, the number of people leaving Dyess became a steady stream - they were not 
as steadily replaced.40 
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Aaron, Family Selection Specialist to Mr. J. B. Lawson, Regional Representative, 
Management Division, 8 November 1935;Letter to Floyd Sharp from Paul Finch, 10 May 
1938; "Interview with a Rural Rehabilitation Supervisor"; "One of several interviews"; 
"Procedure Followed"; "Memories of Dyess"; all in RG 96, Box 182. Lawrence 
Westbrook, "Operating Principles at Dyess," hand annotate typescript of a speech 
delivered at the Colony on 22 May 1936, RG 96, AK - 80. The Colony Herald, 1 May 
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Some colonists claimed that the farm managers used abusive language and 
physical intimidation. Dyess officials, among themselves, discussed the truculent 
personality of some personnel, the greed of others, and argued about what to do with 
those people who would obviously never be able to support themselves. Westbrook 
suggested that around 200 families would never be self-sufficient and that the Colony 
should plan to provide welfare to them until, perhaps, their children could assume care 
for them. Many of the colonists refused to cooperate. The governor and state house 
crowd made Dyess a principal target and the AFB tried to wreck any government 
assistance to the most destitute Americans. Over 100 Dyess men signed a petition 
condemning the government men at Dyess and demanded alterations to the system. At 
the same time, a significant majority of Dyess colonists petitioned the First Lady and 
asked her to ignore the grousing of a few malcontents. Meanwhile, Rexford G. Tugwell 
continued to draw the vicious lashings of the increasingly suspicious and resentful 
Southern Democrats; Dyess Colony was guilty by association.41 
Clearly, the reality of Dyess was very different from the vision of W. R. Dyess, 
and the hopes, if not the expectations, of New Deal planners. The "Third Crisis," was 
inevitable considering the number of contradictory phenomena set at play against each 
other at Dyess. With a full stomach, a snug and comfortable house, furnish provided and 
free of the mind-numbing anxiety of destitution, the Dyess cultivator might well have 
1936; Arkansas Gazette, 9 January 1938,10 June 1977. Letter to Floyd Sharp from Paul 
Finch, 10 May 1938, WPA Central Office Files. 
41Letter to Lawrence Westbrook, 29 April 1938; letter to Floyd Sharp from Lawrence 
Westbrook, 11 May 1938; both in WPA Central Office Files. Bernard Stershner, Rexford 
Tugwell and the New Deal, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 238-
250. 
reason to reflect and to re-examine his present condition and future obligations. Was his 
present state that different from his former? 
Before a Dyess colonist had failed dramatically enough to become a client of the 
Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, his residence status was tenuous at best. He 
had no guarantee that he could cultivate the same ground the next crop season. New 
arrivals at Dyess could rely on the goodwill of the bosses; they were on probation for at 
least a year and could be dismissed if they failed to meet expectations. The new arrival 
had no guarantee that he could cultivate the same ground the next crop season; his 
residence status was tenuous. On the landlord's place the cultivator had to tolerate the 
rude and sometimes demeaning behavior of the boss. At Dyess, one only had to avoid 
Farm Manager Jake Terry's acerbic tongue and physical threats. Before Dyess, the 
Arkansas cultivator had little discretion over the acreage he could crop. The amount 
depended on the opinion of the boss as to the likely efficiency of his labor force. At 
Dyess, the bosses determined the size of his farm and his house, based on the size and 
likely efficiency of his labor force. 
A southern sharecropper planted the seeds that his landlord provided. The 
cooperative agreement at Dyess required the colonist to plant the seed the bosses sold 
him. Sharecroppers did not choose where or by whom to "gin" cotton; the cotton barons 
did that. The Dyess colonist had no say over the ginning of cotton; the Cooperative 
Association did that. The fortunes and conditions of the typical Delta sharecropper were 
determined by the landlord, the paternalistic, but mostly well-meaning, cotton-baron that 
financed the crop and owned the land. At least at Dyess, that most "progressive" of all 
the New Deal agrarian programs, the Colonist understood that he was a free citizen of the 
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United States and, therefore, entitled to self-governance and representation. America was 
a democracy. At Dyess, a triumvirate of government men freed the cultivators from all 
the negotiations, all the arrangements, all the travel, entertainment, influence, and power 
that traditionally had been the exclusive domain of cotton barons in the cotton business. 
The trio of Arkansas WPA officials, dominated by Floyd Sharp controlled the 
lives and fortunes of the Dyess Colonists more completely than ever did a cotton baron. 
Most Delta sharecroppers owed the landlord at the end of the year. Many of them carried 
debts that they did not understand and seemed impossible to repay; every year the 
balances got bigger. At Dyess, all the cultivators were in debt. They had great difficulty 
determining just how much they owed; it soon seemed that most of them could never 
"pay out." Every year the balances got bigger. On a cotton baron's plantation the crop 
was, most often, pledged by a crop-lien; at Dyess, it was pledged by a contract. Much to 
the chagrin of social commentators and agricultural experts, sharecroppers had a 
disturbing propensity to move when their debts piled up. Strangely, some also moved 
when they happened to do well during a particular year. It was one of the few tools of the 
peasant class. At Dyess when consciousness of mounting debt intruded some Colonists 
moved. Sometimes, just to prove that they could, some of the cultivators at Dyess cast 
the only meaningful vote at their disposal - they voted with their feet and left Dyess. A 
Dyess colonist lived a better life than did the typical Delta cropper; but they still moved. 
In May 1936, there were 484 families at Dyess; by April 1938,184 (40%) had moved. 
During the period October 1934 to April 1938,649 families had lived at Dyess, of this 
number 252 (39%) had moved. Unlike a good number of white sharecroppers and unlike 
all of the blacks, the Dyess Cooperator could and did vote. He did not remotely 
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resemble, however, the vision of W. R. Dyess, nor that of Thomas Jefferson's yeoman. 
He looked more like a traditional cotton cultivator, a southern sharecropper, than he did a 
virtuous American yeoman. 42 
Floyd Sharp had managed to become, arguably, one of the most powerful cotton 
barons in the South. Despite the published intentions of creating a community of land 
owning, cooperating, and yet self-directed, modestly comfortable farmers, Floyd Sharp 
was mindful of the demonstrated inability of Dyess clients to achieve that status on their 
own. In order to rehabilitate the impoverished and apparently hopeless cultivators, Sharp 
was reconciled to the fact that Dyess farmers needed direction and they must be 
controlled for their own good. Therefore, Sharp, as the state Director managed to control 
both the operations and personnel of the Arkansas Works Progress Administration and 
the largest of all the New Deal agrarian projects. Floyd Sharp with the concurrence of 
two state WPA Board Members, R.C. Limerick and H.C. Baker, exercised control over 
his cut of the New Deal more than any other New Deal official, whether elected or 
appointed. Dyess Colony, because of Sharp's alteration of its original plan by virtue of 
42
 For problems concerning Mr. Jake Terry see: Letter to President Roosevelt from 
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the corporation, was not under the direction of the ERA, the WPA, RA, or the Farm 
Security Administration (FSA), established in 1937. Floyd Sharp was an employee of 
and subordinate to the WPA and subject to its policies and supervision. However, since 
the Dyess Colony was a separate corporate entity, its affairs were subject to the direction 
of the Board of Directors, not to the WPA. Until the FSA absorbed the colony, Floyd 
Sharp controlled the economy and lives of his clients and employees more authoritatively 
and completely than did Harry Hopkins, or Rexford Tugwell, or Senator Joe Robinson, or 
the President of the United States.43 
Aware of the traditional American fear and suspicion of collectivization and 
Americans' propensity to confuse it with cooperation, the Dyess agreement seemed to 
have provided for democratic voice and cropper control. The small farmers at Dyess 
could only prosper and compete if they could avail themselves of the advantages accruing 
to the cotton barons. Only by pooling the crop and resources of individuals could the 
Dyess community achieve the goal of providing a modest and secure competence for its 
members. How could the interests and small inputs of a diverse group of stubbornly 
independent and indebted Arkansas cultivators be channeled into a significant and 
effective participant in American agriculture to the benefit of individuals? The answer, it 
appeared, was the cooperative. However, did not cooperation violate long-held American 
traditions of self-reliance and determination? The answer to the dilemma, said the Dyess 
43
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Board of Directors, was in the creation of Producers' Cooperatives. The Producers' 
Cooperative at Dyess would unify the demands and assets of Dyess cotton cultivators, 
thus, gaining advantages normally the purview of cotton barons. The creation of a 
cooperative did not violate American notions of Democracy, said the bosses. The 
Directors of the Cooperative had control of all business decisions. The Board of the 
Cooperative would determine the particular pure strain of hybrid cotton planted at Dyess. 
The Board would negotiate with Delta and Pine Land (DP&L) or the Delta Experiment 
Station or the University of Arkansas Cotton Branch Experiment Station at Marion for 
use of one of the newly biologically engineered strains of cottonseed. The Board 
determined who could use the Colony gin. Since only those who planted the approved 
cottonseed could use the gin, all the cottonseed extracted from the ginning process was 
sold, not for its oil, or as feed for livestock, but as a single pure seed variety and thus 
demanded as much as a 60% premium over standard cottonseed. By planting only the 
long-staple varieties perfected by the scientists at the Delta Experiment Station or at the 
laboratories of DP&L, Dyess cotton brought premium prices. The Board of Directors 
also undertook the onerous task of negotiating with the various cotton-factors and 
marketing associations that lusted for their business. Stapleton Cotton headquartered in 
Greenwood, Mississippi competed with The O'Donnell Brothers headquartered in 
Boston, New Orleans, Phoenix, Memphis, Atlanta, London, and Paris to market the 
Colony's cotton. The board also enforced the policies of the Colony with regard to 
progress in clearing land, attitude toward cooperation, assumption of minimal standards 
of living, and adherence to community standards. The Producer's Cooperative wielded 
enormous, almost dictatorial power. No matter said the government men, the Board of 
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Directors would be chosen from the Cooperative Membership. The Dyess farmers would 
choose their own bosses; it was democracy at its best, they said.44 
Perhaps not. The specter of ill-prepared, immoderate, and ill-mannered Arkansas 
farmers dealing with professional emissaries representing Oscar Johnston and LeRoy 
Percy, and other cotton barons was more than Floyd Sharp could tolerate. After securing 
the administrative control of Dyess via the creation of Dyess Colony Incorporated, 
shortly after the death of W. R. Dyess, Sharp immediately began to plan a way around the 
democratic realities of an incorporated Cooperative Association. The Delaware 
Incorporation statutes worked well for the creation of Dyess Colony. Control of the 
colony was concentrated in the Board of Directors, a group dominated by Sharp. 
However, the Delaware statutes concerning cooperatives were problematic. Under 
Delaware laws, a chartered cooperative required that the Board of Directors be elected 
from the general membership of the association. That feature made the incorporation of 
Cooperatives under Delaware statutes unacceptable to Floyd Sharp. The Arkansas laws 
provided a loophole. Dr. H. M. Colvin of the WPA Washington staff advised Sharp that 
44
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certain provisions in the Arkansas statutes allowed the Board of Directors of Dyess 
Colony Incorporated to continue directing the affairs of the Colonists. 
The feeling that it was necessary to secure a Delaware Charter was 
probably due to the fact that it was thought that the Dyess Colony 
Incorporated which will lease its property to the cooperative association to 
be formed would not have proper influence or control over the 
association's Board of Directors. However, the Dyess Colony 
Incorporated can have very effective control over the Board of Directors 
and the affairs of the cooperative association under Arkansas statutes. " 
Eventually the attempt to retain control of the people of Dyess resulted in the 
disintegration of the noble experiment. 
Sharp tried gradually to include the colonists in the leadership of the Cooperative 
Association. The activities of the Colony eventually at the end of about four years would 
be managed by Cooperative Associations. By then the financially sound infrastructure 
of Dyess would be an example of a planned democracy. Sharp hoped to dole out 
authority and responsibility to the Colonists as their actions justified it. Ostensibly a 
Board of Directors governed both of the Cooperative Associations; one was a producer's 
co-op, the other a co-op operating the store and non-profit centers. However, by using 
board seats reserved for the Dyess Board and for the University of Arkansas and the 
management contract held by the Dyess Colony, Inc. Board, all decisions rested 
ultimately in the hands of Floyd Sharp. Resident Manager E.S. Dudley helped the 
cooperative board select a committee to meet with the appropriate manager in order to 
investigate the affairs and make recommendations for various colony activities. Thus, 
some Colonists held the impressive sounding title of Member of the Board of Directors of 
the Dyess Colony Cooperative Association; others assumed advisory positions related to 
"'Memorandum to Colonel Westbrook from H.M. Colvin, 8 May 1936, RG 69, WPA 
Central Office Files. 
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specific activities. The degree of dissatisfaction and irritation among the Colonists was 
often demonstrated by the petty recommendations and demands of the committees. The 
advisory committee complained to the store manager about dogs running free in the store 
and the "crabbiness" of one of the female clerks. Other debates concerned whether or not 
to place benches on the store porch. At one such advisory committee meeting, the 
committee's recommendations astounded Dudley. First, wrote Dudley to Sharp, they 
demanded a guaranteed price for any truck crops marketed through the association. 
Second, they asked for funds to give to Mr. S.B. Funk in connection with his eviction suit 
and to aid Mr. Finch in his investigation of Dyess.46 
By the summer of 1937 and continuing until the dissolution of the colony, the 
grievances, imagined or real, became part of growing public disaffection with Dyess 
Colony. Much of the general disdain or suspicion applied to the Colony was a function 
of the ridicule directed at Rexford G. Tugwell by the conservative press, the AAA, and 
the agricultural establishment. However, much of it had simmered since the inception of 
Colonization Project No. 1. Azile Aaron, Family Selection Specialist at the newly 
created Resettlement Administration in Washington and recently charged, by Rexford 
Tugwell, with overall management of the family selection at Dyess, made a research trip 
to Dyess in the fall of 1935. Based on the information gleaned from interviews with 
colonists, Rural Rehabilitation officials, and other government men, Aaron redesigned 
46
 Letter from Floyd Sharp to Lawrence Westbrook, 12 July 1938, WPA Central Office 
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the blanks and the procedures; she also instituted a comprehensive training component 
for the family selection personnel, particularly the Regional Interviewers.47 
The principal complaint from the colonists, even the most cooperative ones, was 
the one-year probationary period and the inability to know what they were to pay for their 
new farms. Colonists discovered mat the blanks they signed at Dyess did not actually 
guarantee anything. The contract required a Colonist to cooperate, satisfy standard 
community obligations, and make reasonable progress during the first year of occupancy. 
Upon satisfactory completion of those requirements, the Colonist would be offered an 
opportunity to enter into an agreement to buy the farm at a price, at an interest rate, and 
for a period of years to be determined later. One of the most universally recognized 
deleterious properties of the American sharecropping system affected Dyess Colonists. 
Tenants who had no permanent interest in a property had no reason to invest time or 
money to improve or even maintain land and structures. The Dyess Colonists, 
presumably, had reason to trust their new bosses and the government. Aaron and her 
associates discovered that, in spite of the stated nature of the experiment, some of the first 
colonists came to Dyess looking for a chance to escape farming for a living. They were 
not committed to farming as a way of life, nor did some of them show much interest in 
becoming part of a community. Some had great difficulty in understanding how 
cooperation, which meant sacrificing personal initiative and preference, could benefit 
them. Some of the initial colonists were shocked and woefully unprepared for the 
47
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peculiar nature of life and farming in the Delta. Based on the experience of the colonists 
and the RRC, Aaron set about improving the selection of colonist families. 
Several of the documents that Aaron's staff prepared for training family selection 
personnel are particularly revealing. The Washington RA office created training 
documents based on the existing interviews and cases of current Dyess residents who had 
been selected by the Arkansas RRC. Using actual questions and objections, the 
documents reconstructed past interviews and supplied appropriate answers. These 
documents are interesting for at least two reasons. All of the issues, which later were the 
subject of so much agitation, were articulated and addressed in the training documents. 
Neither the RA nor the bosses at Dyess were unaware of the problems that confronted 
some of the Colonists. At least after December 1935, all the government men had read 
the documents and had been coached as how to answer those questions. The second 
reason the documents are so important is that their existence proves that the colonists 
should have been aware of the peculiar nature of life at Dyess.49 
The synthetic interview with questions was drawn from actual interviews and 
answers supplied for training purposes addressed the nature of the occupancy. The one-
year probationary period was for the benefit of the applicant as well as the colony, said 
the model interviewer. The one-year trial allowed the applicant to leave before obligating 
himself to pay for the farm. The reason the government men could not specify the price 
was that no one knew, exactly, what the final price of the project would be because 
48
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construction was still ongoing. Colonists did not get a deed with their amortization 
schedule and contract because the government was obligated to protect its investment. 
Thus, the colonists would get title when the farms were paid for. 50 
The potential colonists came to the interviews with questions apparently based on 
rumors. Selection personnel hastened to assure that the Colony did not use bells to 
summon people to the fields and that Colonists were not required to get permission to 
leave the property. Some had concerns about having visitors, others asked about the mud 
and the quality of water. In their answers, the interviews offered straightforward answers 
along with a moderate commentary. For example, in assuring that Colonists could leave 
the property at will, staffers also commented on the necessity of applying close attention 
to the crops if one was to be successful. Relatives and friends could visit at the discretion 
of the Colonist, interviewers assured potential Colonists, but one should be considerate of 
the sensibilities of neighbors. The houses were not large enough for extended families or 
numerous visitors. Extended stays by large numbers of people could easily 
inconvenience Colony neighbors. The questions asked by the colonists in early 1936 did 
not come as a surprise to the government men - they had ready, and for the most part, 
truthful answers. That some of the assertions made by the interviewers turned out to be 
less than accurate is certain. Twenty acres of Delta land was not sufficient to produce 
food, feed, and cash enough to amortize the loan and provide a wholesome living. The 
property turned out to be not as safe from flooding as the interviews said. Even so, the 
50
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interviews and the training materials they used were not deliberately misleading. Any 
errors or misrepresentations were honest errors. Every Dyess Family Placement 
Specialist had been trained by use of the synthetic interviews. Later some colonists 
claimed that they were ignorant of the items discussed in the training materials.51 
"Dyess Colony, Inc," is an in-house narrative and summary of conditions at Dyess 
covering its inception through 1937. It is anonymous, and it is a non-published 
typescript, yet it contains direct quotations from several reports of RA officials, it seems 
to have been created for internal use only as an objective summary, and not as an attempt 
to justify or defend the Colony. Therefore, it seems to be a trustworthy source. The 
narrative was glowing in its report on the character, training, and attitude of the Regional 
Interviewers and Family Selection Specialists. All were college graduates; all had 
received some post-graduate training; all were Arkansas natives. They had compassion 
for the potential clients and were passionate about the promise of Dyess. Most of them 
were from rural backgrounds and all demonstrated skill in driving the muddy and rutted 
roads of rural Arkansas. All had faced situations that made an automobile useless and all 
had reverted to riding a mule or horse to an interview, or hiking through the Arkansas 
wilderness of mud and swamps in the Delta, or piney woods, prairies, and remote 
mountains in other parts of the state; four interviewers were women. Some of the 
Washington officials suspected the compassion and enthusiasm caused the Interviewers 
to oversell the conditions and hope at Dyess and to understate the difficulties of 
cultivating cotton in the Delta.52 
Ibid. 
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The Washington RA staff was convinced that the key to proper family selection 
lay in good recommendations from the county Rural Rehabilitation Supervisors. Some of 
these officials had "oversold" the project to their least successful clients. Many of the 
county supervisors refused to mention the project to their best clients. They did not want 
to lose their most successful clients, or best mules. As a result, some of the applicants 
came to Dyess expecting almost Utopian conditions while others never became applicants 
because the county supervisor never informed them about Dyess. Later analysis of the 
Dyess family selection identified another problem. Despite the training and introduction 
to Dyess, the Regional Interviewers had often oversold Dyess. Compared to the places 
and under the conditions that their clients lived, the possibilities at Dyess made it difficult 
for young college-educated social workers to remain objective and analytical. Part of the 
interviewer's duty was to dissuade those who demonstrably were unsuited for the 
project.53 
Soon other problems occupied the minds and conversations of the colonists. The 
"Deferred Balances" loomed large in their fears. In addition to the debts transferred from 
the RRC, the balance grew because of particular circumstances. The initial ERA grant to 
Dyess Colony included a substantial reserve fund, designed to ensure the colony's 
existence should there be unusual or aberrant situations. Because of the reserves and the 
provision that applied all payments, not to the U. S. Treasury but to Dyess Colony, Inc, 
the Board of Directors were free to provide liberal conditions for the repayment of the 
Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts. Should a colonist not be able to pay on the two 
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accounts, arrangements were quickly and easily arranged for payment at some future 
time. Payments were applied only to the furnish account until the balance on that account 
was satisfied. Only after the furnish account had been paid, were payments allocated to 
Deferred or Capital Goods Accounts. However, even the seniority of the furnish debt and 
its claim to first payment did not halt the growth of the furnish balance. It seemed that 
aberrant situations hindered the colonist' ability to achieve complete amortization of 
previous furnish and capital goods accounts within the first four years, as Colony officials 
initially forecast. Most of the colonists came after January 1936; therefore, many of them 
had time to clear and plant only a fraction of their acreage, a large part of what they 
planted was devoted to vegetables and feed. Part of the reason for this liberality was the 
flood of 1937. The flood further delayed land clearing, the government men evacuated 
all the mules, and their evacuation and temporary care cost the Colony $10,712.05. No 
one could make a payment on Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts; the government 
wrote off all the 1937 and one-half of the 1938 Furnish Accounts. No payment was 
required on the Deferred and Capital Goods Accounts, but interest still accrued at 5%.54 
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The End 
The 20 April 1939 postal telegram was addressed to Floyd Sharp as WPA 
Administrator, not as President of Dyess Colony, Inc. Corrington Gill, the Assistant 
Administrator of the Works Progress Administration wired Sharp: 
Petitions by various inhabitants of Dyess Colony received complaining, in 
brief, that cost of land to them would be its actual cost, said to be two 
dollars fifty per acre, and improvements thereon whereas actually 
corporation is trying to force deeds upon them at a cost exceeding seventy 
five dollars per acre. Complaints also re eviction suites (sic) against S. B. 
Funk and A. J. McCraven. Various other complaints by petitioners 
alleging abuses. Please submit written report as soon as possible.55 
Just nineteen days earlier, Lawrence Westbrook had confided to Sharp that Gill desired 
merely to, "hold the situation in status quo pending final decision as to what agency of 
the government will be responsible for these communities." The continuing agitation of 
McCraven, Funk, and Finch - and the murmuring among some - allowed no quiet 
environment in which to dispose of Dyess Colony.56 
The original plan, and one continually reaffirmed by the Dyess Board, provided 
that in four years from inception, the Colonists would have established profitable 
Cooperatives to manage the marketing and ancillary activities. In four years, planners 
thought, all the 500 farms would be solidly secured by government mortgages, there 
would be no furnish or capital goods balances, and the New Deal would have 
demonstrated a way to redeem American agriculture. Dyess and the other two aberrant 
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projects, Cherry Lake and Pine Mountain, would resurrect a player that America had not 
seen since the late seventeenth century. In an industrialized nation, in the midst of an 
agricultural technical revolution (cotton was mechanized later than any other American 
staple crop), and in a geo-economic environment in which gaining an economic and 
social competence from family-sized farms was impossible, the New Deal proposed a 
reappearance of the independent and disinterested yeoman farmer. He would plan his 
production for subsistence, trade his surplus for extra-community goods, and, perhaps sell 
his surplus according to notions of "just price" rather than market forces. The telegram 
and the issues addressed must have represented a dilemma for Sharp; to write an adequate 
report he would have to go back, at least to early 1937, if not earlier.57 
Conditions that spawned petitions, eviction suits, and "various other complaints" 
were present at the beginning and became more robust with age. Floyd Sharp's five 
years as President of Dyess Colony Incorporated and Arkansas WPA Director had just 
reached their nadir as Sharp received the telegram. Governor Carl Bailey had just 
dissolved Dyess Colony Incorporated and Sharp was trying to control his outrage against 
those who, in his opinion, were simply taking advantage of the naive Colonists by 
making ludicrous charges of malfeasance against the Dyess staff and Board. Earlier in 
the year, at the Governor's dissolution of the corporation, Floyd Sharp and Lawrence 
Westbrook had been trying to determine under which agency the Dyess Colony could 
avoid domination of Governor Bailey's allies. At the same time Sharp was fearful that 
the colony and its remaining trust fund balance would fall into the hands of the Arkansas 
statehouse crowd; he was trying to find a way to rescue W.R. Dyess's dream. It appeared 
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as if Governor Bailey had won. That the WPA would call Sharp to account for 
conditions and actions concerning a program over which the WPA nor any other agency 
had authority served only to accent the gravity of the situation. Normally matters 
concerning Dyess were addressed to him as President of Dyess Colony, even those from 
other governmental departments and agencies, particularly the Works Progress 
Administration. The corporate entity that removed Dyess from WPA and RA control also 
removed it from their protection. The fall-out from Dyess might very well negatively 
C O 
affect Sharp's career and it might disassemble the patronage system he controlled. 
Perhaps events in January 1937 were a portent of troubles corning to Dyess. The 
first years of the Colony's existence, 1934-35 were times of bustle and construction; of 
designing and redesigning; of recruiting and explaining; and then the almost sudden 
culminating rush of colonists who came to Dyess in early 1936. Only those who came in 
1934 had a chance to clear a significant portion of their acres in time for the 1935 crop; 
some who came in 1936 also were not able to clear land quickly enough to harvest a cash 
crop. Nineteen thirty-seven should have been a great year for Dyess Colony. Most of the 
colonists had positive attitudes about their new homes and landlords; families had cleared 
a substantial amount of land; pigs, mules, milch cows, and chickens supplied food for the 
table and power for the fields; and fine new schools educated the children. The women's 
clubs were robustly improving themselves, and fully intended to improve everybody else. 
The year of 1937 would demonstrate what hardworking and right-minded people could 
do if they only had a fair chance. But, Dyess Colony was in the heart of the Great 
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American Delta and in the Delta success had always been as much a function of chance 
as equity. In January when the Mississippi River flooded, again, and backed the Tyronza 
River over the flat Delta land, Dyess colonists were evacuated to higher and drier places; 
the crop at Dyess Colony was delayed while workers cleared and cleaned and waited on 
the colony's mules to return from their exile at the state prison farm.5 
In spite of the 1937 flood, the Colony was making fair progress in becoming a 
major player in the Delta cotton hierarchy. Resident Manager E.S. Dudley reported to 
Westbrook on 13 November 1937, despite bad weather, that the colony had ginned 1,493 
bales of cotton totaling 788,133 pounds. The long staple and high-tensile strength cotton 
grown at Dyess was denser than the common upland green seed cotton sewn by most 
producers. The average bale of Dyess cotton weighed almost 528 pounds, the typical 
bale of cotton in the 1930s weighed around 500 pounds, but often less. The cotton bale is 
a measure of volume rather than weight. In a further effort to increase the market value 
of cotton, Westbrook and Sharp were, in 1937, discussing with the Arkansas and Florida 
extension services the possibility, and risk, of planting the even more valuable sea-island 
strain of cotton, heretofore grown successfully only in coastal South Carolina and 
Georgia. In 1937, the occasional vocal complaint and the sometimes-casual attitude 
about "community spirit" had become, by the end of the year, a murmur; in the next two 
years, it became a roar.60 
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Even the first colonists expressed some anxiety about the initial rental 
agreements. The biggest problem seems to have been not the probationary period, but the 
undetermined price of the new farms. The government men tried to explain to the 
colonists that the final price of the farm could not be determined until the entire planned 
infrastructure and ancillary facilities were completed. There were certain adjustments 
necessary in order for equity in pricing the farms. For example, initially only two acres 
of ground was cleared for each new farm-site. The land adjacent to the house was 
cleared as a convenience to new arrivals; new comers would at least have a garden spot. 
The colonists were expected to clear their own property, if the colony cleared any land 
beyond the two acres, then the colonists would be charged $15.00 for each acre cleared. 
The rental and the purchase contract allowed the Colony, in cases where a colonist's 
progress was not satisfactory, to clear land and to add the per acre charge to the purchase 
price. In the spring of 1936, against stated colony policy, some of the Colonists were 
employed at relief work wages by ERA schedule to clear their own land. The alteration 
in the Dyess policy was to speed up cotton production, to make up for lost time. Some 
Colonists claimed that they were not given credit for the land they had cleared while on 
relief work. They felt that the amount of land they had cleared while drawing relief 
wages should be exempt from the land clearing charges included in the price of the farms. 
Precisely why they expected to be paid for the work and at the same time draw all the 
benefit of the work for their own profit puzzled the government men. Many of the 
Colonists thought that the price of the house was inflated and almost all thought that the 
price for the land was extortionary. It was common knowledge that Dyess had bought the 
Memphis, TN, 11 October 1937; letter to Floyd Sharp from H.D. Sanders, Regional 
Engineer, WPA Memphis, 16 October 1937; all in RG 69 WPA Central Office Records. 
land for $2.50 an acre. The government men wanted $75.00; some said $90.00 an acre. 
Some said they never would have signed the rental agreement had they known how much 
the farms would cost.61 
The government men assured the Colonists that the government would charge 
only what the property and its development cost. Such notables as Lawrence Westbrook 
and Floyd Sharp made efforts to allay anxieties about the price; in no case, said Sharp, 
would the farms cost more than they had cost the government. At least that is what he 
told them in 1935. By 1936, the colonists were assured that the prices would be 
"reasonable." In the halcyon days of early spring 1936, Sharp reassured the concerned 
Colonists: 
. . . We have delayed the actual selling of these homes to the families until 
such a time as we could complete most of the buildings. Meanwhile 
families have been moved in on tentative agreements. We are now in the 
final stages of the Colony construction and beginning to plan for the 
future. 
. . . You can start to work with every assurance that your interest is our 
interest, your success our success, and that these homes will be sold at a 
fair price and payments extended over a period of years within the 
reasonable earnings of the property. The new Corporation will work out 
these sales contracts with you shortly after the dedication of the Colony 
which is now tentatively scheduled for the month of June. 
. . . We want you to know that we are more interested in your having a 
home and being in position to earn an independent living than we are in 
collecting back the money used in this development. We make this 
statement, not because we want to leave the impression that you will not 
be required to pay for this property, but because we know that once you 
have a comfortable home and facilities for making a living, the actual 
61
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annual payments that you will be required to make to the Corporation for 
your home will be an easy task. 
Resident Manager E. S. Dudley published assurances in the Colony newspaper, and all 
the Regional Interviewers as well as Dyess Family Selection Personnel, presumably, had 
addressed with comforting assurances and as much clarity as they could muster, the -as-
yet-undetermined price of the farms. What had been mild anxiety for some became 
outraged resistance by others on the distribution of the first land deeds to the settlers at 
Dyess Colony. S. B. Funk, citing his own work in clearing the land and the initial land 
price of $2.50 an acre refused to sign the purchase contract. Not only did Funk refuse to 
sign, he also articulated his charges and suspicions freely and found that some of the 
Colonists were also dissatisfied with the conditions and requirements of Dyess. He 
conferred with Colonist A. J. McCraven and McCraven also refused to sign his contract. 
Some were surprised that the land contracts did not allow them total freedom to sell their 
property as they saw fit. Until the balance had been paid, said the contract and 
government men, the property could be transferred only to Dyess Colony, Inc. If the 
Colonist wanted to sell, he only had one potential customer.63 
Other things bothered some of the Dyess Colonists. The Farm Manager and 
Assistant Director Jake Terry was domineering and abrasive. Homer Donaldson 
complained to President Roosevelt. 
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Mr. Dudley and Mr. Terry (the managers) stopped me m the road and 
Terry began to use abusive language and I ask him to quit and then he 
begot (sic) worse and when I did the same he struck at me. I have two 
witness (sic) on this as it happened in front of Mario Rattan's home house 
556 and Mr. Pulliam of house 562 was with me. Mr. Rattan was very 
dissatisfied with the way they done in hearing of his house... and that is 
the way Mr. Terry has been doing he re . . . and most of the people here 
will tell you the same.64 
The Dyess bosses, Sharp, R. C. Limerick, H.S. Henry, and Lawrence Westbrook were 
cognizant of bis prickly personality and imperious manner. Baker, Limerick, Sharp, and 
Westbrook discussed his contempt of the colonists, and deemed it unfortunate 
considering Mr. Terry's demonstrated farm ability. However, when Terry refused to take 
Westbrook's advice to have samples of the Colony's cotton graded, and as a result the 
Colony's crop brought a lower price, the bosses decided that Terry's services were no 
longer required.65 
One of Floyd Sharp's most frustrating endeavors at Dyess was the formation of a 
Cooperative Association that could assume ownership and operation of the various 
Colony centers at a profit. In an effort to explain the cooperative contract to the colonists 
and to encourage them to join, in 1938 Sharp hired lawyer C. T. Carpenter of Marked 
Tree, Arkansas. Carpenter had demonstrated sympathy for the dispossessed and he had 
recently fallen out of favor with some of his recent clientele. His representation of 
evicted Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU) members had diminished his practice. 
He hoped to educate the Colonists about the cooperative principle in general and the 
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benefits of the Producers Cooperative in particular. He had great difficulty. In Sharp's 
memorandum to the Colonists outlining procedures for 1939 he explained that now, after 
the three years of construction and the flood and the reorganization of the Consumer's 
Cooperative, the Colony and the colonists would prosper. It was true, he said, that the 
Colony would no longer subsidize the Hospital. It was also true that for a two-month 
period, the Colony would bear the expense of returning colonists to their homes or to an 
equidistant place before February 28,1939. The Colony offered this feature in order to 
accommodate the Dyess families that were dissatisfied. The Colony, said Sharp, 
intended to never make such an offer again. The furnish for 1939 would be handled 
exclusively by the Dyess Credit Union. Owned by the Cooperative Association, twelve 
of the twenty Directors were employees of the WPA or of Dyess Colony, Incorporated. 
All crops and all property would be pledged to the bank in security of the furnish. The 
maximum amount of furnish would be calculated based on ten cents per pound, 400 
pounds per acre.66 
By the time Sharp received the telegram from Corrington the end was near. As 
early as June 1938, T. Roy Reid had called on Sharp inquiring about Sharp's attitude 
concerning transferring Dyess Colony to the Farm Security Adniinistration. Sharp and 
Westbrook discussed the FSA's interest in Dyess and Sharp commented on the 
competition among federal agencies. The governor's revocation of the Dyess Charter 
had effectively dissolved the corporation and Floyd informed Westbrook that the 
Arkansas statutes allowed a dissolved corporation three years to conclude all its business 
66
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and liquidate its holdings. That meant, said Floyd, the $200,000 government bond, held 
in a Little Rock bank box, the remnant of the once robust Dyess Trust Fund, was safe 
from confiscation by the state. 
During the remainder of 1939, Funk and McCraven gathered publicity and 
focused their outrage over the price of the farms. Their non-Colonist neighbor, Paul 
Finch made charges so outrageous that even rabid anti-New Deal critics grew tired. By 
the end of the year, Dyess Colony had become the property and concern of the Farm 
Security Administration. Through a complicated procedure the Colony was liquidated in 
January 1944, but all the details were not settled until 1951. Some colonists moved away 
at great loss, some sold and moved away, and some made large farms and stayed. The 
losses at Dyess were enormous. The only positive is that the losses to the U.S. 
Government amounted to less each year.68 
In Retrospect 
S. B. Funk had no real reason to complain, at least as far as the price of his farm 
was concerned. Administrators at Dyess went to great lengths to explain the $2.50-per-
acre price that W.R. Dyess paid at the outset Interviewers were encouraged to provoke 
questions and if the questions were not forthcoming from the prospective colonists, to 
propose a question and answer. Funk claimed that his five-room house was over-priced, 
that he was charged too great a fee for his turn-in bridge, and that he was not given credit 
for the land he had cleared. In response to Funk's complaint, Dyess Colony requested 
67
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that the Colony's accountants, Russell, Brown, and Company analyze the cost of Funk's 
property. They reported that the cost of the five-room house, barn, poultry house, turn-
in-bridge, and 36.99 acres was $3,539.56. A credit of $275.90 toward land clearing 
reduced the cost to $3,265.66. The sales price to Funk was reduced to $2,999.52. The 
accountants pointed out, notwithstanding normally accepted standard accounting 
procedures, no prorated charges for community infrastructure had been added to the sales 
price. Funk's assertions were without foundation. Funk's price-per-acre, including the 
house and structures, was $81.09. Excluding the house and structures, the land price was 
$19.37 per acre. According to Russell Brown & Company, the market value for cleared 
and drained Delta cropland was between $90.00 and $100.00 per acre, and even for 
"buckshot" land in the midst of an agricultural depression.69 
Paul Finch's challenges were more difficult to refute, in part, because he dealt in 
the murky world of intrigue, conspiracy, innuendo, and motives. Finch was not a 
Colonist but his small farm was almost completely surrounded by Dyess land. His 
property was a salient into the Dyess community. Dyess Resident Manager E. S. Dudley 
did not get any good information regarding Finch's activities until later than he thought. 
Dudley wrote to H.C. Baker and Lawrence Westbrook in May of 1938, reporting on a 
meeting that took place at the Finch place amongst fractious colonists. Apparently, said 
Dudley, the meeting, details about which he had just heard, was one of a series and it was 
the only one about which Dudley had any information. He did have, he said, a list of 
those thought to be closely allied with Finch and Funk who had attempted to keep the 
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Dyess staff ignorant of the meetings. Some people had reported seeing Finch and Funk 
entering various colony houses. He suspected that those who attended were just curious. 
One Colonist told him that the only reason that he went to sign the petition criticizing the 
Dyess management was that he wanted a ride to town. On the whole, Dudley told Baker, 
he did not think Finch was a cause for great alarm because even some of the more 
prominent citizens of south Mississippi County viewed Funk as a troublemaker and a 
danger to labor relations.70 
Lawrence Westbrook was concerned about Finch's activities before word of the 
meeting(s) came to Dudley. He inquired of H.L. Mitchell, the Executive Secretary of the 
STFU, as to whether or not the trouble at Dyess and with Mr. Finch reflected the 
activities of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Mitchell reported that he knew of no 
such union activity at Dyess, but did advise that Union activist Howard Kester was 
tentatively scheduled to speak at Dyess on 8 April. Lawrence Westbrook cheerfully 
reported to Sharp that the STFU was innocent of the trouble at Dyess and heartily 
endorsed Kester's appearance at the Colony. Howard Kester, said Westbrook, was a 
71 
"high quality person." 
Finch demanded that the Board of Directors and staff at Dyess resign and their 
positions be filled by Dyess colonists, and elected by the membership. All decisions 
would require the validation by a majority of Dyess members. A jury of twelve men 
selected by the Dyess membership would decide any issues requiring further 
adjudication, Finch proposed. He charged that the colony industries, a favored project of 
70Ibid. 
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Lawrence Westbrook, were sweatshops, the colony charged $30.00 to $35.00 per ton of 
hay for which the colony paid only $12.00 to $17.00, and the bosses at Dyess were 
greedy, arrogant, and incompetent. Furthermore, said his newspaper article, 99% of the 
colonists were dissatisfied and wanted the changes he recommended. Finch was 
exaggerating his support. By far most of the Dyess residents, even in the midst of Finch's 
most vigorous criticisms, did not support the revolt or sign the petition. Most of the 
Colonists were embarrassed by the reportage - it made them look ridiculous. 
In late 1939, Dyess Colony was transferred to the Farm Security Administration. 
The FSA closed out the various credit accounts, negotiated a price for the farms and 
settlement of the debts. Dyess, Arkansas became very quickly, and remains to this day, a 
typical seedy, blighted Delta town. The deeds and mortgages presented by the FSA 
allowed Dyess farms to be sold piecemeal. Some settlers stayed and retired at Dyess. 
Some prospered and retired elsewhere. Most did not stay at Dyess. They appreciated the 
opportunity, the enhanced living conditions, the excellent schools, and the chance that 
Dyess gave to think and to evaluate options. Those that left Dyess Colony moved for the 
same reasons as did the Tupelo Homesteaders. Some things are too precious to sacrifice. 
The President had urged young men to settle for a "competence" in the country rather 
than gamble on getting rich in the city. The Dyess folks, like those at Tupelo were not 
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ready to settle for a competence, and they would form a community and cooperate with 
those of their own choosing and preference. 
One reads Arthur Raper's work on two Georgia counties to understand why Dyess 
seemed to offer such a great opportunity for the advancement of poor Arkansans. In 
Georgia, a terrible combination of thin and nutrient-poor soil, gashing erosion that 
destroyed cropland, the boll weevil, and a degenerate credit system devastated the cotton 
economy and the lives of tenant farmers. By contrast, at Dyess black buckshot Delta 
ground lay supine in anticipation of seed. The land seemed to revel in its almost 
gratuitous fecundity. New Dealers imagined that the rich, non-eroding, boll weevil 
resistant Delta could sustain a community of subsistence-minded yeomen. The 
government men at Dyess modified the crop-lien system; the quartet of evils that plagued 
Greene and Macon Counties, Georgia did not exist at Dyess. Hindsight allows 
contemporaries to see with much greater resolution notions that were confused and hazy 
to the New Deal government men. Even with fine schools, comfortable houses, adequate 
food, and medical care, most Dyess settlers decided that the sacrifices required to achieve 
them were too great. For one thing, no matter what the government men said, twenty 
acres - even Delta acres, were not enough. And then there was the main reason for their 
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discontent, they did not necessarily have a problem with authority - they just did not like 
other people telling them what to do.74 
The RA was efficient in moving clients to Dyess, the conditions and opportunities 
at Dyess were not sufficient to create a content and satisfied community of yeoman 
farmers. Tensions between the government men and clients, aggravated by paternalistic 
attitudes and political ambition retarded the cooperation demanded by the bosses. The 
experiment at Dyess suggested that the problem of poverty among small cotton farmers 
in the South was not a function of the boll weevil, or thin soil, or erosion. The major 
problem was much more fundamental. It was no longer possible, even on the best 
agricultural land in the world, for a family to make a living on twenty to forty acre cotton 
farms. 
Such is the story of the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess Colony. The effort of New 
Dealers at Tupelo and Dyess represents only one part of the effort to lift the "Shadows 
Over Goshen." There was trouble brewing throughout the cotton country. Socialist 
Christians, Marxists of various stripes, and dispossessed sharecroppers gathered near Hill 
House, Mississippi and proceeded to conduct, arguably, the most radical agrarian 
experiment in U.S. History - mingling Jesus and Marx in the Mississippi Delta. Chapter 
Six is about Christians and Socialists and sharecroppers; liberal paternalism and 
repression; and the death of a vision. It is the story of Delta Cooperative Farm. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DELTA COOPERATIVE FARM AND THE DEATH OF A VISION 
Why dont (sic) you fellows come down off the official high horse and be human for a 
while. The Christmas season is a good time to begin. And the plantation country waits 
for you to make it a real "new deal"for these forgotten men... William Amberson to 
T. Roy Reid, 22 December 1934. 
The attendant loose talk also runs along bad lines: social equality and what have you. 
If I were in your place and could afford to do so, I would take a vacation and spend 
some of my time at Hill House. W.M. Kethley, President, Delta State Teachers College 
to Francis Harmon, General Secretary, YMCA 
If we can build the union, we will take over all the damn plantations. H.L. Mitchell to 
Howard Kester 
We endeavor to exemplify the return of Christianity to its prophetic mission of 
identification with the dispossessed..." Reinhold Niebuhr 
Never before have I seen with such blinding clarity the essential and irreconcilable 
conflict between the scientific and the ecclesiastical approach to social problems. 
William Amberson1 
The agricultural depression in the cotton South was in its thirteenth year by the 
time the Federal Government thought it necessary to intervene. The gap between the 
onset of the agricultural depression in 1919 and the belated governmental action in 1933 
occurred because the bulk of the depression burden fell on people who did not matter. As 
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long as degradation and poverty inflicted predominately southern rural blacks, there was 
no political necessity and little moral urgency in applying corrective measures. However, 
the general depression of 1929 was rapidly creating a class of dispossessed whites who 
found themselves bound by the same economic and social chains that had immobilized 
blacks since Reconstruction. The Tupelo Homesteaders took brief refuge from the 
economic storm and the Dyess Colonists yielded to duress; the Cooperators at Delta 
Cooperative Farm fled from stark terror. 
The crop reduction activities of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA) necessarily required that agriculture and its attendant protocols undergo intense 
scrutiny and adjustment. As the policies of the AAA intruded on the familiar cotton 
production procedures in the South, certain regional peculiarities came into view. The 
AAA implemented policies and created a situation very much analogous to turning over a 
rotting log in the woods; turn it over and all sorts of creatures are exposed to light. 
Widespread malnutrition, pellagra, hookworm, mental retardation, almost 
unbelievable poverty, and a robust repressive economic system slithered into public view 
as provisions of the crop reduction campaign of the AAA disturbed the cotton culture 
environment. Sharecropping and the crop-lien system had long been a regional scandal. 
Regional scholars and activists examined almost every aspect of the system but this work 
remained within a tightly constructed circle of academics and published studies did not 
appear until well into the mid 1930s. Novels with a sharecropping motif, Erskine 
Caldwell's Tobacco Road (1932) and God's Little Acre (1933) for instance, did appear. 
According to historian Donald Holley, they were popular because of their frank treatment 
of sex rather than as exposes of the conditions of sharecropping or tenancy.2 
FDR believed that reconciliation of the dissonance in prices between industry and 
agriculture was essential to national recovery. In his inaugural address, President 
Roosevelt promised to promulgate, " . . . definite efforts to raise the values of agricultural 
products and with this the power to purchase the output of our cities."3 FDR responded 
to the political pressure and the economic emergency and satisfied his inaugural promise 
by asking Congress to approve the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Especially important in 
the bill was its call for parity prices and the authority of the president and the secretary of 
agriculture to establish a balance between agricultural and industrial prices. The 
president specifically proposed to raise agricultural prices to parity. He defined parity as 
the relationship of agricultural commodities and industrial prices as measured by the 
prices in the base period, August 1909 - July 1914.4 The act also allowed the secretary to 
reduce the production of agricultural commodities by paying farmers rental or benefit 
payments for land withdrawn from production. 5 
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act clearly sought to alleviate the distress of middle 
class and prosperous farmers, and was a significant plank in the president's plan for 
industrial recovery. FDR believed that reduced consumer spending came, in part, as a 
result of the loss of farm income. Even with the mass pull of cities, in 1933, fully sixty 
percent of the population still had rural or farm connections. The president blamed much 
of the decline in manufacturing on the inability of this large population to consume the 
output of industry. 
Cully Cobb, Director of the Cotton Section of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration claimed that implementation of the AAA crop reduction contracts had no 
effect on agricultural labor or tenancy. Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, 
admitted that there were some unfortunate incidents. Scholars agree that the AAA cotton 
producer contracts imposed severe repression and hardships on those at the very bottom 
of agricultural society to the benefit of middle-class American farmers and the cotton 
aristocracy, those most aggressively represented by the American Farm Bureau.6 
In response to the hardships brought on by the AAA programs, two distinct 
socialist camps converged to create the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms. In the 
Northeast Arkansas Delta, a country dry cleaner, an internationally acclaimed intellectual, 
a county constable, America's most famous contemporary missionary, and a perpetual 
Socialist Party presidential candidate listened to the humanitarian views of a 
distinguished professor of physiology. From his avocation as a guiding member of the 
6
 Roy V. Scott and J.G. Shoalmire, The Public Career of Cully A. Cobb: A Study in 
Agricultural Leadership, (Jackson: College and University Press of Mississippi, 1973); 
Grubbs, Cry From the Cotton, 19-21,23, 59,61; Mertz, New Deal Policy, 24-25. 
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Memphis Chapter of the Socialist Party of America, Dr. William Ruthraugh Amberson, 
professor of physiology at the University of Tennessee Medical School in Memphis, 
provided the practical guidance that resulted in the formation of the Southern Tenant 
Farmers' Union (STFU) and the intellectual genesis of Delta Cooperative Farm. 
Amberson and the Delta Cooperative Farm - and its lineal descendant, the Providence 
Cooperative Farm - have received little attention from scholars of the STFU. The 
scholarly literature on the Southern Tenant Farmers Union is huge.7 
7
 The papers of the STFU, originals at Chapel Hill, are available in more than sixty 
publicly accessible archives. Donald Holley gives the Delta and Providence Cooperative 
Farms four sentences and makes no mention of Amberson in his fine book Uncle Sam's 
Farmers: The New Deal Communities in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975), 106,192. H.L. Mitchell, in what must be considered 
the authorized word on the STFU, Mean Things Happening in This Land: The Life and 
Times of H.L. Mitchell, Co-Founder of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (Montclair, 
New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1979) briefly mentions Delta Farm in four places, 
but Amberson is given somewhat fuller treatment. Paul Conklin, Tomorrow a New 
World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959) 
treats the farm in thirty-four words. Neither David E. Hamilton, From New Day to new 
Deal: American Farm Policy From Hoover to Roosevelt, 1928-1933 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), nor Paul E. Mertz, New Deal Policy and 
Southern Rural Poverty (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1978) mention 
either farm. Mertz gives slight attention to Amberson. The most impassioned scholarly 
work on the STFU is Donald Grubbs, Cry From the Cotton: The Southern Tenant 
Farmers' Union and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1971.) Grubbs takes no notice of either farm but he gives Amberson fuller attention than 
any of the other scholars. Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and 
Prophets, 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981), gives insight 
into some of the personalities but not the details of the Delta and Providence Cooperative 
Farms. Jonathan Daniels, in his highly reflective, speculative, anecdotal, biased, yet 
frustratingly well-written panoramic view of the depression South, A Southerner 
Discovers the South (New York: The McMillan Company, 1938), gives significant 
attention to the work of the STFU and of Delta Cooperative Farm. Daniels and to an 
even greater degree, David Cohn, are typical of the breezy, poetic, yet banal treatment of 
social conditions in the Delta. The only satisfactory treatment of the Delta and 
Providence Cooperative farm is Jerry W. Dallas, "The Delta and Providence Cooperative 
Farms: A Mississippi Experiment in Cooperative Farming and Racial Cooperation, 1936-
1956," Mississippi Quarterly 4 (3) (1987): 283-308. 
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The first group of Socialist activists, composed of liberal churchmen headed by 
Reinhold Niebuhr, endeavored to: 
. . . exemplify the return of Christianity to its prophetic mission of 
identification with the dispossessed, of bearing witness of the judgment of 
God in history upon the injustices of the existing economic and political 
order, and of aiding men to enter into the possibilities of a more abundant 
life with which God has endowed His creation.8 
After studies at Eden Theological Seminary and Yale Divinity School, Niebuhr served as 
a pastor in Detroit for thirteen years. In 1928, he joined the faculty of Union Theological 
Seminary as Professor of Christian Ethics and remained there until his retirement in 1960. 
His influence on moral, ethical, and religious philosophy was and is enormous. His best-
known and most influential works were Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) Beyond 
Tragedy (1937), The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941), The Children of Light and the 
Children of Darkness (1944), and The Irony of American History (1952). The Delta and 
Cooperative Farms proved to be a laboratory for the application of lessons that Niebuhr 
hoped would emerge from Moral Man and Immoral Society. Interestingly, it was a thesis 
of this very book that Amberson later hurled accusatively at the directors of Delta and 
Providence Cooperative Farms as he resigned from the board of trustees. 
The Christian Socialists most intimately associated with Delta and Providence 
Cooperative Farms identified with, and were heavily influenced by Niebuhr. Sherwood 
Eddy, a student and protege of Niebuhr, had written numerous meditation books and 
8
 University of Memphis Archives, Mississippi Valley Collection #13, Box 1, folder 3, 
Delta Cooperative Farm Papers, untitled manuscript (copy). This manuscript is divided 
into twenty parts and is a synopsis of Delta Cooperative Farm. Its divisions include: 
characteristics, operations, finances, cultural and social aspects, race relations, etc. 
Handwritten notations say "author unknown." There is no notation about the location or 
even the existence of the original of this mss. 
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traveled the world as a missionary and trouble-shooter for the Young Men's Christian 
Association (YMCA). Over the course of his career, he witnessed Soviet collective 
operations, assisted cooperative farmers in Japan, conversed with Adolph Hitler, Benito 
Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin, and served as point-man for many humanitarian fund-
raising efforts. Sam H. Franklin, a protege of Eddy, spent his early career as a 
Presbyterian missionary to Japan. Franklin became the first resident director of Delta and 
Providence Cooperative Farms. Finally, A. E. (Gene) Cox, a recent graduate of Texas 
Christian University, with interests in accountancy and the Bible, came to the attention of 
Sherwood Eddy. Eddy convinced Cox that the letters GPC, which had appeared to Cox 
in a vision, did not mean "Go Preach Christ," but rather they were directing him to "Go 
Pick Cotton" in Mississippi. Cox initially served as the farm bookkeeper and, upon 
Franklin's resignation, he became the Resident Director. He remained in that post until 
the Providence Cooperative Farm finally closed in 1956.9 
These "Christian Socialists" paid more attention to humanitarian than political 
objectives. They did not speak in traditional Marxist terms, nor did they concern 
themselves with party orthodoxy or direction. They were, in the main, nominal socialists 
and did not see any particular economic or political ideology as a cure for economic and 
cultural distress. Their political notions were somewhat analogous to Tugwell's view of 
pragmatism; God's graces were not subject to any particular civic government form, and 
a pleasure economy required neither the blessings of Adam Smith nor the inevitability of 
9
 The biographical information on Niebuhr is taken from the back cover of: Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932). Sherwood Eddy, Eighty Adventurous Years: An 
Autobiography (New York: Harpers, 1955). Sam H. Franklin, "Early Years of the Delta 
Cooperative Farm and the Providence Cooperative Farm," photocopy of privately 
published document, Alcoa, TN, 1980) 17-18, Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi 
State University Library, Special Collections. 
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Karl Marx. Socialism seemed the best response to what they saw as perverted capitalism. 
Their experience in institutional governance emphasized their lack of fealty to socialist 
dogma American Christianity, particularly the ecclesiastical tradition practiced by 
Niebuhr, was conducted within a highly hierarchical system. Ordained ministers, in all 
Christian traditions, were considered to have some "higher calling" than the parishioners 
and matters both spiritual and temporal were most often adjudicated by sessions, 
diaconates, conferences, presbyteries, conventions, and synods, and so forth. Thus, the 
church was in most cases a highly elitist institution. Taking comfort in their "higher 
calling" and drawing on their experience of elitist governance, these Christian Socialists 
found it difficult to allow popular or democratic governance. Their notions of elitist 
guidance and superior knowledge placed them in direct opposition to the philosophy of 
their secular socialist colleagues in the administration of the Delta and Providence 
Cooperative Farms. 
A second camp of socialists also undertook to aid the sharecroppers of the South. 
Norman Thomas, perennial Socialist Party presidential candidate, led them, ostensibly. 
Thomas was a friend of FDR and had access to him from time to time. Clarence Senior, 
Executive Secretary of the Socialist Party of America, gave advice and helped with fund-
raising campaigns. Blaine Treadway, a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Socialist Party of Tennessee, worked part time as a press operator for the Press Scimitar, 
the Memphis evening newspaper much more sympathetic and balanced in its reporting of 
union activities than the conservative Commercial Appeal. Treadway had developed a 
close association with Amberson and later shared his increasing suspicion of the practices 
and ambitions of the Christian Socialist element involved with the cooperative farms. 
The chief operative, intellectual strategist and prime motivator of social activism was 
William Ruthraugh Amberson.10 
10
 Amberson papers, box 1, folder 3. Citing his teaching load and union activities 
Amberson declined appointment as vice-chairman of a new committee on behalf of the 
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Dr. William R. Amberson earned bis Ph.D. in physiology from Princeton in 1923. 
In the same year, he accepted a position as faculty at the University of Tennessee Medical 
School in Memphis. While there he co-authored six textbooks; he became head of the 
department in 1932. Amberson joined the Memphis Socialist Party, served as state 
secretary for the American Civil Liberties Union, and thoroughly involved himself in 
social activism. Through Amberson's close friendship with Paul Porter, adiriiriistrative 
assistant to AAA head Chester Davis, the STFU gained an audience with the Secretary of 
Agriculture and placed a union representative on the 1937 President's Commission on 
Farm Tenancy. Amberson also maintained friendship with Paul Appleby, Executive 
Assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Amberson served as the union's 
liaison with the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote articles and letters for publication, 
coordinated the legal defense of union members, and collected evidence used to bring suit 
on behalf of the STFU against planters who had evicted sharecroppers under the 
provisions of the AAA contract. In addition to his founding work with the STFU and the 
enormous time and energy he devoted to its development, Amberson conceptualized and 
promoted the creation of Delta Cooperative Farm. 
Even before the effects of the AAA cotton acreage reduction campaign were 
apparent in the mid-South, Amberson and the Socialist Party of Memphis were already 
trying to apply pressure on the authorities for better treatment of the dispossessed. On 5 
June 1933, well before the AAA contracts were executed, Amberson, under the auspices 
of "the Committee of Socialist Party" (sic) issued a "Report of Investigations of Short-
Scottsboro Boys being formed by the ACLU. A.E. Cox Collection, Series 7 folder lc, 
Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library, letters to and from Senior, Treadway, 
Amberson, Thomas; William R. Amberson "Outline of Proposed Union," a copy of this 
document is also found at the University of Memphis Archives, Mississippi Valley 
Collection, the original at the Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
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Weighting and Similar Dishonest Practices by Merchants in the City of Memphis." The 
report described the experiences of investigators in buying store-measured commodities 
and in redemption of relief coupons. The report named guilty individuals and companies 
and urged new city ordinances concerning weighing, the publication of guilty operators' 
identities, and removal of certain merchants from the relief program. The committee 
presented its report to city officials and to the two major Memphis newspapers. No 
evidence exists that the report found publication or that Memphis Mayor Edward Hull 
"Boss" Crump's political machine attempted any corrective measures. Several names 
appeared on the document. One of particular interest is that of George A. McLean. 
McLean was at the time a Professor of Sociology at Southwestern (now Rhodes College). 
One month before the Tupelo, Mississippi, Homesteaders moved into their new Division 
of Subsistence Homesteads (DSH) homes, McLean left Memphis and moved to Tupelo 
where he bought the Tupelo Journal. The names on this document are typed and there 
are no signatures. It is possible, though not likely, that McLean's name was appended 
without his knowledge or permission. Rumors in the Tupelo area circulated, even after 
McLean's leadership in developing Tupelo into a marvelously successful New South city, 
that McLean was a communist and that "they ran him out of Memphis back in the '30s." 
Archival evidence indicates that at least another portion of the rumor has merit. Lucille 
Miller, Secretary of the Committee on Academic Freedom of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, wrote to Amberson in June 1934. Her letter asked for information 
concerning Professor McClain's (sic) dismissal from Southwestern College, "because of 
his activities on behalf of labor. This case has recently been called to our attention. We 
should like to have the facts."11 McLean was no communist, his business 
accomplishments attest to that. However, McLean was always in the forefront of social 
11
 Lucille Miller to William R. Amberson, 19 June 1934. William Ruthraugh Amberson 
Papers, SHC, Chapel Hill, NC. 
improvement and incurred the disfavor of Tupelo's business elite in his early years m 
Tupelo.12 
Tenant farmers and sharecroppers constituted the largest group of rural poor in the 
nation. In 1930, they totaled 1,091,944 white and 698,839 black families, about 25% of 
the South's population and about half its farmers. The conditions in the Delta were 
worse. In the Arkansas and Mississippi portions of the Delta, tenants or sharecroppers 
operated well over 85% of all farms. The 1930 Census figures are revealing. Arkansas 
tenants operated 152,691 of 242,334 farms. Of those, only 14,961 tenants paid cash rent. 
A representative Arkansas delta county, Desha, more accurately represents the cotton 
culture. Of 3,516 farms, tenants operated 3,130, amere 481of those were cash tenants. 
Tenants operated 225,716 of Mississippi's 312,663 farms; 27,103 paid rent. In a 
representative Mississippi Delta county, Tallahatchie, tenants cultivated cotton on 6,612 
of the 7,298 farms; only 251 tenant farmers paid cash. The crop reduction program of the 
AAA paid farmers for taking land out of production. In the spring of 1934 Hiram 
Norcross, absentee owner of a 5,000-acre cotton plantation near Tyronza, Arkansas, 
evicted twenty-three of his 248 tenant families. Reduced acreage meant, obviously, a 
decreased need for labor. Wages for agricultural laborers in the cotton South averaged 
between fifty and seventy-five cents a day, and as planters began to see the economic 
advantage of replacing sharecroppers with day laborers, they forced hundreds of cotton 
sharecropping families to vacate their sub-standard housing. Many of them pitched tents 
along the road and sought relief from the already overwhelmed state emergency relief 
administrations.13 
12
 University of Memphis Archives, MSS 36, folder 1, William Amberson Papers, 
"Report on Investigation of Short-Weighting and Similar Dishonest Practices in the City 
of Memphis." For a fuller discussion of McLean see Vaughn L. Grisham, Tupelo: 
Evolution of A Community, (Dayton: Kettering Foundation Press, 1999): passim. 
13
 Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and Will W. Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton 
Tenancy: A Summary of Field Studies and Statistical Surveys, 1933-1935 (Chapel Hill: 
Eleven white and seven black men evicted from the Norcross plantation gathered 
nearby at the Sunnyside School and formed the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). 
The apparent force behind the new organization was the small Tyronza Socialist Party, 
the only two significant members were dry-cleaner H. L. Mitchell, and Clay East, a 
county constable. Mitchell reported that by the time he and East arrived at the meeting, 
the men had decided to form a bi-racial organization. According to Mitchell, the 
sharecroppers approached him with the idea of forming a union. It is likely that Mitchell 
had previously planted the organization idea as he made his rounds through the Arkansas 
countryside. It is also likely that Mitchell and Thomas got their notions from Amberson. 
Archival evidence clearly indicates that Amberson, Socialist Party of American Executive 
Secretary Clarence Senior, and Mitchell had already discussed the possibility and nature 
of some sort of sharecroppers' union.14 
Communist-influenced black Alabama sharecroppers had already claimed 
"Sharecroppers Union" therefore, the group decided to incorporate in Arkansas under the 
name, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union (STFU). This name, however, was misleading. 
Although the union recruited tenant farmers for membership, the union championed the 
cause of sharecroppers, a class of society without representation in the government or 
economy. In part because the union chose to use "tenant farmer" as part of its name, the 
United States Government, newspapers, and the public of the 1930s often identified 
University of North Carolina Press, 1935,) 1 and passim; Grubbs, 43-45; Mertz, 3-4; The 
figures cited in this note are from: http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/ The 
counties selected representing the Arkansas and Mississippi Delta are at the mid-point in 
terms of tenant concentration. As the decade continued the number of sharecroppers 
decreased. 
14
 Mitchell says the idea of a sharecropper's union was first expressed to him by Norman 
Thomas in 1933, see correspondence between Amberson and Clarence Senior in 
"Correspondence, Amberson" Socialist Party of America Papers, Perkins Library, Special 
Collections, Duke University, Durham, NC. 
sharecroppers as tenant farmers. This mingling of terms created its own set of problems. 
Upon the advent of the AAA crop reduction contracts there existed a marked difference 
in the social and economic status between that of the tenant farmer and the sharecropper, 
and the term "tenant farmer" is imprecise at best. In 1934, the public, the press, and 
government officials used the term "tenant farmer" mdiscriminately and universally to 
designate as one single entity at least three separate classes of farmers, all of whom 
suffered from specific economic problems and faced different limitations in climbing the 
agricultural ladder. The designation was particularly important with regard to the AAA 
producer contract. The tenant farmer owned rights that were protected by the language of 
the contract; laborers had none. By manipulating the status of tenant farmers to that of 
sharecroppers, planters could relieve themselves of responsibility for furnish and housing. 
According to the AAA, sharecroppers were wage laborers and as such had no claim to 
shelter or furnish. It was cheaper to hire help during picking time than to have a family 
live on the place.15 
In December 1934, Amberson presented a report for dissemination among the 
membership of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Socialist Party of 
America (SPA) on the "Present Status of Legal Action in the Defense of Tenants and 
Sharecroppers Threatened with Eviction." The report noted that more than 100 members 
of the STFU had received written or oral eviction notices from plantation management 
informing them that they must vacate houses and lands by December 31,1935. The 
15 Grubbs, 29; Mertz, 31; Conrad, 85, 87-93; William R. Amberson to Clarence Senior, 
Feb 4,1936 in Cox Collection Series 7, folder 1 b, Special Collections, Mitchell 
Memorial Library. For a discussion of the legal status of tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers see A.B. Book, "A Note on the Legal Status of Share-Tenants and 
Sharecroppers," Law and Contemporary Problems 4 (October, 1937): 421-526. 
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report speculated that the reasons for evictions were membership in the STFU and the 
new payment proposals of the AAA.16 
Concurrent with the cotton picker strike conducted by the STFU in 1935, and 
increasing union agitation for investigations of violations of AAA contracts, violence, 
repression, and wholesale evictions raged throughout Northeast Arkansas. Planters and 
their riding bosses disrupted union meetings with gunfire and threats. Thugs threw 
dynamite sticks into an evicted sharecropper encampment; local law officers imprisoned 
union speakers. In the spring of 1935, Norman Thomas visited Northeast Arkansas. As 
he was being introduced to a meeting of the STFU at Birdsong, a group of riding bosses 
interrupted the meeting, dragged Thomas from the platform, and escorted him outside. 
Vigilantes drove Thomas from town and beat some of bis companions. "We don't need 
no Gawddamn Yankee bastard to tell us what to do with our niggers," explained a riding 
boss.17 
As sharecroppers from Northeast Arkansas lost their homes, they inundated relief 
offices in Arkansas and in Memphis. Amberson wrote the Resettlement Administration 
(RA) and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) requesting a program to 
aid the evicted Arkansas sharecroppers. He talked in person with Will Alexander of 
FERA who greeted Amberson's requests with cool aloofness and pleaded inability to help 
due to current projects. Amberson soon realized that identification with the union 
militated against help from any of the federal relief organizations. The aid given by the 
Arkansas ERA was controlled by the local cotton aristocracy. Cotton baron domination 
of local relief administration ensured that local relief workers directed benefits to their 
16 William R. Amberson, "Present Status of Legal Action in Defense of Tenants and 
Share-Croppers Threatened with Eviction," Cox Collection, Series 7, folder 2 i, Special 
Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. 
1 7
 Sherwood Eddy to "Dear Friend," 18 March 1936, Arthur Raper Papers, SHC, Chapel 
Hill. Holley, 82-86, the quote is taken from page 86; Mitchell, 128-129, Grubbs, 73-
75,85, 89,102-103,104-106. 
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best croppers and tenants; union members were ignored. In late 1935, C. H. Dibble, a 
plantation owner near Parkin, Arkansas, ordered almost 100 sharecropper families off his 
property. 
The influx of newly dispossessed and the continuing pressure from those already 
evicted inspired in Amberson the notion of a cooperative farm.18 In late 1935, Sam 
Franklin, on furlough from his YMC A assignment in Japan contacted Amberson and 
expressed some interest in the condition of the sharecroppers. Amberson told Franklin of 
his plans to establish a cooperative farm for the benefit of evicted sharecroppers. The 
idea appealed to Franklin and he arranged to visit with Amberson in Memphis. 
Franklin's boss, Sherwood Eddy, also expressed interest in the project and funded 
Franklin's exploratory trip to the Bluff City. En route to Memphis, Franklin visited the 
Division of Subsistence Housing Arthurdale project in West Virginia. In view of the 
enormous expenditure of federal funds on the project, Franklin assumed that similar 
government funding would be made available for other promising projects. Amberson, 
better informed by bis correspondence and conversation with various New Deal officials, 
quickly disabused Franklin of that notion.19 
18 Amberson to Oscar Johnston, October 21,1934, Cox Collection Series 7, folder 2a; 
Amberson letter to Oscar Johnston, November 23,1934, Amberson to Hiram Norcross, 
November 23,1934, both in Cox Collection, folder 2b; Amberson to Clarence Senior, 
February 4,1936, Amberson to Senior, February 4,1936 both in Cox Collection, folder 
lb; Amberson to S.N. Vann, Arkansas Emergency Relief Admimstration, December 31, 
1934, Cox Collection folder 2c; Amberson to Sam Franklin, summary of conversation 
with Will Alexander, November 19,1936, Brooks Hayes, Resettlement Administration, 
to Amberson, July 29,1937, Cox Collection, folder 2g; Sam Franklin to Amberson, 
December 28,1935, February 13,1936, February 14,1936; Amberson to Franklin 
February 11, and February 26,1935, all in Cox Collection, House Box 1, 1996 
Accession, unlabeled folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. 
!9 For information on Franklin's visit, his interest in cooperative farming, and 
Amberson's information relative to the possibility of federal assistance, see Amberson, 
Franklin, and Senior correspondence cited above. 
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Franklin had experienced what Amberson viewed as the practical solution to 
sharecropping, cooperative farming. Franklin met with Amberson, Mitchell, and East in 
February 1936 in Amberson's Memphis home. There seemed to be an immediate 
connection. Franklin's experience in working with Japanese collective farms and his 
intelligence, energy, and enthusiasm impressed Amberson. While he was interviewing 
Franklin, Amberson still saw the creation of a cooperative farm as a function of the 
Socialist Party. In a 20 February 1936, letter to Senior, Amberson revealed his thinking. 
He detailed his efforts in the field to provide relief to the dispossessed and his search for a 
suitable place for a "genuine cooperative farm." Amberson proposed that Franklin head 
the venture. As no funding was likely to be forthcoming from New Deal relief and 
resettlement agencies, Amberson suggested that the Socialist Party itself help to establish 
the proposed cooperative. The letter complained about WPA officials warning Franklin 
to stay away from the union and that the WPA claimed that they were taking care of the 
evicted families. Furthermore, evicted union sharecroppers received no relief while relief 
officials gave the cotton barons' best tenants preferential treatment.20 
Early in 1936, Amberson and Franklin began planning the cooperative venture. 
Amberson and Franklin toured Northeast Arkansas and Franklin urged Sherwood Eddy to 
come and see the conditions for himself. In early March, 1936, Eddy and Franklin visited 
the tent cities of evicted sharecroppers. Threatened with jail if they did not immediately 
leave, these two ministers were arrested and jailed for several hours by Parkin, Arkansas, 
police for the crime of being outside agitators. After this experience, Franklin, a farm boy 
20 Cox Collection Series 7, folder lb, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. 
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from rural Tennessee, decided that he would stay in his native South and help the 
sharecroppers rather than return to Japan.21 
Eddy enthusiastically embraced Amberson's proposal to purchase a large tract of 
land. He was willing, he told Amberson, to finance the farm by committing a charitable 
trust fund at his disposal. STFU Executive Secretary H. L. Mitchell suggested that they 
buy land in Arkansas but Eddy insisted, "We could not hope to raise crops upon literal 
dynamite."22 Although Mitchell warned that starting a cooperative farm in Mississippi 
rather than Arkansas was like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, Eddy and 
Franklin began touring parts of three states in the Mississippi Delta in search of 
appropriate property. In March 1936, in the last hours of an apparently futile three-day 
search, a real estate broker directed Eddy and Franklin to a 2,138-acre tract near Hill 
House in Bolivar County, Mississippi. Eddy had to fly back to New York, having missed 
scheduled rail connections from Memphis. He considered the last minute revelation of 
this segment of Goshen as miraculous and often invoked notions of the supernatural 
manifestation in his periodic fund-raising appeals. Along with a few mules, rude cabins, 
and some farm equipment, Eddy purchased the property for $17,500. Slightly over 600 
acres of the property was cotton-ready; the remaining 1,500-acres was unevenly divided 
between cypress swamp and ridge lands. Eddy proposed, and the hastily formed Board of 
Trustees agreed, that profits of the cooperative amortize the loan at an interest rate of 
2.5%. The funds that Eddy committed were residual funds from another humanitarian 
effort. At the end of the Great War, Eddy, and businessman James Causey, later a 
director of the farms, had begun an effort to raise $500,000 in order to feed refugees in 
2 1
 Arthur Raper, "Notes on Trip to Hillhouse, Mississippi and Eastern Arkansas, 1936; 
Sherwood Eddy to "Dear Friend," 18 March 1936, both in Arthur Raper Papers. 
Franklin, 8-10. 
2 2
 Franklin, "Early Years," 23. 
the French occupied Ruhr. William H. Timken of Canton, Ohio, had made a $20,000 
contribution. U.S. Government intervention made the fund unnecessary and Timken 
advised Eddy to use the money wherever Eddy thought it would do the most good. Years 
later, Amberson castigated Eddy and Franklin for their hasty and rash decision in 
purchasing the Bolivar County property. Eddy was acting with perfect consistency; he 
was also the first contributor to Myles Horton for the establishment of Highlander Folk 
School, a radical labor and social institution, in Monteagle, Tennessee. 23 
Five original members formed Cooperative Farms, Incorporated. They were 
ReinholdNiebuhr, president, Sherwood Eddy, William Amberson, Sam Franklin, Jr., and 
John Rust. A few weeks later, sociologist Arthur Raper and Bishop William Scarlett of 
the Episcopal Diocese of Missouri joined the board. The board named Sam Franklin, 
Resident Director of the cooperative project and Blaine Treadway as Associate Director.24 
Both Rust and Treadway were appointed to the board for decidedly utilitarian 
reasons. John and Mack Rust had invented a mechanical cotton picker. Originally from 
Texas, the brothers had found support and cooperation from the Newllano Colony in 
Louisiana. John Rust, recognizing mat a successful cotton picker would further shrink 
the demand for agricultural labor, expressed his intention to donate the profits of the sale 
of his invention to eleemosynary organizations, particularly those serving dispossessed 
^Letter to "Dear Folks from Sherwood Eddy, 19 March 1936; Delta and Providence 
Farm Papers #3473, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, (hereinafter "Delta nd Providence Papers." This letter informs 
the interested people of H.H. Timkin's donation. According to Eddy, Timken refused to 
accept repayment because he had already deducted 15% from his tax obligation. 
Amberson to A.E. Cox, January 17,1973, Cox Collection, House Box 1,196 Accession, 
William R. Amberson Trustee Folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. 
Thomas Bledsoe, Or We'll All Hang Separately: The Highlander Idea (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1969), 22. Franklin, 8-13; Mitchell, 132; Dunbar, 116-117. 
24 "The Delta Cooperative Farm," letterhead stationary, letter dated November 4,1936 
from Sam Franklin to Amberson, Cox Collection House Box 1,1996 Accession, 
unlabeled folder, Special Collections, Mitchell Memorial Library. Sherwood Eddy, "The 
Delta Cooperative's First Year," The Christian Century, 54 (3 February, 1937), 139-140. 
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farm workers. According to Sherwood Eddy, the Rust brothers had committed 90% of all 
profits from the development, production, and sale of the mechanical cotton picker to a 
foundation, the principal purpose of which was to ameliorate the economic distress of 
displaced agricultural workers. Specifically, nine-tenths of cotton picker profits were to 
be invested in a series of cooperative farms, cooperative stores, and educational projects 
for black and white. Eddy was awed by the Rust brothers' potential generosity. "If this is 
done," he wrote of the proposed donation of future profits, 
it will be the first time in history, as far as I know, when a major 
mechanical invention has been completely socialized in a capitalistic 
country and harnessed to human welfare, and where virtually all the profit 
of the investors goes to the relief of human labor which would suffer 
because of the machine. Already I can see our new cotton picker invention 
going down the broad acres of our cooperative farm with the people 
prosperous and happy and their children in school.25 
Furthermore, he planned to demonstrate his perfected cotton picker at Delta Cooperative 
Farm. There is no evidence that Rust channeled any funds to the Delta Cooperative 
Farms. He did establish a charitable foundation in 1951. In a paper he delivered to a 
local historical society, "The Origin and Development of the Cotton Picker," Rust 
recounted his tribulations and final success with the cotton picker. He mentioned with 
fondness the support he received from the radicals at the Newllano Colony in Louisiana. 
There was not a single mention of the Delta or Providence Cooperative Farms. There is 
no record of the effect of 90% of the profits derived from the delivery of the single most 
important item of cotton technology since the cotton gin. 26 
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Dr. Amberson planted Blaine Treadway, a true-believer secular socialist, at Delta 
Cooperative Farm. Amberson recommended forcefully that Franklin secure Treadway's 
appointment as associate director. Prior to learning that Eddy would provide funding for 
the cooperative effort, Amberson had targeted Treadway as the likely head of a 
cooperative effort, but since the Christian Socialists provided the money, they selected the 
top leadership. Treadway and Amberson viewed the "social gospel" advocates with a 
cautious suspicion. In particular, they suspected that Eddy, Niebuhr, and Franklin did not 
understand or appreciate the necessity of full democracy in carrying out farm operations, 
nor did they understand the importance of full disclosure of the Farm's financial affairs. 
Finally, both Amberson and Treadway believed that the true hope for cooperative 
agriculture and the restoration of a prosperous life lay in a strong class-consciousness 
among the membership. Franklin and Eddy, on the other hand, saw economic and social 
redemption as a function of the effects of practical religion. Class-consciousness and 
economic and political motivation had no place in the restored Kingdom of God in the 
land.27 
Treadway, a bachelor, and Franklin, providentially and only temporarily separated 
from his wife, Dorothy, moved into a two-room shotgun cabin along the main road that 
traversed the farm; from there they began directing the frenetic work of the first year of 
27
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the cooperative. As operations commenced on the property, Franklin gave existing 
tenants an opportunity to stay on; only three of eight families did. The evicted Arkansas 
sharecroppers, most of them from the Dibble plantation, began arriving in late March and 
by August 1936, thirty-one families, twelve white and nineteen black, had taken positions 
on the farm. At first, some of the new arrivals had to double up or live in tents. The 
necessity of immediate planting in order to harvest a fall crop and constructing cabins for 
newly arriving families required Herculean efforts by Franklin, Treadway, and the 
members. In addition to the necessary tasks, farm staff and membership were 
inconvenienced by accommodating the host of visitors brought to the farm by the 
generous publicity the cooperative generated.28 
In the first year of cooperation, the Delta Cooperative Farm members established 
a sawmill, built houses for all families, cleared some new land, and despite the late start 
and one of the worst droughts in years, produced 152 bales of cotton. The drought 
reduced the cotton yield but it also made the cypress timber more accessible. Sherwood 
Eddy informed the "Dear Friends" network of existing and potential donors that the Farm 
built new cabins at flat cost of $33.00 per unit. They did have screened windows and 
sanitary outhouses, but none of the modern attributes of the Dyess Colony houses. Arthur 
Raper visited Dyess and envied the Colonists pristine wired and piped homes; housing at 
Dyess was farm superior to the cabins at Delta Cooperative Farm. Sherwood Eddy gave 
an encouraging account of the first year in The Christian Century. According to Eddy, 
the trustees held a "$30,000 farm fully paid for and free from debt." Thirty families were 
settled on the farm, and the members had been able to pay the trustees $1,000 toward 
28E. B. Mckinny, 1st Vice President, Southern Tenant Farmers; Union, 14 March 1934, 
Delta Cooperative Farm Papers, SHC, Chapel Hill, "Report on How I Found Things at 
Hill House Miss. W. Clarence Edwards, "Cooperative Farming: Hillhouse, Mississippi," 
The Epworth Highroad, 6 (February 1937), 5; Franklin, 13-16; Eddy, 139. 
amortization of the land. In addition, they had been able to distribute among themselves 
$8,909 in dividends, or $327.53 per family. Each family also received an average of 
$122.29 in certificates for the labor involved with cabin construction and clearing fields. 
Thus, at a time when the average income of the southern tenant farmer family was $212 
($3,808) per year, the Delta Cooperative Farm families earned, in cash and deferred 
certificates, $449.82 ($6,545).29 
Eddy continued with even more glorious examples of the results of cooperative 
farming. The farm had sold $4,000 worth of timber from its saw mill operation and put 
another $1,000 worth of timber into houses, a community center capable of seating 
several hundred, and recreational and educational facilities. During the first year the 
cooperative had commenced hog and poultry operations and a dairy operation was 
underway. The cooperative store, called Rochdale in honor of the cooperative established 
by English mill workers in 1843, declared a dividend of nine per cent.30 
In the conclusion of the Christian Century article Eddy stated, without 
elaboration, that the two races had been cooperating on the basis of interracial justice. 
Acknowledging that the experiment had begun in violence, he noted that" thus far we 
have been grateful for the cooperation of many in our adopted state of Mississippi." The 
directors, he told his readers, were already planning for a second cooperative farm.31 
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Reinhold Niebuhr's "Meditations From Mississippi," also published in Christian 
Century, was just as enthusiastic but more philosophical in its praise. Unlike Eddy, 
Niebuhr made a veiled allusion that all was not perfect in this Mississippi paradise. Some 
of the members did not find satisfaction on the farm: 
Undoubtedly they have worked harder man an average sharecropper. No 
wonder that a few yearn for the fleshpots of Egypt, though these fleshpots 
contained nothing but fat-back and cornmeal. One Negro left last week 
with the remark, "I need a rest."32 
These articles, and others, brought tremendous attention to the Delta Cooperative 
Farm. Liberals praised the farm as the Christian example of service toward economic 
emancipation. Eleanor Roosevelt asked Eddy to visit her and discuss the farm. Other 
inquirers and admirers included Rexford G. Tugwell, Henry Wallace, North Carolina 
Senator Frank Graham and Jacob Coxey of 1894 Coxey's Army fame. Indeed, the 
publicity was so massive that Eddy wrote to Franklin in 1939, "We have received more 
publicity than we deserved. When our American Seminar saw [Louis] Brandeis, after an 
hour with him in his home he said, 'I did not want to talk with you about these things, I 
wanted to spend the time asking you about your cooperative farms in Mississippi.'"33 Not 
all the publicity was positive. Writer Jonathan Daniels argued that the farm was living on 
32
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charity, an accusation that Amberson would second along with dishonesty and 
paternalism before the decade was out.34 
Ostensibly, the management of the farm was delegated to a council of five 
members, no more than three of each race, elected by the membership. This council 
made the decisions regarding agricultural operations, logging operations, design and 
construction of farm structures, and matters of discipline. The council had the authority 
to remove families or individuals from cooperative membership, but all council decisions 
were subject to veto by Sam Franklin. The first significant decision of the council was 
the placement of family houses. The council decided that all families would reside in 
relatively close proximity to each other, and that the black and white residences would be 
placed facing each other, separated by the main road.35 
Gradually, residents and friends of the cooperative began to call the entire 
operation by the name of its consumers' cooperative, Rochdale. In 1937, the Postal 
Service established a new post office, Rochdale, and named newly-arrived Alan Eugene 
(Gene) Cox Postmaster. People soon began to refer to the Delta Cooperative Farm by 
different labels; Rochdale, Delta Cooperative Farm, Sherwood Eddy's operation, or the 
Union Farm.36 
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Medical attention for newly arrived sharecroppers, and indeed for the families in 
the community, was almost non-existent. During the early days of the cooperative, 
Amberson prevailed on a physician friend, Dr. Garland Weidner, to drive down from 
Memphis on Sundays and conduct a clinic. Memphis was 100 miles from the farm and 
Weidner was no help in case of an emergency. Dr. Etta Vaughn a retired Osteopath 
volunteered her services and conducted clinics on a part-time basis. She returned to her 
native California in the summer of 1937. Lindsey Hail, the child of missionaries who had 
served in Japan, became acquainted with the Franklins and, upon completion of her R.N. 
training at Massachusetts General Hospital, accepted Franklin's offer to provide medical 
services to the farm and community. Although Franklin could not guarantee her a salary, 
and even though she had never been in the South, she came to Delta Cooperative Farm. 
Nine months later, she married A. E. Cox.37 
Franklin and Eddy realized that the services of one nurse, no matter how 
dedicated, could not meet the needs of the farm or of the rural community. In 1938, 
Franklin proposed that David Minter, recently graduated from the University of 
Pennsylvania Medical School, come to serve at Delta Cooperative Farm. Minter's father 
was a minister and his brother a missionary. Dr. Minter, in effect, became a missionary 
too. He agreed to open his practice at Rochdale for a salary of $1,000 a year plus any fees 
he could collect from the community. In 1939, Dr. Minter met one of the college summer 
volunteers sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, Sue Wooten, and they 
married in 1940.38 
Delta Cooperative Farm experimented. In addition to cotton, members began 
raising alfalfa. The producers' cooperative began poultry, hog, beef, and dairying 
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operations. The saw mill continued to provide a steady stream of income and members 
irrigated the cooperative garden. Members generally were able to improve and add 
variety to their diets. The consumer cooperative provided products without the usurious 
interest rates that the former sharecroppers had experienced in cotton baron 
commissaries. 
The producers' cooperative compensated workers on a graded and somewhat 
complicated scale. Members fell into one of eleven work-scale classifications according 
to the skill level required for the job. Each job carried specific credits and the credits 
determined the distribution from the profits of the enterprises. The system also gave 
members credit for "non-productive" work. Such work included clearing new ground, 
building community facilities, ditching, and fencing. For these labors the members were 
paid in certificates, redeemable at the cooperative store.39 
At the suggestion of white members, the cooperative established a school for the 
black children of the farm and the nearby community. At the time, the state of 
Mississippi provided white children eight months of education but only four and one-half 
months for black children. Seeing a basic injustice in the state's educational system, a 
majority of the white members petitioned the council to establish such a school. The 
cooperative received financial contributions from various black and interracial groups to 
fund the teacher's salary for an additional four months of school.40 
The Cooperative Farm's goals were ambitious. Franklin, some said unwisely, put 
as much time and effort into achieving spiritual, social, and educational goals as he did to 
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achieving economic ones. Franklin conducted church services every Sunday. Only 
occasionally did black and white meet together. Franklin recognized the wisdom in 
yielding to some of the more adamant regional customs. Speakers, sometimes very 
prominent ones, including Arthur Raper and Bishop William Scarlett, came to the Farm. 
Lessons in home economics, book reviews, and, with the gift of a projector, movies, 
became part of the regular fare in the community building. 
Beginning in the summer of 1937, college students, both black and white, came to 
the farm for volunteer work. The YMCA, YWCA, and the Quakers' American Friends 
Service Committee were most instrumental in student recruitment. These volunteers built 
bridges, cared for children, cleared fields, chopped cotton, cooked, and fell in love. 
Franklin and Cox recall several marriages between sons and daughters of members and 
among the summer college volunteers. Minter and Cox both met their spouses during 
service at the Farm. 
The American Friends Service Committee expected that the young people sent to 
the Farm would not only labor and serve; they would also learn. Part of Sam Franklin's 
reciprocal responsibility was to expose the volunteers to some of the people and 
peculiarities of the Delta. W.A. Percy's secretary sent Mr. Percy's regrets. Mr. Percy 
was abroad on vacation, he said. There is no record of Oscar G. Johnston's response to 
Franklin's invitation to come down to the Farm and talk to the young people about the 
cotton industry. Even without the services of two of the Delta's most luminous 
personalities, Franklin was able to provide an impressive lecture lineup. Norman 
Thomas, Miles Horton, Charles Johnson, Sherwood Eddy, Jacob Coxey, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and the occasional journalist came to the Farm to speak to the volunteers. The 
visitors also served a valuable purpose in that their presence often drew local white 
people to visit the Farm. Such familiarity, so the Board expected, would create and 
maintain good will with the community. People from all stations in life, it seemed, 
wanted to visit the Farm and many of them offered their volunteer services. Except for an 
exceptional few, Sam Franklin asked, instead, for money. Among the remarkable people 
to offer services to Delta Cooperative Farm were the merely famous, the widely 
influential, and the truly extraordinary.41 
A. James McDonald ultimately proved too good to be true from Sam Franklin's 
perspective. McDonald, a lawyer admitted to practice in Louisiana was awaiting the 
disposition of his "case" as he corresponded with William Amberson. McDonald lived in 
a ten by ten addition to a sharecropper's cabin, but he did have access to electricity. He 
delicately balanced a substantial library, portable typewriter, hot plate, and his meager 
personal items between a cot and overstuffed chair. The lawyer was a member of the 
Llano Colony and was awaiting some sort of legal adjudication; he was, he told 
Amberson, "marking time." He advised Amberson based on his Llano experiences and in 
early 1938, he arrived at Delta Cooperative Farm and assumed responsibilities as the 
Farm Secretary. McDonald organized the files, wrote a column for the Farm's 
Newsletter, "The Co-Op Call," and was an effective apologist for the Socialist Party of 
America, He was also a competent stenographer; he took shorthand. When in 1939 the 
Cooperators held a meeting at which they were encouraged to express their opinions 
without the intimidation of the management staff, McDonald recorded and transcribed 
into type the proceedings. The evidence of what the members actually thought revealed 
Sam Franklin's dictatorial and insensitive farm management.42 
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Constance H. Rumbough was truly extraordinary. Her life seems to have been 
segmented; few of her acquaintances in a particular segment of her variegated life seem to 
know the Constance Rumbough of the others. Sam Franklin announced the new addition 
to the staff with a flourish, 
A recent edition to the staff members of the Farm is Miss 
Constance Rumbough, formerly a missionery (sic) of the Methodist 
Church, South, and more recently connected with the Emergency Peace 
Campaign. Miss Rumbough is from Virginia and is a blood relative of 
General Robert E. Lee. Her coming to the Farm is, I think, symbolical of 
the growing interest in our enterprise on the part of the best type of 
Southerners.43 
Ms Rumbough's Virginia illustrious ancestry notwithstanding, she proved to be a 
versatile and effective staffer during her tenure at Delta Cooperative Farm from the spring 
of 1937 through at least November. At first, Franklin assigned the forty-three year old 
Longwood College alumna to answer correspondence. She worked in the Rochdale 
Cooperative Store and won praise from the manager for her industry and diligence. She 
did irritate some of the customers by writing their names on paper cups used at the water 
bucket. She assigned a place on a shelf for each Cooperator's cup. She could not abide, 
she said, the waste of throwing away perfectly good paper cups. She taught the black 
Sunday school and in desperation Sam Franklin assigned her to the poultry operation. 
Cooperative Farm Held on February 6,1939;" "Report to the Board of Trustees of 
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She cleaned the roosting areas, gathered and cleaned the eggs, and watered and fed the 
chickens. According to Franklin, she put the poultry operation back in order.44 
Rumbough used her extensive connections gained by missionary work to develop 
contributions to the Farm and gather advice for a project inspired by the Delta 
Cooperative Farm. Apparently, Rumbough moved to 501 Hooker Street, Jackson, 
Mississippi in early 1938 and began another segment in her variegated life. Using her 
Methodist connections, alliances earned as part of her service with the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, and her formidable letter writing skills Rumbough promptly formed 
Mississippi Farms Incorporated. The Board of Directors included a remarkable number 
of the small universe of Mississippians of the wealth and worldview required for 
Rumbough's purposes. The directors of Mississippi Farms, including Constance 
Rumbough, Secretary, were prominent Mississippians, A.S. Cody, Jr., Owen Cooper, and 
Paul Ramsey. Non-director Stockholders included Mrs. W. L. Alford, Dr. Henry M. 
Bullock, and Will Watkins, Sr. Rumbough's vision and her will were impressive. 
Mississippi Farms bought almost 1,000, at $5.00 per acre, acres of land near Hattiesburg, 
and began operations. Mississippi Farms was to have been the first in a series of farms 
sponsored by, possibly, the Methodist Missionary effort. The farms were to be sold to 
44
 Constance H. Rumbough to Mr. Vanderwood, 11 April 1964; Arthur F. Raper to 
Constance Rumbough, 25 March 1938; Arthur Raper to Constance Rumbough, 29 April 
1938, all in Arthur Raper Papers, SHC, Chapel Hill. Much of the information in this and 
following paragraphs comes from a nine-page letter written to Mr. Paul J. Vanderwood of 
Memphis. Vanderwood wrote several Delta Cooperative staffers in the early 1960s. Paul 
Vanderwood, an editor with the Press Scimitar was gathering material for a possible 
book. He never completed the project, but he left his hand-written notes in the Papers of 
the Delta Cooperative Farm, Southern Historical Collection, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
white and black small farmers, the payments used to purchase other plots for other 
farmers. Mississippi Farms resembled the organization of the Delta Cooperative Farm, 
but it was much more emphatic it its insistence that its clients don the role and 
responsibilities of ownership immediately. There would be no "probationary periods" at 
Mississippi Farms. It became apparent very quickly that the Mississippi Farm would be a 
failure, and Constance Rumbough refused to accept that consequence. Rumbough 
enlisted the aid of the Delta Farm Cooperative Store Manager, the Quaker Art Landes, 
and her older sister. The three of them repaid other investors and sold the farm on long 
terms to the best of their clients. The black farmer paid the full price over time, and 
raised five children, all of whom graduated from college. The Rumbough sisters and 
Landes did not sell the mineral rights. A few years later natural gas from the property 
provided a small monthly income for the trio of investors and the new owner.45 
Constance H. Rumbough rejoined the Fellowship of Reconciliation in the 1940s. 
She was also active in the movement to protect the rights of conscientious objectors. In 
the early 1950s, Constance Rumbough moved back to her hometown. Although born in 
Lynchburg, Rumbough's family moved to Danville, Virginia, when Constance was about 
five. She moved back to Danville to be the Director of Religious Education for the 
Danville School System and to take care of her aging mother. Constance Rumbough 
taught in the Jr. High and High Schools in Danville; she taught, at one time or another, 
almost all the Danville public school students from the early 1950s until at least 1977. 
45
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Hundreds of Danville residents remember Miss Constance Rumbough. They remember 
her as a tall, angular, white-haired lady who taught them about the history of the Children 
of Israel. Gary Grant, Danville businessman and regional historian, knew Rumbough and 
he remembers her distinctly and specifically with regard to one incident and one idea. 
Rumbough delivered the news of President John F. Kennedy's assassination to Grant's 
seventh grade class. Her solemnity, yet serenity and compassion in relating the news has 
been, says Grant, a model he has tried to implement on similar occasions. He also 
remembers that he first heard of and understood the notion of "progressive revelation" 
under the tutelage of Ms Rumbough. The Danville Library vertical file has no sources on 
Constance H. Rumbough. The history of Mt. Vernon Methodist Church makes no 
mention of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Emergency Peace Campaign, work with 
conscientious objectors, or her work at Delta Cooperative Farm. People were surprised to 
know that the Misses Rumbough ever financed a bi-racial Mississippi cotton farm. 
Constance Rumbough seems to have been a most modest person."46 
Despite the glowing reports in magazines and the status as a "pet" of liberals, 
things were not going as well as they seemed down on the farm. Slowly, but inexorably, 
the true financial condition of the Delta Cooperative Farm manifested itself. The 
"buckshot" soil of the farm, thick and rich, was difficult to cultivate. It cracked in the hot 
summer sun and became impenetrable mud in rain. It was conducive only for cotton 
production. One of the farm's goals was to demonstrate the superiority of diversified 
farming. By 1937, the farm was losing money, and at the end of that year it faced a large 
46
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operating deficit, met only by charitable contributions from individuals, churches, and 
foundations. Jonathan Daniels claimed that the farm's best crop was Yankee 
benevolence, not its produce. None of the financial reports issued to the members and 
trustees by Ellis and Hirsberg, Certified Public Accountants, noted any contributions. 
Unwisely, Franklin invested some of the reserves in a fanciful effort to establish a pecan 
grove. Amberson's advice notwithstanding, Franklin used the alleged dividends to shore 
up members' income rather than to accommodate new families. Amberson suggested that 
an investment in new members would result in more production and thus increased 
profits. None of these financial matters were communicated to the members. The only 
way a trustee, other than Franklin and Eddy, could know the true financial picture was to 
ask. The questioners had to be very direct and forceful.47 
The racial harmony so lauded by Eddy, Niebuhr, and Franklin also became 
severely strained or, perhaps, it had never existed in the first place. Even while Franklin 
praised the surrounding community for its tolerance of this unusual cooperative 
experiment, the farm became the object of mistrust and fear for a large segment of the 
white community. A rumor circulated around Hill House. They were "'misterin' those 
niggers out there."48 H.L. Mitchell advised Franklin at the onset of operations that 
honorifics would cause trouble. It was a violation of local mores for whites to address 
blacks with titles of respect. He suggested that all personnel, including the staff, be 
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referred to on a first name basis, or addressed as "Sister," "Brother," or "Comrade." 
Amberson concurred with Mitchell's views. Franklin's speech to the Cleveland, 
Mississippi Rotary Club concerning the Farm caused some concern in the community. 
W. M. Kethley, President of Delta State Teachers College, read an article in the local 
newspaper and wrote his friend, Mississippi native Francis Harmon, General Secretary of 
the YMCA, to warn him about the activities of Franklin, one of his former staffers. 
According to Kethley, Franklin advocated "the organization of labor." Kethley also 
added, "The attendant loose talk also runs along bad lines: social equality and what have 
you. If I were in your place and could afford to do so, I would take a vacation [of a few 
days {hand-written addition}] and spend some of my time at Hillhouse." Kethley 
softened his letter with a hand written post-script: 'Nothing so urgent and serious as to 
cause you loss of sleep - but you ought to get hold of this soon -"49 
Amberson, Mitchell, Eddy, and Franklin had all envisioned a series of cooperative 
farms, whose success, they hoped, would actuate a change from cotton tenancy to large-
scale cooperatives. In 1938, Cooperative Farms Incorporated purchased 2,880 acres in 
Holmes County, about eighty miles from Delta Cooperative Farm. The Holmes County 
purchase was consistent with that vision. The farm had been called "Providence" by its 
former owners, and the name remained. Sam and Dorothy Franklin moved to Providence 
while Blaine Treadway and Gene Cox stayed at Delta. Dr. Minter and Lindsey Cox made 
weekly trips to Providence and conducted clinics for members and for anyone else 
desiring their services. Significantly, Amberson abstained during the trustees' vote to buy 
another farm.50 
49W.M. Kethley to Francis Harmon, October 8,1936, University of Memphis Archives, 
MVHC, MSS 16, Delta Cooperative Farm. The spelling of Hill House is problematic. 
Many letters from those familiar with the area write Hillhouse, others Hill House. The 
Farm stationary used the Hill House spelling. 
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The Schism between Ecclesiastical and Scientific Socialists 
The veiled information given in Niebuhr's Christian Century article indicated that all was 
not well. To the outside world, the Cooperative Farms presented a model of racial 
harmony, liberal society, economic success, and potential solution to the evils of farm 
tenancy. Archival evidence indicates that, in all of the areas mentioned above, there 
existed conflict, contradictions, paternalism, and subterfuge. The Delta and Providence 
Cooperative Farms were created with contradictory ideals and operational philosophies. 
By accepting funding from Sherwood Eddy, the Socialist Party lost any chance of 
becoming the dominant ideological partner. William Amberson, however, was an idealist 
with a broad streak of pragmatism. Recognizing that identification with Niebuhr, Eddy, 
and the liberal Christian community they represented placed the Cooperative Farms in a 
position to gain political and economic support from people who viewed the SFTU as 
anathema, he was content to allow the Cooperative Farms to be associated with liberal 
Christianity. Consequently, in only one of the articles extolling the success and virtues of 
the cooperative effort was there any mention that the farms were originally the brain-child 
and "arm" of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Even Amberson, in an article in The 
Christian Register, referred to the farm as Eddy's effort.51 
5 1
 William R. Amberson, "The New Deal for Sharecroppers," The Christian Register 
(March 18,1937): 178-180. There is one article that does co-identify the farms with the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union: Jonathan Mitchell, "Cabins in the Cotton," The New 
Republic (September, 25,1937): 175-177. 
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The Socialist Party of America, while rigorously publicizing its critique of 
American capitalism and aggressively promoting its political candidates, understood that 
some of its humanitarian and social efforts suffered by identification with the party. 
Indeed, the party was so sensitive to the deleterious effects of association with Marxist 
ideology that spokesmen often aggressively denied any such connection. H. L Mitchell 
repeatedly denied in public that the STFU was in any way connected with the Socialist 
Party. STFU spokesman Howard "Buck" Kester, in his highly emotional and effective 
book, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, wrote: "It should be said furthermore, that the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union is not, nor ever has been, an adjunct or organ of either 
the Socialist Party or the Communist Party." H.L. Mitchell advised STFU leadership that 
they should "appear as gentle as lambs," but he privately wrote to Kester, "If we can build 
the union, we will take over all the damn plantations " and he hoped that the whole South 
would "come under the collectivist farm system."52 
That the STFU was organized as an arm of the Socialist Party is beyond 
reasonable doubt. The archival evidence strongly suggests that the Socialist Party, under 
the direction of Amberson, originated the efforts which resulted in the Delta Cooperative 
Farm. Internal communications of the STFU and scattered papers of the Socialist Party 
of America clearly indicate that the party leadership considered the Delta Cooperative 
Farm as much an arm of the Socialist Party as the STFU itself. The STFU office 
manager, Evelyn Smith, in particular, co-identified the STFU, Delta Cooperative Farm, 
and the Socialist Party of America. Amberson was quite willing to allow Eddy, Franklin, 
and Niebuhr to serve as the "mouthpiece" for the Delta Cooperative Farm.53 
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 Mitchell, 47-48; Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers (New York: Arno 
Press and The New York Times, 1969), 54; Mitchell to Howard Kester, March 22,1936, 
STFU papers, Reel 3. 
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 For evidence with reference to the STFU's attitude and Amberson's concept of the 
Delta Cooperative Farm, see: STFU Papers, especially reels 2,3, 5,6; Cox Collection, 
Mitchell Memorial Library, Mississippi State University; William Amberson Papers, 
Franklin gave some support to Socialist distinctions. Franklin began his letters to 
certain correspondents with greetings to his "Dear Comrade." At Amberson's insistence, 
he joined the Socialist Party of America and helped conduct a labor school under 
Socialist Party auspices in the summer of 1937. Despite these favors and despite 
Franklin's assurances that all the residents of Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms 
would be strongly encouraged to maintain membership in the STFU, the Socialist Party 
lost all control and most of its influence over the management and development of the 
cooperative farms. Christian Socialists inexorably eradicated Socialist Party influence 
and stymied Amberson's hope for a vibrant and self-disciplined political action group. 
The story presented by the Delta Cooperative Farm management to America was 
misleading, and at, times mendacious.54 
MSVC, University of Memphis Library. From the letters in the archives, Evelyn Smith 
emerges as a most interesting person. She had heard of the STFU and in the very early 
days of its existence, she contacted H.L. Mitchell in Memphis from her home in New 
Orleans. She expressed an interest in providing clerical support for the Union for very 
modest compensation or, if necessary, gratis. Mitchell asked her to travel to Memphis for 
an interview but she replied that she did not have transportation or money for bus or train 
fare. Mitchell wired her enough money for travel to Memphis and hired her as office 
secretary. Over the months one can see Ms Smith develop from a somewhat naive young 
woman to an effective administrator, political operative, and humanitarian activist. As 
the months rolled on she began speaking and writing for the STFU. On many occasions 
people chose to bypass Executive Secretary H.L. Mitchell and President J.R. Butler and 
consult with Ms Smith. Her writing is superior to that of other STFU officials and she 
developed mutually respectful relationships with such important people as Gardner 
Jackson, Brooks Hayes, and Will Alexander. In addition to her professional leadership, 
she was also a nurturer. Often she provided room and board to itinerant social activists, 
even during those times when the Union was not able to pay her small salary. She was 
generous with her meager funds to the point that Amberson continually worried about her 
subsistence. 
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 For Franklin's membership in the Socialist Party of America, see Amberson to 
Franklin, July 30,1936, Cox Collection, House Box 1, unlabeled folder. 
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In his Christian Century article, Sherwood Eddy proclaimed that, after the first 
year, the trustees owned a "$30,000 farm fully paid for and free from debt." This 
statement was misleading at best. He implied that farm revenue had paid for the farm, 
and made no mention of the charitable contribution that had funded the purchase. 
Second, there is little to support the assertion that the farm was worm $30,000 after its 
first year in operation. Third, the "dividends" (which generated the cash income to the 
tenants) were not paid from current earnings, but from contributions not included on the 
farm's balance sheet. 
William Amberson became even more critical of the farm's policy and 
management. He deplored Sam Franklin's refusal to accept the decision of the council in 
disciplinary matters, and he was appalled at the inactivity of the local chapter of the 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Of the 35,000 alleged members of the STFU, only 125 
were in Mississippi. The union had almost no success in organizing sharecroppers in 
Mississippi. The Socialist Party and the STFU expected the locals at Delta and 
Providence to be the vanguard of sharecropper organization, but Franklin repeatedly 
ignored the union's views and frequently overturned decisions of the farm council. 55 
Furthermore, Franklin attempted to keep the news of an "indignation meeting" 
held by Delta Farm blacks from the trustees. Loyalty to the cooperative among the 
members was diminishing. Beginning with the harvest of 1937, many of the black 
women of the cooperative hired themselves out as day laborers to adjacent planters, 
leaving husbands and children to gather the cooperative's crop. Franklin berated the 
women and refused to allow the council to consider the issue. He imposed a penalty on 
the women's work accounts, thus reducing their cash distributions. In response the black 
members of the cooperative held a meeting at which they expressed their indignation at 
55
 Sherwood Cooperative Farm No. 1 Council Meeting, Minutes, 5 April, 20 April, 30 
April, 5 May, 1936, Delta Farm Papers, Council Papers, SHC, Chapel Hill. 
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Franklin's tyrannical actions and his intemperate language, as well as perceived 
discrimination in favor of the white members. Franklin instructed the staff to make no 
mention of the meeting or the issues raised to the board. Amberson's tolerance reached 
the breaking point when, in 1939, the Board of Trustees sent a draft of another fund-
raising letter to the trustees for approval. The appeal, Amberson believed, was based on a 
deliberate misstatement of the cooperatives' finances.56 
In February 1939, Amberson resigned from the board. In his resignation 
statement, he claimed that, despite public announcements to the contrary, the farm had 
actually lost money in every year of its existence. Both Amberson and Blaine Treadway 
viewed the statements regarding farm income in the various public appeal letters as 
deliberate misstatements designed to induce continuing financial contributions.57 
Indeed, Blaine Treadway became so concerned with what he saw as financial 
reporting irregularities that he requested that the STFU conduct an audit of the farms. 
Amberson strongly advised against such an audit, claiming that Franklin would 
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Amberson, April 20,1939, Cox Collection, Series 7, folder 2h. For information 
concerning financial reporting irregularities see letters among Amberson, Treadway, and 
McDonald, University of Memphis, Amberson papers, box 10. 
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deliberately confuse the records and that the trustees would see to it that the farm was 
exonerated and would then use the "manipulated" report as evidence of its fiduciary 
integrity. Amberson was correct at least as far as the composition of the audit committee 
was concerned. Only two members of the STFU office were included on the committee, 
and the report was hailed by Franklin as proof that even the most vocal critics of the 
farms could find no malfeasance. It is interesting to note that, by the time of the 1939 
audit, Franklin referred to the STFU as "critics" of the cooperative farm.58 
There were other ways in which Amberson believed that the farms had abandoned 
the original socialist motivations. Franklin, he charged, was acting in the manner of a 
paternalistic despot. He had made no attempt to allow true democratic decision making 
and he had invested no time and effort in raising up indigenous leadership. Furthermore, 
Amberson alleged, the cooperative members were deliberately being kept uninformed as 
to business decisions and their overall economic status. In addition, Amberson asserted 
that Franklin, Eddy, and Niebuhr had abandoned all intentions of ever allowing the 
cooperative membership a way of actually owning the farms. Finally, Amberson claimed 
that a fund-raising appeal sent out over the signature of the directors contained 
deliberately misstated financial information. In his resignation statement, Dr. Amberson 
concluded: 
I shall struggle no more with that dark spirit of untruth which is blighting 
every chance we ever had to make a success of this work. I cannot 
maintain the pace of your frenzied philanthropy. Never before have I seen 
with such blinding clarity the essential and irreconcilable conflict between 
the scientific and the ecclesiastical approach to social problems. Never 
58Series of letters between Amberson, Treadway, and McDonald: Cox collection, folder 2 
h; Amberson Papers, MVHC, MSS 36, Box 8 , folder 1 
before have I become so deeply committed to the scientific search for 
knowledge as opposed to all other methods.59 
The Death of a Vision 
In 1942, the trustees sold Delta Cooperative Farm in order to concentrate their 
activities at Providence. War-time job opportunities lured many sharecroppers from the 
Mississippi Delta and farm mechanization made farm laborers expendable. The 
incidence of sharecropping in the Mississippi Delta decreased. Delta Cooperative Farm 
had never been self-supporting despite the publicity to the contrary. Cooperative Farms, 
Incorporated received $34,600 for the Delta farm which had cost $17,500. By 1942, the 
improvements made to the farm were significant. All the cabins had sanitary outhouses, 
and screens. A large community structure and attendant sheds and storage facilities had 
added considerable value to the original investment. But Franklin and Eddy, anxious to 
concentrate efforts at Providence, sold it too quickly. Two months later the new owner 
resold the farm to a levee contractor for $47,000.60 
War service claimed Dr. Minter and Sam Franklin. Franklin only returned to 
Mississippi for brief visits. Minter, after a refresher course at the University of 
Pennsylvania Medical School, eventually came back to Providence. Gene Cox attempted 
to run Providence on a sound fiscal basis without sacrificing the cooperative's spiritual, 
educational, and medical missions. The cooperative bought a creamery and sent for 
Blaine Treadway to operate it. It failed, through no fault of the cooperative. The dairy's 
largest customer defaulted on its debt to the cooperative. Gradually, war industry 
opportunities siphoned off the members. Cox, Minter, and two or three families stayed 
on. After the war, Providence Farm was home to only two or three tenant families at a 
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time. Cox devoted himself to providing Christian education and social activities for the 
community while Dr. Minter conducted his clinic. The Providence farm relied on 
contributions, not production for its sustenance 
The dream of William R. Amberson, who was by now disillusioned with the 
advocates of "practical Christianity" and the social gospel, met an ignominious end. In 
1955, a teen-aged white girl told her school-bus driver that some black boys had whistled 
at her while she was waiting on the bus. The bus driver quickly informed the Holmes 
County Sheriff and the four young black boys were brought in for questioning. The 
questions had less to do with whistling at the girl than they did with the activities down 
there at Providence Farm. Intimidated and terrified (Emmet Till had just been found 
murdered not far away) the boys' answers to extremely prejudicial and leading questions 
were recorded on tape. Because the tape-recorded answers "proved" that the people at 
Providence were promoting social equality, advocating racial integration, and 
countenanced interracial swimming, the community leaders, especially the local 
prosecutor, state representative, and the White Citizens Council, felt that the community 
should be made aware of such "goings on." 
On a September evening a large crowd of Holmes County citizens met at the 
Tchula school to hear the taped "confessions." The citizens of Tchula, guided by the 
White Citizens Council, decided that Providence Cooperative Farm exerted a dangerous 
and unwholesome influence on the community in general and upon blacks in particular. 
The throng voted, near unanimously, that Gene Cox, the soul of propriety and 
compassion, advocate of the downtrodden, and almost (unlike Franklin) devoid of 
arrogance, leave the county. The vote also applied to David Minter. The one person 
who defended them before the crowd, sixty-year-old Presbyterian Minister Marsh 
Callaway of Durant, was soon asked by the Session of his church to leave. David Minter 
moved to Arizona. Gene Cox moved to Memphis and continued his work with the Delta 
Foundation, a non-profit corporation established by the Coxes and Minters.61 
On October 12,1956, the Stockholders and Directors of Cooperative Farms, Inc., 
voted to sell Providence Farm to the Delta Foundation for "$1.00 in cash and other 
considerations."62 Will Campbell, author of the novel, Providence, said that the farm was 
eventually sold to private interests by the Delta Foundation. The cooperative farms did 
not achieve their goals, the Christian Socialists did not usher in an age of social justice 
and economic success, the Socialist Party did not transform sharecroppers of the 
Mississippi Delta to a rural socialist-vanguard, and Dr. Amberson's vision died.63 
Discussion of the failures of the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms must 
begin with the single most important fact relative to the creation of these farms, the 
acreage reduction programs of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. AAA 
administrators were fully aware of the effect of their policies on sharecroppers in the 
Mississippi Delta. 
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In their highly sympathetic treatment of Cully Cobb, Professors Roy Scott and J. 
G. Shoalmire dismiss, in a very few words, Cobb's responsibility for the almost 
unbelievable horrors inflicted on sharecroppers. Scott and Shoalmire inform us that Cobb 
simply did not see social problems as part of his job. This occluded vision on the part of 
Cobb is difficult to accept in view of the fact that the sole purpose of the cotton acreage 
reduction contracts was to preserve the South's cotton middle class. It is apparent that 
Cobb believed that the ends justified the means. With a phalanx of county extension 
agents serving as staff for the county production committees, adjudicating planter/cropper 
disputes, and reporting directly to him, Cobb must have known what was occurring in the 
Mississippi Delta. William Amberson informed Cobb of the evictions occurring in 
Arkansas, and he reprinted a portion of Cobb's response: "No case of eviction has come 
to our attention that in any way involved our contract, or has been caused of (sic) the 
contract, and we have no evidence of wholesale eviction for cause anywhere." By the 
time Cobb received Amberson's complaints, word from the AAA's own investigators had 
reached Washington; it confirmed Amberson's claims.64 
When Amberson resigned from the Board of Trustees of Delta and Providence 
Cooperative Farms, he included in his statement a passage from Reinhold Niebuhr's 
Moral Man and Immoral Society: 
The most common form of hypocrisy among the privileged class is 
to assume that their privileges are the just payments with which society 
rewards especially useful or meritorious functions it must be proved 
or assumed that the underprivileged classes would not have the capacity of 
rendering the same service if given the same opportunity. This assumption 
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is invariably made by privileged classes. The educational advantages 
which privilege buys, and the opportunities for the exercise of authority 
which come with privileged social position, develop capacities which are 
easily attributed to innate endowment. The presence of able men among 
the privileged is allowed to obscure the number of instances in which 
hereditary privilege is associated with knavery and incompetence. It has 
always been the habit of privileged groups to deny the oppressed classes 
every opportunity for the cultivation of innate capacities and then to 
accuse them of lacking what they have been denied the right to acquire.65 
Amber son used this passage to complain about Franklin's paternalistic 
management of the farms and his lack of effort in developing indigenous leadership. 
Amberson was giving voice to a problem consistently extant among leftist groups, 
reliance upon leadership from the elitist classes. Amberson and others believed that the 
farms were deliberately presenting a false financial face to potential donors. Amberson 
continued his diatribe against Sherwood Eddy until the end of his life. He triumphantly 
reported to Gene Cox in 1973 that he had met Eddy's grandson and that the grandson 
admitted Eddy's propensity to stretch the truth. However, Amberson never once accused 
Eddy of dishonesty for personal financial gain. Sam Franklin, in his account of the Delta 
and Providence Cooperative Farms, took a measured and thoughtful account of 
Amberson's various accusations. He concluded that the accusations were made with 
some basis in fact.66 
Why did the farms fail? One obvious reason is that the farm managers simply 
were terrible businessmen. Other planters made money (or at least survived) using the 
same farming techniques and growing the same crops. And few, if any, other planters 
were in a position to garner financial contributions and free labor from summer 
volunteers. Of course, few planters were interested in the physical, educational, or moral 
development of their sharecroppers. As much as the trustees would deny it, and as harsh 
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as it would have sounded to them, the Delta and Providence Cooperative Farms were 
examples of the very institution they hated. The farms were paternalistic plantations 
worked by sharecroppers. 
The nature of cotton agriculture was changing. Technology, expensive at first but 
far more economical than human labor in the long run, was becoming a necessary part of 
profitable cotton production. Even while the Farm Security Administration was settling 
farmers on more productive land, the likelihood of success for "family sized" farms 
diminished. Efficient use of expensive technology required much larger acreage. 
William Amberson and the Socialist Party of America must share part of the 
blame. By allowing the farms to come completely under control of the Christian 
Socialists, they lost any prospect of developing leadership and affecting a class-
consciousness-driven economic and social revolution. However, the Socialist Party of 
America had trouble enough just surviving without expending the enormous resources 
and energy required to develop fully an agricultural proletariat. The "agrarian" problem 
has perplexed Marxists of all stripes, in all places, and at all times. Mississippi agrarian 
Marxists remained perplexed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SHADOWS OVER GOSHEN 
It will be the central point - the garden spot of the North American Continent - where 
wealth and prosperity culminate. E.N. Lowe, Mississippi State Arckeologisi, 1857. 
The country needs ...the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is 
common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit Ufrankly and try another. 
But above all, try something. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 6 June 1933. 
President Clinton has sent Congress a proposal to establish a Delta Regional 
Commission... designed to strengthen the economic development of the chronically 
impoverished lower Mississippi River area. Memphis Business Journal, 9 February 
1998. 
Ten years have passed since Congress established the Delta Regional Authority, 
seventy-five years since New Dealers began experimentation, and 150 since E.N. Lowe 
rhapsodized over the potential of the Delta to create wealth and prosperity. Perhaps only 
the lessons forgotten are more egregious than those not learned. With the luxury of time 
and die clarifying light that comes with time and scholarship, the reasons for the failure 
of the Tupelo Homesteads, Dyess Colony, and the Delta Cooperative Farm are obvious; 
whether or not they actually failed is not. 
All three projects were experiments; they were built to test possible responses to 
real or hypothetical economic realities. Success for all three projects would be 
determined, in large part, by the ability of the clients to forego voluntarily some of the 
privileges and rights associated with American individualism. In all three projects 
success depended on the economic cooperation of the clients. The Tupelo Homesteads 
were designed to meet the requirements of a pleasure economy and radically different 
manufacturing world. Dyess Colony was an attempt to create in flesh and blood an 
American myth, a robust class of independent and disinterested yeoman farmers. Delta 
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Cooperative Farm was supposed to give the means of production to the people and to turn 
the hearts of man to God. To say categorically that these projects failed is to ignore the 
primary purpose of experimentation. Arguably, the greatest benefit from experimentation 
is falsification of theory. Two of the communities, the Tupelo Homesteads and Dyess 
Colony, were certain to be failures from the very beginning. The failure of the Delta 
Cooperative Farm was self-inflicted by its leadership. 
The Tupelo Homesteads 
The Tupelo Homesteads were to point the way to a permanent solution to the 
problems necessarily associated with a pleasure economy and a decentralization of 
industry. The Division of Subsistence Homesteads could have been successful by its own 
definition only if the U.S. and world economies got markedly worse or got miraculously 
better. Should the depression continue its erosion of the manufacturing segment, should 
the nation's standards of living regress, and should the urban squalor require a 
redistribution of the population, the Tupelo Homesteads might have been efficacious. 
Should the planning envisioned by Tugwell, and others, result in a rational economy that 
allowed a more fulsome distribution of wealth and depended more on die brawn of 
technology than human muscles or brain power, then the Tupelo Homesteads might have 
indeed, provided one model of how one might occupy time in a pleasure economy. In the 
sense that the Tupelo Homesteads were created to respond to specific hypothetical 
problems and since those problems failed to materialize, there is nothing in the Tupelo 
Homesteads to falsify. 
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Neither the continued deterioration of the economy nor the blessings of a pleasure 
economy emerged. The sense of urgency mat had allowed President Roosevelt amazing 
license in the early depression days gave way to a calmer consideration by politicians and 
policy makers. As people endured the Great Depression, they became less convinced of 
the necessity of bold, repetitive experimentation. It was no longer enough by, 1937, to 
"try something." Without either of the two supposed justifications for the development 
of part-time subsistence gardening, the purpose of the Tupelo Homesteads and the 
proposed benefits to society and economy became problematic. 
Despite the vision of M.L. Wilson and Rexford Tugwell, the Tupelo Homesteads, 
by far the most successful of the DSH projects, became a place for middle-class people 
who were experiencing economic turmoil to recover. The original justification for 
funding was the need to demonstrate a way that people with part-time employment could 
maintain a healthy and decent lifestyle by incorporating subsistence gardening. The 
Tupelo Homesteaders worked every hour they could and, as evidenced by their incomes, 
they worked full-time. Kathleen Perkins remembered that all heads of households at 
Tupelo Homesteads held full-time jobs. Bearing in mind the President's assurance that 
the subsistence homesteads project was not a relief effort, and that the homesteaders were 
to be financially able to pay mortgages or rents, the local, state, and national screening 
committees made sure that the Tupelo Homesteaders were competent, responsible, and 
ambitious. Such people were not content to exist in bare subsistence. The Tupelo 
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Homesteaders were all employed, they all appeared to be resourceful, and all of them 
declined to purchase a Tupelo Homestead. 
Tupelo, unlike the Delta, was a place of increasing labor demands. It is true that 
many hill-farmers moved to the Delta when they began to lose their farms during the 
agricultural depression, but it is also true that growing industrial centers such as New 
Albany, Amory, and Tupelo drew a large number to town. Northeast Mississippi was 
diversifying and developing a light-industrial base; the Delta still grappled with mono-
crop agriculture and an antiquated labor system. When the Tupelo Homesteaders made 
economic gains, if their job began to provide more hours, if they were successful in 
saving money, they found that they had options far more attractive than the subsistence 
homesteads. 
The original Tupelo Homesteaders were in an envious place. They were able to 
rent what were, for the day, marginally acceptable middle class quarters while they 
managed their finances, increased their earnings, and considered the government's 
proposition They found that the benefits of wholesale financing were not sufficient to 
compensate for missing an opportunity to provide better quarters of their own choosing. 
The Tupelo Homesteaders made the rational decision. They were confident both in fee 
ultimate fate of fee American Economy and in their own ability to make their way. They 
were correct. In fee final analysis, fee Tupelo Homesteads simply provided a safe place 
for ambitious and competent middle class Americans to weather fee storms of fee 
depression and temporary financial reversals. The Tupelo Homesteaders were not willing 
to trade their perceived birthright, feat of fee pursuit of happiness, for fee privilege of 
1
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being in debt for thirty years, their integrity dependent on others, in order to purchase a 
home that was at the bottom tier of white respectability. 
The New Deal, in describing the anticipated homesteader, spoke of a new 
economic entity. The homesteads would produce a new consumer/producer entity. 
However, this concept was not new for Tupelo or any of the "New South" cities. The 
efficient coordination between industrial employment and subsistence gardening had 
been a key reason for Tupelo's phenomenal success. By 1934, growing most of one's 
food was simply a normal part of life, even for those holding full-time jobs. Only the 
aged, infirm, or incompetent ("sorry" in the vernacular of the area) did not have sizable 
gardens. Lorena Hickok, on one of her information seeking tours, commented on a 
phenomenon she observed at Tupelo. Mentioning the Tupelo Homesteads, she told Harry 
Hopkins of interviewing a young textile worker. The young man lived about three miles 
from Tupelo and drove to work every day. He told Hickock that he thought of his wages 
as "net profit" since he raised almost all of what he needed back on his place. It was this 
profit that allowed him to buy the automobile he was driving. Wage-work and 
subsistence farming already seemed to be a very common way of life in Tupelo, said 
Hickok.2 
Hickok told Hopkins that Tupelo's experience with subsistence gardening and 
wage work began in 1923 when a local textile factory manager decided to hire only those 
who lived in the country and owned their own farms. Of the 2,000 industrial employees, 
only 700 to 800 actually lived in the city. School buses performed double duty. The 
buses picked up and returned workers to die city factories and children to the city 
2
 Lorena Hickok to Harry Hopkins, Harry L. Hopkins Paper, FDR Library, Hyde Park, 
New York. 
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schools. The Tupelo Homesteaders had no particular economic factor in common. The 
notion that people would work and raise most of their vegetables, eggs, and milk was not 
a new notion in Tupelo. 
There were no community specific institutions or activities through which notions 
of community emerged. They did not practice the same trade, work for the same 
organization, or depend on any single commodity or product for their livelihoods. The 
Tupelo Homesteaders sent their children to Tupelo Schools, went to church in Tupelo, 
bought their groceries in Tupelo, and for the most part, worked in Tupelo. They 
maintained their previous social, religious, and family associations. There was no central 
principle or activity around which to build a community. The limited duress that the New 
Dealers applied to encourage cooperation among the Tupelo Homesteaders was not 
sufficient to disincline mem from pursuing the honored American goals of acquisition 
and intra-class advancement. 
The Tupelo Homesteaders were offered opportunity to enter into a thirty-year 
indenture, at the end of their term they would have a small plot of ground and a very 
modest home. The Tupelo Homesteaders figured they could do better. They were 
correct. 
Dyess Colony 
The Colonists at Dyess were on relief. Indeed, the first requirement was that one 
be on relief and be among the most successful. There was no possibility that the Dyess 
Colony could produce a community of small yeoman farmers. The plan of incubating a 
community of 500 or so yeoman farmer families on twenty to forty acre farms was 
3
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264 
impossible to execute. The false assumptions that made it impossible for the Dyess 
Colonists to meet the expectations of the bosses are of two types. 
The investigative work of Howard Odom and his associates and proteges revealed 
some apparent physical reasons for the anemic condition of most of the rural citizens of 
the cotton South. Arthur F. Raper's classic work on two Georgia counties revealed some 
debilitating physical reasons that small cotton cultivators could no longer flourish or even 
survive in parts of the eastern cotton belt. Added to the gashing erosion, thin soil and the 
boll weevil, the ruinous crop financing system put small cotton growers in debt and kept 
them mere. Raper was convincing; his narration gave nuance and depth to the raw 
statistics. If the three physical problems did not exist, if there was a rational and fair 
system of crop financing, then perhaps the South' s over eight million destitute might find 
a way out of debilitating poverty.4 
Dyess Colony did not have any of the physical problems that plagued Raper's two 
Georgia counties, and the U.S. Government provided the financing and furnish functions 
heretofore dominated by the cotton aristocracy. Dyess was located in the heart of the 
Great American Delta. The topsoil was from 40 to 100 feet deep as actually measured on 
the property. The erosion that occurs in the Delta is "sheet erosion." It occurs along the 
ridge lands and riverbanks and the soil exposed by erosion is richer than that sloughed 
off. The boll weevil, so devastating to the cotton areas east of the Delta was, to Delta 
farmers, a momentary chastisement for lack of diligence, rather than potential and actual 
disaster. Part of the Delta's relative resistance to the boll weevil was the preferences of 
4
 Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry: A Tale of Two Black Belt Counties, (Columbia: 
South Carolina, 2005, reprint of Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936), 
passim. 
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the weevil and part was due to the experiments at the Delta Experiment Station. Boll 
weevils prefer to winter in pine litter, and they generally prefer hilly terrain. If given his 
preferences, the boll weevil would prefer to live in cotton areas other than the Delta. The 
scientists at Delta Experiment Station discovered that the application of fertilizer to 
cotton resulted in a surprising benefit. Agriculturalists had only recently introduced 
fertilizer to the Delta. Generally, Delta cotton barons elected to save the cost of fertilizer 
given the minimum increase in yields. However, the application of fertilizer caused 
cotton to grow more rapidly. By the time each spring that boll weevils began their 
ravenous raids on cotton fields, cotton in the Delta had already grown beyond the point 
where the cotton plants were most attractive to the boll weevil. They tended to pass the 
Delta cotton, to find more appealing cotton plants in the South. Whenever rain or human 
laziness delayed planting and the application of fertilizer, the boll weevil devastated 
Delta cotton fields. In the Delta, control of the weevil was relegated to planting and 
applying fertilizer early in the crop year.5 
Even with solution to the physical deficiencies that plagued much of the cotton 
South, and with financing, administration, and management provided by the U.S. 
Government, the cotton culture was unable to support a class of yeoman cotton farmers. 
There was something fundamentally wrong with the cotton culture. Even after the 
obvious problems with land and weevils were resolved, the cotton culture of the South 
was incapable of supporting a population of yeomen. 
5
 Amy Lipe Taylor, The Delta Branch Experiment Station: One Hundred Years of 
Agricultural Research, edited by James W. Smith and Charles E. Snipes, (Stoneville and 
Starkville, MS: Mississippi State University, 2004:24. 
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The second assumption held that families on small, yet diversified, farms could 
earn enough cash from a cotton crop to meet their cash needs; their nutritional 
requirements, for the most part, would come from vegetable and animal husbandry. By 
1930, the ability of families to sustain a decent standard of living from a family sized 
cotton farm was a statistical and physical impossibility. In 1931, Agriculturalists M. G. 
Vaiden, J.O. Smith, and W. E. Ayers of the Delta Experiment Station in Stoneville, 
Mississippi published a remarkable bulletin that clearly proved that a traditional family-
sized cotton farm could never provide an acceptable standard of living.6 
Using production figures, costs, and prices received, the Delta Experiment Station 
Bulletin demonstrated that even in the best of circumstances a family could not survive at 
a level approaching decent conditions on fifteen acres of cotton production. The Dyess 
Homesteaders were limited by the AAA to eight acres of cotton per twenty-acre farm. 
Even those Colonists who had been able to procure forty acres at Dyess would not be 
able to achieve a middle class level of living based on the cotton acreage allowed. 
"Making Cotton Cheaper" drove home one unalterable conclusion. Profit from cotton 
cultivation depended on reducing costs; the most dramatic cost reducing element was the 
addition of technology in terms of increased animal or machine power. It cost a farmer 
using one mule and its equipment $13.09 to cultivate and harvest one acre of cotton. 
With a two-mule system and implements, the costs per acre fell to $8.09; the addition of 
four-row tractor cultivation reduced the per acre cost to $5.24. The economies of scale, 
however, required fields much larger than those at Dyess. Dyess Colonists could finance 
6
 M.G. Vaiden, J.O. Smith, and W.E. Ayers, "Making Cotton Cheaper: Can Present 
Production Costs be Reduced?": Bulletin No. 290 Delta Experiment Station, (Stoneville, 
Mississippi: Mississippi A & M College, Feb., 1931). 
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one or two mules, but there was no provision in the original plans for the purchase of 
tractors or for cotton fields large enough to justify their use. The Colonists at Dyess were 
expected to achieve yeoman status on plots far too small to generate the required income 
and without access to truly efficient technology. Vaiden, Smith, and Ayres did not deny 
that some people lived on the proceeds of small plots farmed on halves; they firmly 
asserted that people would not continue to do so.7 
Even if the cooperative associations at Dyess gained the loyalty and support of all 
the Colonists, even if the Colonists abided by expert advice, and even if the weather and 
the river behaved, the Colonists had absolutely no chance of attaining the goals of 
William R. Dyess or Floyd Sharp. The tragedy of Dyess is that no one listened to the real 
experts on cotton production economics. 
Delta Cooperative Farm 
Of the three communities in this study, the Delta Cooperative Farm was the most 
heroic, radical, romantic, and rational. Its demise and failure is also the most shameful. 
One would think that the leaders of liberal socially conscious Christianity and the 
Socialist Party of America would champion the cause of the dispossessed. One would 
think that both lines of progressive thought would have honored the worker, shown 
respect for latent, though undeveloped, abilities and promoted dignity and self-respect. 
They did not. 
When A. James McDonald came to Delta and assumed responsibilities of Office 
Secretary, he immediately received permission from Sam Franklin to express his opinion 
about the Farm operation and management. He received permission from Franklin to 
7
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read the Colony mail and to converse with other staff and Board of Trustee Members 
about conditions on the Farm. What McDonald found disturbed him. At the intense 
displeasure of the Cooperators, Sam Franklin insisted on retaining the services of Mr. 
Alvin Day, the Farm Manager. Mr. Day was, in the minds of the members of the Farm, 
nothing more than a recreation of a planter's "riding boss." Day interfered in all of the 
departments at the Delta Cooperative Farm and his manner was curt and obnoxious.8 
The complaints about Day and indeed, about a whole lot of what was going down 
on the Farm were first articulated in a meeting of the membership called by McDonald. 
Sam Franklin was in New York getting ready for the Cooperative Farms Incorporated 
Trustee Meeting in February of 1939. In his absence and the absence of any other 
trustees, McDonald invited the members to a meeting where they could express openly 
and without the intimidation of Franklin, their opinions about Farm operations. 
At the 6 February meeting of the members, McDonald told the members that he 
would transcribe their words and send a copy to Franklin and the Board in New York in 
time for their 22 February meeting. Anyone who wished could have remarks omitted; 
likewise, McDonald would take dictation from any member who wished to add fuller 
comments in a separate addendum. What occurred at the meeting was no surprise to 
McDonald. The hand-written minutes of the council meetings of Delta Cooperative Farm 
illustrate the autocratic manner in which Sam Franklin operated the Farms. George 
Smith, a black member of the Council and considered the Farm's best farmer, kept 
handwritten minutes of the meetings beginning in April 1936. Smith was meticulous in 
8
 Delta - Providence Farms, Council Meeting Papers, Volume 1 through 4, Southern 
Historical Collection, Chapel Hill. 
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recording the actual language of motions presented to the Council. Time after time, the 
members would pass a measure only to have Franklin ask them to reconsider. After 
telling the cooperatives his notions, invariably the membership repealed their just passed 
motions and passed one according to Franklin's wishes. The membership council was 
advertised to Delta supporters and to the public as being run by decisions made by the 
members. That was true only for inconsequential matters or items for which Franklin had 
no preferences. 
For some time prior to the February 1939 Trustees Meeting, the membership at 
Delta Cooperative Farm believed that support for the Farm was rapidly diminishing. 
Franklin complained about costs and warned of the need of increased production. The 
members at Dyess were no longer confident in ever owning the operation. Indeed, a 
1938 re-organization of the Delta Cooperative Farm dropped any notion of the farm ever 
being transferred to the membership. 
At the 22 February meeting of the Trustees, William Amberson presented the 
cold, hard and unchallenged facts regarding misleading publicity and outright lies to 
supporters. The Farms had consistently misrepresented their true financial condition to 
donors and Franklin and Eddy ruled the sharecroppers at Delta Cooperative Farm with a 
disdain and arrogance rarely encountered even among the most refined of the Delta 
cotton barons. They were also horrible managers.10 
9
 Ibid. 
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 William Amberson, "Statement to the Board of Trustees, Cooperative Farms 
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The epistle from the Cooperators to the Trustees, the statements of actual workers 
was a blistering indictment of the churchmen. Assuming superior management ability, 
the trustees had made a mess of every operation that they managed. The operations left 
to the management of the members, at the same time, were the only operations that 
showed any profit. The Rochdale community store made money every year; a 
Cooperator managed it. The sawmill was also managed by Cooperators and it too 
showed a substantial profit. All the other areas, the areas in which the trustees tried to 
manage from afar or the ones for which "expert" staff was employed suffered continuing 
and serious deficits and losses. Indeed, profits from the store and sawmill operations 
often went to pay obligations from other departments rather than as dividends to the 
members. The members suggested that the paid managers be removed, their positions 
assumed by Cooperators.11 
William Amberson had written to Trustees Charles Embry and Arthur Raper prior 
to the New York meeting to try to inform mem of the true condition of the Farms and to 
enlist their aid in requiring both transparency with the public and true self-management 
among the cooperators. Both were cautious in their response. At the New York meeting, 
Amberson recounted years of arrogant paternalistic treatment of the Cooperators at the 
hands of the Trustees, pointed out blatant misstatements in the summary of financial 
conditions at the Farm, and charged that the Farm's Trustees had violated the very 
premise of opening the Farm in the first place. The Trustees, particularly Eddy and 
Franklin, said Amberson, were dishonest, manipulative, and more interested in personal 
11
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aggrandizement and the praise of uninformed liberals that in helping the workers gain 
control of the means of production. Amberson's charges were irrefutable. 
Amberson resigned at that meeting and the response of Sam Franklin and 
Sherwood Eddy would be pitiful if it were not so tragic. Franklin immediately began to 
devise ways of keeping A. James McDonald from seeing any office correspondence. He 
arranged for "Mac" to be away from the Farm whenever he was absent, or he arranged to 
have a volunteer handle the mail. Franklin was more interested in seeing that no negative 
information made its way to the public. 
Franklin and Eddy grew tired of their liberal plaything it seems. They wearied of 
being the courageous missionaries and the acclaim they received from the uninformed 
public. They sold the farm, thereby ridding themselves of the problems of poor folks 
who were just trying to make a living. 
So What? 
One common assumption guided all three of the depression communities. The 
ability of Homesteaders, Colonists, and Cooperators to improve their financial prospects 
and living conditions depended on the practical cooperation of the participants. All of the 
projects claimed that decisions would be made by the members and that innate abilities in 
the individual would redound to the benefit of the entire community. In all three 
communities the bosses tried to force cooperation, in all three communities the members 
refused to be coerced. In all three communities the clients were denied meaningful 
participation in management. 
The current economic troubles of the United States, as evidenced by the 
continuing problem in the Great American Delta, are often met with ideas that require the 
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cooperation of various entities. Without transparency of motives, without a clear and full 
revelation of the status and condition of social and economic efforts, it is unlikely that 
Americans will ever combine their efforts in a cooperative effort. If a housing project is 
going to be a safe and pleasant home to residents, the residents must have authority to 
manage and operate it. They must be entrusted with difficult decisions and when 
decisions turn out to be ill-advised, they must be allowed to continue their participation. 
The rapid deterioration of public housing and of community economic endeavors is due, 
in large measure, to Americans unwillingness to forego the pleasures and prestige of 
paternalism, a lesson American society has yet to learn. 
Americans must learn also that a particularly egregious form of arrogance often 
colors projects designed for the public good. This arrogance was manifested in the three 
communities in ways that find resemblance in contemporary affairs. The class status of 
clients was determined by the opinion of those who deemed themselves competent to 
make such judgments and able to decide at what level a specific class should be satisfied. 
It mirrors the complaints of some cotton barons about the overly generous subsistence 
provided by the Red Cross in the flood or the New Deal in the depression. Black folks, 
alleged the cotton aristocracy, just did not need as much money or comfort as white 
folks. Likewise, the failed sharecroppers at Dyess would or should be contented, and 
grateful for amenities much less comfortable than those provided for the middle-class 
white people at Tupelo. 
Another way in which this insufferable and egregious arrogance is communicated 
is by the aspirations allowed various classes. Every year the Colonists at Dyess were told 
that their modest homes, their chickens, and milch cows, and vegetable gardens would 
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provide more security for them than any job or profession. They should glory in the 
security offered by a subsistence farm; they should not aspire to greater economic status. 
The bosses discouraged client aspirations of becoming wealthy or significant. Even 
President Roosevelt on occasion suggested that people be satisfied with "a competence" 
and eschew notions of becoming wealthy. 
Whatever form the Delta Regional Commission takes, whatever programs it 
institutes to deal with the crushing poverty that has historically plagued the rich land, the 
history of the three communities suggests that success will not come if the participants 
are marginalized, judged, and treated with contempt. The concept of cooperation for the 
greater good has yet to be fairly tried among this nation's poor and marginalized. 
Tupelo, Dyess, and Delta were not fair attempts. In that sense all three experiments were 
indeed successful. They have taught a stern lesson about how arrogance and paternalism 
can destroy a vision. However, the most egregious misapplication of any education is 
that of lessons not remembered. 
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